AGAINST HERMOGENES

III. AGAINST HERMOGENES.

CONTAINING AN ARGUMENT AGAINST HIS OPINION THAT MATTER IS ETERNAL.

[TRANSLATED BY DR. HOLMES.]

CHAP.I.--THE OPINIONS OF HERMOGENES, BY THE PRESCRIPTIVE RULE OF ANTIQUITY SHOWN TO BE HERETICAL. NOT DERIVED FROM CHRISTIANITY, BUT FROM HEATHEN PHILOSOPHY. SOME OF THE TENETS MENTIONED.

WE are accustomed, for the purpose of shortening argument,(1) to lay down the rule against heretics of the lateness of their date.(2) For in as far as by our rule, priority is given to the truth, which also foretold that there would be heresies, in so far must all later opinions be prejudged as heresies, being such as were, by the more ancient rule of truth, predicted as (one day) to happen. Now, the doctrine of Hermogenes has this(3) taint of novelty. He is, in short,(4) a man living in the world at the present time; by his very nature a heretic, and turbulent withal, who mistakes loquacity for eloquence, and supposes impudence to be firmness, and judges it to be the duty of a good conscience to speak ill of individuals.(5) Moreover, he despises God's law in his painting,(6) maintaining repeated marriages,(7) alleges the law of God in defence of lust,(8) and yet despises it in respect of his art.(9) He falsities by a twofold process--with his cautery and his pen.(10) He is a thorough adulterer, both doctrinally and carnally, since he is rank indeed with the contagion of your marriage-hacks,(11) and has also failed in cleaving to the rule of faith as much as the apostle's own Hermogenes.(12) However, never mind the man, when it is his doctrine which I question. He does not appear to acknowledge any other Christ as Lord,(13) though he holds Him in a different way; but by this difference in his faith he really makes Him another being,--nay, he takes from Him everything which is God, since he will not have it that He made all things of nothing. For, turning away from Christians to the philosophers, from the Church to the Academy and the Porch, he learned there from the Stoics how to place Matter (on the same level) with the Lord, just as if it too had existed ever both unborn and unmade, having no beginning at all nor end, out of which, according to him,(14) the Lord afterwards created all things.

CHAP. II.--HERMOGENES, AFTER A PERVERSE INDUCTION FROM MERE HERETICAL ASSUMPTIONS, CONCLUDES THAT GOD CREATED ALL THINGS OUT OF PRE-EXISTING MATTER.

Our very bad painter has coloured this his primary shade absolutely without any light, with such arguments as these: He begins with laying down the premiss,(15) that the Lord made all things either out of Himself, or out of nothing, or out of something; in order that, after he has shown that it was impossible for Him to have made them either out of Himself or out of nothing, he might thence affirm the residuary proposition that He made them out of something, and therefore that that something was Matter. He could not have made all things, he says, of Himself; because whatever things the Lord made of Himself would have been parts of Himself; but(1) He is not dissoluble into parts,(2), because, being the Lord, He is indivisible, and unchangeable, and always the same. Besides, if He had made anything out of Himself, it would have been something of Himself. Everything, however, both which was made and which He made must be accounted imperfect, because it was made of a part, and He made it of a part; or if, again, it was a whole which He made, who is a whole Himself, He must in that case have been at once both a whole, and yet not a whole; because it behaved Him to be a whole, that He might produce Himself,(3) and yet not a whole, that He might be produced out of Himself.(4) But this is a most difficult position. For if He were in existence, He could not be made, for He was in existence already; if, however, he were not in existence He could not make, because He was a nonentity. He maintains, moreover, that He who always exists, does not came into existence,(5) but exists for ever and ever. He accordingly concludes that He made nothing out of Himself, since He never passed into such a condition(6) as made it possible for Him to make anything out of Himself. In like manner, he contends that He could not have made all things out of nothing--thus: He defines the Lord as a being who is good, nay, very good, who must will to make things as good and excellent as He is Himself; indeed it were impossible for Him either to will or to make anything which was not good, nay, very good itself. Therefore all things ought to have been made good and excellent by Him, after His own condition. Experience shows,(7) however, that things which are even evil were made by Him: not, of course, of His own will and pleasure; because, if it had been of His own will and pleasure, He would be sure to have made nothing unfitting or unworthy of Himself. That, therefore, which He made not of His own will must be understood to have been made from the fault of something, and that is from Matter, without a doubt.

CHAP. III.--AN ARGUMENT OF HERMOGENES. THE ANSWER: WHILE GOD IS A TITLE ETERNALLY APPLICABLE TO THE DIVINE BEING, LORD AND FATHER ARE ONLY RELATIVE APPELLATIONS, NOT ETERNALLY APPLICABLE. AN INCONSISTENCY IN THE ARGUMENT OF HERMOGENES POINTED OUT

He adds also another point: that as God was always God, there was never a time when God was not also Lord. But(8) it was in no way possible for Him to be regarded as always Lord, in the same manner as He had been always God, if there had not been always, in the previous eternity,(9) a something of which He could be regarded as evermore the Lord. So he concludes(10) that God always had Matter co-existent with Himself as the Lord thereof. Now, this tissue(11) of his I shall at once hasten to pull abroad. I have been willing to set it out in form to this length, for the information of those who are unacquainted with the subject, that they may know that his other arguments likewise need only be(12) understood to be refuted. We affirm, then, that the name of God always existed with Himself and in Himself--but not eternally so the Lord. Because the condition of the one is not the same as that of the other. God is the designation of the substance itself, that is, of the Divinity; but Lord is (the name) not of substance, but of power. I maintain that the substance existed always with its own name, which is God; the title Lord was afterwards added, as the indication indeed(13) of something accruing. For from the moment when those things began to exist, over which the power of a Lord was to act, God, by the accession of that power, both became Lord and received the name thereof. Because God is in like manner a Father, and He is also a Judge; but He has not always been Father and Judge, merely on the ground of His having always been God. For He could not have been the Father previous to the Son, nor a Judge previous to sin. There was, however, a time when neither sin existed with Him, nor the Son; the former of which was to constitute the Lord a Judge, and the latter a Father. In this way He was not Lord previous to those things of which He was to be the Lord. But He was only to become Lord at some future time: just as He became the Father by the Son, and a Judge by sin, so also did He become Lord by means of those things which He had made, in order that they might serve Him. Do I seem to you to be weaving arguments,(14) Hermogenes? how neatly does Scripture lend us its aid,(13) when it applies the two titles to Him with a distinction, and reveals them each at its proper time! For (the title ) God, indeed, which always belonged to Him, it names at the very first: "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth;" (1) and as long as He continued making, one after the other, those things of which He was to be the Lord, it merely mentions God. "And God said," "and God made," "and Gad saw;" (2) but nowhere do we yet find the Lord. But when He completed the whole creation, and especially man himself, who was destined to understand His sovereignty in a way of special propriety, He then is designated a Lord. Then also the Scripture added the name Lord: "And the Lord God, Deus Dominus. took the man, whom He had formed;"(4) "And the Lord God commanded Adam."(5) Thenceforth He, who was previously God only, is the Lord, from the time of His having something of which He might be the Lord. For to Himself He was always God, but to all things was He only then God, when He became also Lord. Therefore, in as far as (Hermogenes) shall suppose that Matter was eternal, on the ground that the Lord was eternal, in so far will it be evident that nothing existed, because it is plain that the Lord as such did not always exist. Now I mean also, on my own part,(6) to add a remark for the sake of ignorant persons, of whom Hermogenes is an extreme instance,(7) and actually to retort against him his own arguments.(8) For when he denies that Matter was born or made, I find that, even on these terms, the title Lord is unsuitable to God in respect of Matter, because it must have been free,(9) when by not having a beginning it had not an author. The fact of its past existence it owed to no one, so that it could be a subject to no one. Therefore ever since God exercised His power over it, by creating (all things) out of Matter, although it had all along experienced God as its Lord, yet Matter does, after all, demonstrate that God did not exist in the relation of Lord to it,(10) although all the while He was really so.

CHAP. IV.--HERMOGENES GIVES DIVINE ATTRIBUTES TO MATTER, AND SO MAKES TWO GODS.

At this point, then, I shall begin to treat of Matter, how that, (according to Hermogenes,)(12) God compares it with Himself as equally unborn, equally unmade, equally eternal, set forth as being without a beginning, without an end. For what other estimate's of God is there than eternity? What other condition has eternity than to have ever existed, and to exist yet for evermore by virtue of its privilege of having neither beginning nor end? Now, since this is the property of God, it will belong to God alone, whose property it is--of course(14) on this ground, that if it can be ascribed to any other being, it will no longer be the property of God, but will belong, along with Him, to that being also to which it is ascribed. For "although there be that are called gods" in name, "whether in heaven or in earth, yet to us there is but one God the Father, of whom are all things;"(15) whence the greater reason why, in our view,(16) that which is the property(17) of God ought to be regarded as pertaining to God alone, and why (as I have already said) that should cease to be such a property, when it is shared by another being. Now, since He is God, it must necessarily be a unique mark of this quality,(18) that it be confined to One. Else, what will be unique and singular, if that is not which has nothing equal to it? What will be principal, if that is not which is above all things, before all things, and from which all things proceed? By possessing these He is God alone, and by His sole possession of them He is One. If another also shared in the possession, there would then be as many gods as there were possessors of these attributes of God. Hermogenes, therefore, introduces two gods: he introduces Matter as God's equal. God, however, must be One, because that is God which is supreme; but nothing else can be supreme than that which is unique; and that cannot possibly be unique which has anything equal to it; and Matter will be equal with God when it is held to be(19) eternal.

CHAP. V.--HERMOGENES COQUETS WITH HIS OWN ARGUMENT, AS IF RATHER AFRAID OF IT. AFTER INVESTING MATTER WITH DIVINE QUALITIES, HE TRIES TO MAKE IT SOMEHOW INFERIOR TO GOD.

But God is God, and Matter is Matter. As if a mere difference in their names prevented equality,(20) when an identity of condition is claimed for them! Grant that their nature is different; assume, too, that their form is not identical,--what matters it so long as their absolute state have but one mode?(1) God is unborn; is not Matter also unborn? God ever exists; is not Matter, too, ever existent? Both are without beginning; both are without end; both are the authors of the universe--both He who created it, and the Matter of which He made it. For it is impossible that Matter should not be regarded as the author(2) of all things, when the universe is composed of it. What answer will he give? Will he say that Matter is not then comparable with God as soon as(3) it has something belonging to God; since, by not having total (divinity), it cannot correspond to the whole extent of the comparison? But what more has he reserved for God, that he should not seem to have accorded to Matter the full amount of the Deity?(4) He says in reply, that even though this is the prerogative of Matter, both the authority and the substance of God must remain intact, by virtue of which He is regarded as the sole and prime Author, as well as the Lord of all things. Truth, however, maintains the unity of God in such a way as to insist that whatever belongs to God Himself belongs to Him alone. For so will it belong to Himself if it belong to Him alone; and therefore it will be impossible that another god should be admitted, when it is permitted to no other being to possess anything of God. Well, then, you say, we ourselves at that rate possess nothing of God. But indeed we do, and shall continue to do--only it is from Him that we receive it, and not from ourselves. For we shall be even gods, if we, shall deserve to be among those of whom He declared, "I have said, Ye are gods,"(5) and, "God standeth in the congregation of the gods."(6) But this comes of His own grace, not from any property in us, because it is He alone who can make gods. The property of Matter, however, he(7) makes to be that which it has in common with God. Otherwise, if it received from God the property which belongs to God,--I mean its attribute(8) of eternity -one might then even suppose that it both possesses an attribute in common with God, and yet at the same time is not God. But what inconsistency is it for him(9) to allow that there is a conjoint possession of an attribute with God, and also to wish that what he does not refuse to Matter should be, after all, the exclusive privilege of God!

CHAP. VI.--THE SHIFTS TO WHICH HERMOGENES IS REDUCED, WHO DEIFIES MATTER, AND YET IS UNWILLING TO HOLD HIM EQUAL WITH THE DIVINE CREATOR.

He declares that God's attribute is still safe to Him, of being the only God, and the First, and the Author of all things, and the Lord of all things, and being incomparable to any--qualities which he straightway ascribes to Matter also. He is God, to be sure. God shall also attest the same; but He has also sworn sometimes by Himself, that there is no other God like Him.(10) Hermogenes, however, will make Him a liar. For Matter will be such a God as He--being unmade, unborn, without beginning, and without end. God will say, "I am the first!"(11) Yet how is He the first, when Matter is co-eternal with Him? Between co-eternals and contemporaries there is no sequence of rank.(12) Is then, Matter also the first? "I," says the Lord, "have stretched out the heavens alone."(13) But indeed He was not alone, when that likewise stretched them out, of which He made the expanse. When he asserts the position that Matter was eternal, without any encroachment on the condition of God, let him see to it that we do not in ridicule turn the tables on him, that God similarly was eternal without any encroachment on the condition of Matter--the condition of Both being still common to Them. The position, therefore, remains unimpugned(14) both in the case of Matter, that it did itself exist, only along with God; and that God existed alone, but with Matter. It also was first with God, as God, too, was first with it; it, however, is not comparable with God, as God, too, is not to be compared with it; with God also it was the Author (of all things), and with God their Sovereign. In this way he proposes that God has something, and yet not the whole, of Matter. For Him, accordingly, Hermogenes has reserved nothing which he had not equally conferred on Matter, so that it is not Matter which is compared with God, but rather God who is compared with Matter. Now, inasmuch as those qualities which we claim as peculiar to God--to have always existed, without a beginning, without an end, and to have been the First, and Alone, and the Author of all things--are also compatible to Matter, I want to know what property Matter possesses different and alien from God, and hereby special to itself, by reason of which it is incapable of being compared with God? That Being, in which occur(1) all the properties of God, is sufficiently predetermined without any further comparison.

CHAP. VII.--HERMOGENES HELD TO HIS THEORY IN ORDER THAT ITS ABSURDITY MAY BE EXPOSED ON HIS OWN PRINCIPLES.

When he contends that matter is less than God, and inferior to Him, and therefore diverse from Him, and for the same reason not a fit subject of comparison with Him, who is a greater and superior Being, I meet him with this prescription, that what is eternal and unborn is incapable of any diminution and inferiority, because it is simply this which makes even God to be as great as He is, inferior and subject to none--nay, greater and higher than all. For, just as all things which are born, or which come to an end, and are therefore not eternal, do, by reason of their exposure at once to an end and a beginning, admit of qualities which are repugnant to God--I mean diminution and inferiority, because they are born and made--so likewise God, for this very reason, is unsusceptible of these accidents, because He is absolutely unborn,(2) and also unmade. And yet such also is the condition of Matter.(3) Therefore, of the two Beings which are eternal, as being unborn and unmade--God and Matter--by reason of the identical mode of their common condition (both of them equally possessing that which admits neither of diminution nor subjection--that is, the attribute of eternity), we affirm that neither of them is less or greater than the other, neither of them is inferior or superior to the other; but that they both stand on a par in greatness, on a par in sublimity, and on the same level of that complete and perfect felicity of which eternity is reckoned to consist. Now we must not resemble the heathen in our opinions; for they, when constrained to acknowledge God, insist on having other deities below Him. The Divinity, however, has no degrees, because it is unique; and if it shall be found in Matter--as being equally unborn and unmade and eternal--it must be resident in both alike,(4) because in no case can it be inferior to itself. In what way, then, will Hermogenes have the courage to draw distinctions; and thus to subject matter to God, an eternal to the Eternal, an unborn to the Unborn, an author to the Author? seeing that it dares to say, I also am the first; I too am before all things; and I am that from which all things proceed; equal we have been, together we have been--both alike without beginning, without end; both alike without an Author, without a God.(5) What God, then, is He who subjects me to a contemporaneous, co-eternal power? If it be He who is called God, then I myself, too, have my own (divine) name. Either I am God, or He is Matter, because we both are that which neither of us is. Do you suppose, therefore, that he(6) has not made Matter equal with God, although, for-sooth, he pretends it to be inferior to Him?

CHAP. VIII.--ON HIS OWN PRINCIPLES, HERMOGENES MAKES MATTER, ON THE WHOLE, SUPERIOR TO GOD.

Nay more,(7) he even prefers Matter to God, and rather subjects God to it, when he will have it that God made all things out of Matter. For if He drew His resources from it for the creation of the world, Matter is already found to be the superior, inasmuch as it furnished Him with the means of effecting His works; and God is thereby clearly subjected to Matter, of which the substance was indispensable to Him. For there is no one but requires that which he makes use of;(9) no one but is subject to the thing which he requires, for the very purpose of being able to make use of it. So, again, there is no one who, from using what belongs to another, is not inferior to him of whose property he makes use; and there is no one who imparts(10) of his own for another's use, who is not in this respect superior to him to whose use he lends his property. On this principle,(11) Matter self, no doubt,(12) was not in want of God, but rather lent itself to God, who was in want of it--rich and abundant and liberal as it was--to one who was, I suppose, too small, and too weak, and too unskilful, to form what He willed out of nothing. A grand service, verily,(13) did it confer on God in giving Him means at the present time whereby He might be known to be God, and be called Almighty --only that He is no longer Almighty, since He is not powerful enough for this, to produce all things out of nothing. To be sure,(14) Matter bestowed somewhat on itself also--even to get its own self acknowledged with God as God's co-equal, nay more, as His helper; only there is this drawback, that Hermogenes is the only man that has found out this fact, besides the philosophers--those patriarchs of all heresy.(1) For the prophets knew nothing about it, nor the apostles thus far, nor, I suppose, even Christ.

CHAP, IX.--SUNDRY INEVITABLE BUT INTOLERABLE CONCLUSIONS FROM THE PRINCIPLES OF HERMOGENES.

He cannot say that it was as its Lord that God employed Matter for His creative works, for He could not have been the Lord of a substance which was co-equal with Himself. Well, but perhaps it was a title derived from the will of another,(2) which he enjoyed--a precarious holding, and not a lordship,(3) and that to such a degree, that(4) although Matter was evil, He yet endured to make use of an evil substance, owing, of course, to the restraint of His own limited power,(5) which made Him impotent to create out of nothing, not in consequence of His power; for if, as God, He had at all possessed power over Matter which He knew to be evil, He would first have converted it into good--as its Lord and the good God-- that so He might have a good thing to make use of, instead of a bad one. But being undoubtedly good, only not the Lord withal, He, by using such power(6) as He possessed, showed the necessity He was under of yielding to the condition of Matter, which He would have amended if He had been its Lord. Now this is the answer which must be given to Hermogenes when he maintains that it was by virtue of His Lordship that God used Matter--even of His non-possession of any right to it, on the ground, of course, of His not having Himself made it. Evil then, on your terms,(7) must proceed from God Himself, since He is--I will not say the Author of evil, because He did not form it, but--the permitter thereof, as having dominion over it.(8) If indeed Matter shall prove not even to belong to God at all, as being evil, it follows,(9) that when He made use of what belonged to another, He used it either on a precarious title(10) because He was in need of it, or else by violent possession because He was stronger than it. For by three methods is the property of others obtained,--by right, by permission, by violence; in other words, by lordship, by a title derived from the will of another,(11) by force. Now, as lordship is out of the question, Hermogenes must choose which (of the other methods) is suitable to God. Did He, then, make all things out of Matter, by permission, or by force? But, in truth, would not God have more wisely determined that nothing at all should be created, than that it should be created by the mere sufferance of another, or by violence, and that, too, with(12) a substance which was evil?

CHAP. X.--TO WHAT STRAITS HERMOGENES ABSURDLY REDUCES THE DIVINE BEING. HE DOES NOTHING SHORT OF MAKING HIM THE AUTHOR OF EVIL.

Even if Matter had been the perfection of good,(13) would it not have been equally indecorous in Him to have thought of the property of another, however good, (to effect His purpose by the help of it)? It was, therefore, absurd enough for Him, in the interest of His own glory, to have created the world in such a way as to betray His own obligation to a substance which belonged to another--and that even not good. Was He then, asks (Hermogenes), to make all things out of nothing,that so evil things themselves might be attributed to His will? Great, in all conscience,(14) must be the blindness of our heretics which leaves them to argue in such a way that they either insist on the belief of another God supremely good, on the ground of their thinking the Creator to be the author of evil, or else they set up Matter with the Creator, in order that they may derive evil from Matter, not from the Creator. And yet there is absolutely no god at all that is free from such a doubtful plight, so as to be able to avoid the appearance even of being the author of evil, whosoever he is that--I will not say, indeed, has made, but still--has permitted evil to be made by some author or other, and from some source or other. Hermogenes, therefore, ought to be told(15) at once, although we postpone to another place our distinction concerning the mode of evil,(16) that even he has effected no result by this device of his.(17) For observe how God is found to be, if not the Author of, yet at any rate the conniver at,(18) evil, inasmuch as He, with all His extreme goodness, endured evil in Matter before He created the world, although, as being good, and the enemy of evil, He ought to have corrected it. For He either was able to correct it, but was unwilling; or else was willing, but being a weak God, was not able. If He was able and yet unwilling, He was Himself evil, as having favoured evil; and thus He now opens Himself to the charge of evil, because even if He did not create it yet still, since it would not be existing if He had been against its existence, He must Himself have then caused it to exist, when He refused to will its non-existence. And what is more shameful than this? When He willed that to be which He was Himself unwilling to create, He acted in fact against His very self,(1) inasmuch as He was both willing that that should exist which He was unwilling to make, and unwilling to make that which He was willing should exist. As if what He willed was good, and at the same time what he refused to be the Maker of was evil. What He judged to be evil by not creating it, He also proclaimed to be good by permitting it to exist. By bearing with evil as a good instead of rather extirpating it, He proved Himself to be the promoter thereof; criminally,(2) if through His own will--disgracefully, if through necessity. God must either be the servant of evil or the friend thereof, since He held converse with evil in Matter--nay, more, effected His works out of the evil thereof.

CHAP. XI.--HERMOGENES MAKES GREAT EFFORTS TO REMOVE EVIL FROM GOD TO MATTER. HOW HE FAILS TO DO THIS CONSISTENTLY WITH HIS OWN ARGUMENT.

But, after all,(3) by what proofs does Hermogenes persuade us that Matter is evil? For it will be impossible for him not to call that evil to which he imputes evil. Now we lay down this principle,(4) that what is eternal cannot possibly admit of diminution and subjection, so as to be considered inferior to another co-eternal Being. So that we now affirm that evil is not even compatible with it,(5) since it is incapable of subjection, from the fact that it cannot in any wise be subject to any, because it is eternal. But inasmuch as, on other grounds,(6) it is evident what is eternal as God is the highest good, whereby also He alone is good--as being eternal, and therefore good--as being God, how can evil be inherent in Matter, which (since it is eternal) must needs be believed to be the highest good? Else if that which is eternal prove to be also capable of evil, this (evil) will be able to be also believed of God to His prejudice;(7) so that it is without adequate reason that he has been so anxious(8) to remove evil from God; since evil must be compatible with l an eternal Being, even by being made compatible with Matter, as Hermogenes makes it. But, as the argument now stands,(9) since what is eternal can be deemed evil, the evil must prove to be invincible and insuperable, as being eternal; and in that case(10) it will be in vain that we labour "to put away evil from the midst of us;"(11) in that case, moreover, God vainly gives us such a command and precept; nay more, in vain has God appointed any judgment at all, when He means, indeed,(12) to inflict punishment with injustice. But if, on the other hand, there is to be an end of evil, when the chief thereof, the devil, shall "go away into the fire which God hath prepared for him and his angels" (13)--having been first "cast into the bottomless pit;"(14) when likewise "the manifestation of the children of God"(15) shall have "delivered the creature"(16) from evil, which had been "made subject to vanity;"(17) when the cattle restored in the innocence and integrity of their nature(18) shall be at peace(19) with the beasts of the field, when also little children shall play with serpents;(20) when the Father shall have put beneath the feet of His Son His enemies,(21) as being the workers of evil,--if in this way an end is compatible with evil, it must follow of necessary that a beginning is also compatible with it; and Matter will turn out to have a beginning, by virtue of its having also an end. For whatever things are set to the account of evil,(22) have a compatibility with the condition of evil.

CHAP. XII.--THE MODE OF CONTROVERSY CHANGED. THE PREMISSES OF HERMOGENES ACCEPTED, IN ORDER TO SHOW INTO WHAT CONFUSION THEY LEAD HIM.

Come now, let us suppose Matter to be evil, nay, very evil, by nature of course, just as we believe God to be good, even very good, in like manner by nature. Now nature must be regarded as sure and fixed, just as persistently fixed in evil in the case of Matter, as immoveable and unchangeable in good in the case of God. Because, as is evident,(1) if nature admits of change from evil to good in Matter, it can be changed from good to evil in God. Here some man will say, Then will "children not be raised up to Abraham from the stones?"(2) Will "generations of vipers not bring forth the fruit of repentance?"(3) And "children of wrath" fail to become sons of peace, if nature be unchangeable? Your reference to such examples as these, my friend,(4) is a thoughtless(5) one. For things which owe their existence to birth such as stones and vipers and human beings--are not apposite to the case of Matter, which is unborn; since their nature, by possessing a beginning, may have also a termination. But bear in mind(6) that Matter has once for all been determined to be eternal, as being unmade, unborn, and therefore supposably of an unchangeable and incorruptible nature; and this from the very opinion of Hermogenes himself, which he alleges against us when he denies that God was able to make (anything) of Himself, on the ground that what is eternal is incapable of change, because it would lose--so the opinion runs(7)--what it once was, in becoming by the change that which it was not, if it were not eternal. But as for the Lord, who is also eternal, (he maintained) that He could not be anything else than what He always is. Well, then, I will adopt this definite opinion of his, and by means thereof refute him. I blame Matter with a like censure, because out of it, evil though it be--nay, very evil --good things have been created, nay, "very good" ones: "And God saw that they were good, and God blessed them"(8)--because, of course, of their very great goodness; certainly not because they were evil, or very evil. Change is therefore admissible in Matter; and this being the case, it has lost its condition of eternity; in short,(9) its beauty is decayed in death.(10) Eternity, however, cannot be lost, because it cannot be eternity, except by reason of its immunity from loss. For the same reason also it is incapable of change, inasmuch as, since it is eternity, it can by no means be changed.

CHAP. XIII.--ANOTHER GROUND OF HERMOGENES THAT MATTER HAS SOME GOOD IN IT. ITS ABSURDITY.

Here the question will arise How creatures were made good out of it," which were formed without any change at all?(12) How occurs the seed of what is good, nay, very good, in that which is evil, nay, very evil? Surely a good tree does not produce evil fruit,(13) since there is no God who is not good; nor does an evil tree yield good fruit, since there is not Matter except what is very evil. Or if we were to grant him that there is some germ of good in it, then there will be no longer a uniform nature (pervading it), that is to say, one which is evil throughout; but instead thereof (we now encounter) a double nature, partly good and partly evil; and again the question will arise, whether, in a subject which is good and evil, there could possibly have been found a harmony for light and darkness, for sweet and bitter? So again, if qualities so utterly diverse as good and evil have been able to unite together,(14) and have imparted to Matter a double nature, productive of both kinds of fruit, then no longer will absolutely(15) good things be imputable to God, just as evil things are not ascribed to Him, but both qualities will appertain to Matter, since they are derived from the property of Matter. At this rate, we shall owe to God neither gratitude for good things, nor grudge(16) for evil ones, because He has produced no work of His own proper character.(17) From which circumstance will arise the clear proof that He has been subservient to Matter.

CHAP. XIV.--TERTULLIAN PUSHES HIS OPPONENT INTO A DILEMMA.

Now, if it be also argued, that although Matter may have afforded Him the opportunity, it was still His own will which led Him to the creation of good creatures, as having detected(18) what was good in matter--although this, too, be a discreditable supposition(19)--yet, at any rate, when He produces evil likewise out of the same (Matter), He is a servant to Matter, since, of course,(20) it is not of His own accord that He produces this too, having nothing else that He can do than to effect creation out of an evil stock(21)--unwillingly, no doubt, as being good; of necessity, too, as being unwilling; and as an act of servitude, because from necessity. Which, then, is the worthier thought, that He