THE DIVINE INSTITUTES. BOOK II--OF THE ORIGIN OF ERROR (CHAP. I TO CHAP. IX)
THE DIVINE INSTITUTES.
BOOK II.
OF THE ORIGIN OF ERROR.
CHAP. I--THAT FORGETFULNESS OF REASON MAKES MEN IGNORANT OF THE TRUE GOD, WHOM
THEY WORSHIP IN ADVERSITY AND DESPISE IN PROSPERITY.
ALTHOUGH I have shown in the first book that the religious ceremonies of
the gods are false, because those in whose honour the general consent of men
throughout the world by a foolish persuasion undertook various and dissimilar
rites were mortals, and when they had completed their term of life, yielded to a
divinely appointed necessity and died, yet, lest any doubt should be left, this
second book shall lay open the very fountain of errors, and shall explain all
the causes by which men were deceived, so that at first they believed that they
were gods, and afterwards with an inveterate persuasion persevered in the
religious observances which they had most perversely undertaken. For I desire, O
Emperor Constantine, now that I have proved the emptiness of these things, and
brought to light the impious vanity of men, to assert the majesty of the one God,
undertaking the more useful and greater duty of recalling men from crooked
paths, and of bringing them back into favour with themselves, that they may not, as
some philosophers do, so greatly despise themselves, nor think that they are
weak and useless, and of no account, and altogether born in vain. For this notion
drives many to vicious pursuits. For while they imagine that we are a care to
no God, or that we are about to have no existence after death, they altogether
give themselves to the indulgence of their passions; and while they think that
it is allowed them, they eagerly apply themselves to the enjoyment of
pleasures, by which they unconsciously run into the snares of death; for they are
ignorant as to what is reasonable conduct on the part of man: for if they wished to
understand this, in the first place they would acknowledge their Lord, and would
follow after virtue and justice; they would not subject their souls to the
influence of earth-born fictions, nor would they seek the deadly fascinations of
their lusts; in short, they would value themselves highly, and would understand
that there is more in man than appears; and that they cannot retain their power
and standing unless men lay aside depravity, and undertake the worship of
their true Parent. I indeed, as I ought, often reflecting on the sum of affairs, am
accustomed to wonder that the majesty of the one God, which keeps together and
rules all things, has come to be so forgotten, that the only befitting object
of worship is, above all others, the one which is especially neglected; and
that men have sunk to such blindness, that they prefer the dead to the true and
living God, and those who are of the earth, and buried in the earth, to Him who
was the Creator of the earth itself.
And yet this impiety of men might meet with some indulgence if the error
entirely arose from ignorance of the divine name. But since we often see that
the worshippers of other gods themselves confess and acknowledge the Supreme God,
what pardon can they hope for their impiety, who do not acknowledge the
worship of Him whom man cannot altogether be ignorant of? For both in swearing, and
in expressing a wish, and in giving thanks, they do not name Jupiter, or a
number of gods, but God;(1) so entirely does the truth of its own accord break forth
by the force of nature even from unwilling breasts. And this, indeed, is not
the case with men in their prosperity. For then most of all does God escape the
memory of men, when in the enjoyment of His benefits they ought to honour His
divine beneficence. But if any weighty necessity shall press them, then they
remember God. If the terror of war shall have resounded, if the pestilential force
of diseases shall have overhung them, if long-continued drought shall have
denied nourishment to the crops, if a violent tempest or hail shall have assailed
them, they betake themselves to God, aid is implored from God, God is entreated
to suc-cour them. If any one is tossed about on the sea, the wind being
furious, it is this God whom he invokes. If any one is harassed by any violence, he
implores His aid. If any one, reduced to the last extremity of poverty, begs for
food, he appeals to God alone, and by His divine and matchless name(1) alone
he seeks to gain the compassion of men. Thus they never remember God, unless it
be while they are in trouble. When fear has left them, and the dangers have
withdrawn, then in truth they quickly hasten to the temples of the gods: they pour
libations to them, they sacrifice to them, they crown(2) them with garlands.
But to God, whom they called upon in their necessity itself, they do not give
thanks even in word. Thus from prosperity arises luxury; and from luxury,
together with all other vices, there arises impiety towards God.
From what cause can we suppose this to arise? Unless we imagine that there
is some perverse power which is always hostile to the truth, which rejoices in
the errors of men, whose one and only task it is perpetually to scatter
darkness, and to blind the minds of men, lest they should see the light,--lest, in
short, they should look to heaven, and observe the nature(3) of their own body,
the origin(4) of which we shall relate at the proper place; but now let us
refute fallacies. For since other animals look down to the ground, with bodies
bending forward, because they have not received reason and wisdom, whereas an
upright position and an elevated countenance have been given to us by the Creator
God, it is evident that these ceremonies paid to the gods are not in accordance
with the reason of man, because they bend down the heaven-sprung being to the
worship of earthly objects. For that one and only Parent of ours, when He created
man,--that is, an animal intelligent and capable of exercising reason,--raised
him from the ground, and elevated him to the contemplation of his Creator. As
an ingenious poet s has well represented it:--
"And when other animals bend forward and look to the earth, He gave to man
an elevated countenance, and commanded him to look up to theheaven, and to
raise his countenance erect to stars."
From this circumstance the Greeks plainly derived the name
<greek>anqrwpos</greek>,(6) because he looks upward. They therefore deny themselves, and
renounce the name of man, who do not look up, but downward: unless they think that
the fact of our being upright is assigned to man without any cause. God willed
that we should look up to heaven, and undoubtedly not without reason. For both
the birds and almost all of the dumb creation see the heaven, but it is given to
us in a peculiar manner to behold the heaven as we stand erect, that we may
seek religion there; that since we cannot see God with our eyes, we may with our
mind contemplate Him, whose throne is there: and this cannot assuredly be done
by him who worships brass and stone, which are earthly things. But it is most
incorrect that the nature of the body, which is temporary, should be upright,
but that the soul itself, which is eternal, should be abject; whereas the figure
and position have no other signification, except that the mind of man ought to
look in the same direction as his countenance, and that his soul ought to be as
upright as his body, so that it may imitate that which it ought to rule. But
men, forgetful both of their name and nature, cast down their eyes from the
heaven, and fix them upon the ground, and fear the works of their own hands, as
though anything could be greater than its own artificer.
CHAP. II.--WHAT WAS THE FIRST CAUSE OF MAKING IMAGES; OF THE TRUE LIKENESS OF
GOD, AND THE TRUE WORSHIP OF HIM.
What madness is it, then, either to form those objects which they
themselves may afterwards fear, or to fear the things which they have formed? But, they
say, we do not fear the images themselves, but those beings after whose
likeness they were formed, and to whose names they are dedicated. You fear them
doubtless on this account, because you think that they are in heaven; for if they
are gods, the case cannot be otherwise. Why, then, do you not raise your eyes to
heaven, and, invoking their names, offer sacrifices in the open air? Why do
you look to walls, and wood, and stone, rather than to the place where you
believe them to be? What is the meaning of temples(7) and altars? what, in short, of
the images themselves, which are memorials either of the dead or absent? For
the plan of making likenesses was invented by men for this reason, that it might
be possible to retain the memory of those who had either been removed by death
or separated by absence. In which of these classes, then, shall we reckon the
gods? If among the dead, who is so foolish as to worship them? If among the
absent, then they are not to be worshipped, if they neither see our actions nor
hear our prayers. But if the gods cannot be absent,--for, since they are divine,
they see and hear all things, in whatever part of the universe they are,--it
follows that images are superfluous, since the gods are present everywhere, and it
is sufficient to invoke with prayer the names of those who hear us. But if
they are present, they cannot fail to be at hand at their own images. It is
entirely so, as the people imagine, that the spirits of the dead wander(1) about the
tombs and relics of their bodies. But after that the deity has begun to be
near, there is no longer need of his statue.
For I ask, if any one should often contemplate the likeness of a man who
has settled in a foreign land, that he may thus solace himself for him who is
absent, would he also appear to be of sound mind, if, when the other had returned
and was present, he should persevere in contemplating the likeness, and should
prefer the enjoyment of it, rather than the sight of the man himself?
Assuredly not. For the likeness of a man appears to be necessary at that time when he
is far away; and it will become superfluous when he is at hand. But in the case
of God, whose spirit and influence are diffused everywhere, and can never be
absent, it is plain that an image is always superfluous. But they fear lest their
religion should be altogether vain and empty if they should see nothing
present which they may adore, and therefore they set up images; and since these are
representations of the dead, they resemble the dead, for they are entirely
destitute of perception. But the image of the ever-living God ought to be living and
endued with perception. But if it received this name(2) from resemblance, how
can it be supposed that these images resemble God, which have neither
perception nor motion? Therefore the image of God is not that which is fashioned by the
fingers of men out of stone, or bronze, or other material, but man himself,
since he has both perception and motion, and performs many and great actions. Nor
do the foolish men understand, that if images could exercise perception and
motion, they would of their own accord adore men, by whom they have been adorned
and embellished, since they would be either rough and unpolished stone, or rude
and unshapen wood,(3) had they not been fashioned by man.
Man, therefore, is to be regarded as the parent of these images; for they
were produced by his instrumentality, and through him they first had shape,
figure, and beauty. Therefore he who made them is superior to the objects which
were made. And yet no one looks up to the Maker Himself, or reverences Him: he
fears the things which he has made, as though there could be more power in the
work than in the workman. Seneca, therefore, rightly says in his moral treatises:
They worship the images of the gods, they supplicate them with bended knee,
they adore them, they sit or stand beside them through the whole day, they offer
to them contributions,(4) they slay victims; and while they value these images
so highly, they despise the artificers who made them. What is so inconsistent,
as to despise the statuary and to adore the statue; and not even to admit to
your society him who makes your gods? What force, what power can they have, when
he who made them has none? But he was unable to give to these even those powers
which he had, the power of sight, of hearing, of speech, and of motion. Is any
one so foolish as to suppose that there is anything in the image of a god, in
which there is nothing even of a man except the mere resemblance? But no one
considers these things; for men are imbued with this persuasion, and their minds
have thoroughly imbibed the deception s of folly. And thus beings endowed with
sense adore objects which are senseless, rational beings adore irrational
objects, those who are alive adore inanimate objects, those sprung from heaven adore
earthly objects. It delights me, therefore, as though standing on a lofty
watch-tower, from which all may hear, to proclaim aloud that saying of Persius:(6)--
"O souls bent down to the earth, and destitute of heavenly things?"
Rather look to the heaven, to the sight of which God your Creator raised
you. He gave to you an elevated countenance; you bend it down to the earth; you
depress to things below those lofty minds, which are raised together with their
bodies to their parent, as though it repented you that you were not born
quadrupeds. It is not befitting that the heavenly being should make himself equal to
things which are earthly, and incline to the earth. Why do you deprive
yourselves of heavenly benefits, and of your own accord fall prostrate upon the
ground? For you do wretchedly roll yourselves(7) on the ground, when you seek here
below that which you ought to have sought above. For as to those vain(1) and
fragile productions, the work of man's hands, from whatever kind of material they
are formed, what are they but earth, out of which they were produced? Why, then,
do you subject yourselves to lower objects? why do you place the earth above
your heads? For when you lower yourselves to the earth, and humiliate
yourselves, you sink of your own accord to hell, and condemn yourselves to death; for
nothing is lower and more humble than the earth, except death and hell. And if you
wished to escape these, you would despise the earth lying beneath your feet,
preserving the position of your body, which you received upright, in order that
you might be able to direct your eyes and your mind to Him who made it. But to
despise and trample upon the earth is nothing else than to refrain from adoring
images, because they are made of earth; also not to desire riches, and to
despise the pleasures of the body, because wealth, and the body itself, which we
make use of as a lodging, is but earth. Worship a living being, that you may
live; for he must necessarily die who has subjected(2) himself and his soul to the
dead.
CHAP. III.--THAT CICERO AND OTHER MEN OF LEARNING ERRED IN NOT TURNING AWAY
THE PEOPLE FROM ERROR.
But what does it avail thus to address the vulgar and ignorant, when we
see that learned and prudent men, though they understand the vanity of these
ceremonies, nevertheless through some perverseness persist in the worship of those
very objects which they condemn? Cicero was well aware that the deities which
men worshipped were false. For when he had spoken many things which tended to
the overthrow of religious ceremonies, he said nevertheless that these matters
ought not to be discussed by the vulgar, lest such discussion should extinguish
the system of religion which was publicly received. What can you do respecting
him, who, when he perceives himself to be in error, of his own accord dashes
himself against the stones, that all the people may stumble? or tears out his own
eyes, that all may be blind? who neither deserves well of others, whom he
suffers to be in error, nor of himself, since he inclines to the errors of others,
and makes no use of the benefit of his own wisdom, so as to carry out(3) in
action the conception of his own mind, but knowingly and consciously thrusts his
foot into the snare, that he also may be taken with the rest, whom he ought, as
the more prudent, to have extricated? Nay rather, if you have any virtue,
Cicero, endeavour to make the people wise: that is a befitting subject, on which you
may expend all the powers of your eloquence. For there is no fear lest speech
should fail you in so good a cause, when you have often defended even bad ones
with copious-ness and spirit. But truly you fear the prison of Socrates,(4) and
on that account you do not venture to undertake the advocacy of truth. But, as
a wise man, you ought to have despised death. And, indeed, it would have been
much more glorious to die on account of good words than on account of
revilings. Nor would the renown of your Philippics have been more advantageous to you
than the dispersion of the errors of mankind, and the recalling of the minds of
men to a healthy state by your disputation.
But let us make allowance for timidity, which ought not to exist in a wise
man. Why, then, are you yourself engaged in the same error? I see that you
worship things of earth made by the hand: you understand that they are vain, and
yet you do the same things which they do, whom you confess to be most foolish.
What, therefore, did it profit you, that you saw the truth, which you were
neither about to defend nor to follow? If even they who perceive themselves to be in
error err willingly, how much more so do the unlearned vulgar, who delight in
empty processions, and gaze at all things with boyish minds! They are delighted
with trifling things, and are captivated with the form of images; and they are
unable to weigh every object in their own minds, so as to understand that
nothing which is beheld by the eyes of mortals ought to be worshipped, because it
must necessarily be mortal. Nor is it matter of surprise if they do I not see
God, when they themselves do not even see man, whom they believe that they see.
For this, which falls under the notice of the eyes,(5) is not man, but the
receptacle of man, the quality and figure of which are not seen from the lineaments
of the vessel which contains them, but from the actions and character. They,
therefore, who worship images are mere bodies without men, because they have
given themselves to corporeal things, and do not see anything with the mind more
than with the body; whereas it is the office of the soul to perceive those things
more clearly which the eye of the body cannot behold. And that philosopher and
poet severely accuses those men as humble and abject, who, in opposition to
the design of their nature, prostrate themselves to the worship of earthly
things; for he says:(1)--
"And they abase their souls with fear of the gods, and weigh and press
them down to earth."
When he said these things, indeed, his meaning was different--that nothing was
to be worshipped, because the gods do not regard the affairs of men.
In another place, at length, he acknowledges that the ceremonies and
worship of the gods is an unavailing office:(2)--
"Nor is it any piety to be often seen with veiled head to turn to a stone,
and approach every altar, and fall prostrate on the ground, andspread the
hands before the shrines of the gods, and sprinkle thealtars with much blood of
beasts, and to offer vow after vow."
And assuredly if these things are useless, it is not right that sublime and
lofty souls should be called away and depressed to the earth, but that they
should think only of heavenly things.
False religious systems, therefore, have been attacked by more sagacious
men, because they perceived their falsehood; but the true religion was not
introduced, because they knew not what and where it was. They therefore so regarded
it as though it had no existence, because they were unable to find it in its
truth. And in this manner they fell into a much greater error than they who held
a religion which was false. For those worshippers of fragile images, however
foolish they may be, inasmuch as they place heavenly things in things which are
earthly and corruptible, yet retain something of wisdom, and may be pardoned,
because they hold the chief duty of man, if not in reality, yet still in their
purpose; since, if not the only, yet certainly the greatest difference between
men and the beasts consists in religion. But this latter class, in proportion to
their superior wisdom, in that they understood the error of false religion,
rendered themselves so much the more foolish, because they did not imagine that
some religion was true. And thus, because it is easier to judge of the affairs of
others than of their own, while they see the downfall of others, they have not
observed what was before their own feet. On either side is found the greatest
folly, and a certain trace(3) of wisdom; so that you may doubt which are rather
to be called more foolish--those who embrace a false religion, or those who
embrace none. But (as I have said) pardon may be granted to those who are
ignorant and do not own themselves to be wise; but it cannot be extended to those who,
while they profess(4) wisdom, rather exhibit folly. I am not, indeed, so
unjust as to imagine that they could divine, so that they might find out the truth
by themselves; for I acknowledge that this is impossible. But I require from
them that which they were able to perform by reason(5) itself. For they would act
more prudently, if they both understood that some form of religion is true, and
if, while they attacked false religions, they openly proclaimed that men were
not in possession of that which is true.
But this consideration may perhaps have influenced them, that if there
were any true religion, it would exert itself and assert its authority, and not
permit the existence of anything opposed to it. For they were unable to see at
all, on what account, or by whom, and in what manner true religion was depressed,
which partakes of a divine mystery(6) and a heavenly secret. And no man can
know(7) this by any means, unless he is taught. The sum of the matter is this:
The unlearned and the foolish esteem false religions as true, because they
neither know the true nor understand the false.(8) But the more sagacious, because
they are ignorant of the true, either persist in those religions which they know
to be false, that they may appear to possess something; or worship nothing at
all, that they may not fall into error, whereas this very thing partakes largely
of error, under the figure of a man to imitate the life of cattle. To
understand that which is false is truly the part of wisdom, but of human wisdom. Beyond
this step man cannot proceed, and thus many of the philosophers have taken
away religious institutions, as I have pointed out; but to know the truth is the
part of divine wisdom. But man by himself cannot attain to this knowledge,
unless he is taught by God. Thus philosophers have reached the height of human
wisdom, so as to understand that which is not; but they have failed in attaining the
power of saying that which really is. It is a well-known saying of Cicero:(9)
"I wish that I could as easily find out the truth as I can refute false
things." And because this is beyond the power of man's condition, the capability of
this office is assigned to us, to whom God has delivered the knowledge of the
truth; to the explaining of which the four last books shall be devoted. Now, in
the meantime, let us bring to light false things, as we have begun to do.
CHAP. IV.--OF IMAGES, AND THE ORNAMENTS OF TEMPLES, AND THE CONTEMPT IN WHICH
THEY ARE HELD EVEN BY THE HEATHENS THEMSELVES.
What majesty, then, can images have, which were altogether in the power of
puny man, either that they should be formed into something else, or that they
should not be made at all? On which account Priapus thus speaks in Horace:(1)
"Formerly I was the trunk of a fig-tree,(2) a useless log, when
thecarpenter, at a loss whether he should make a bench or a Priapus,decided that it
should be a god. Accordingly I am a god, a very greatterror to thieves and birds."
Who would not be at ease with such a guardian as this? For thieves are so
foolish as to fear the figure of Priapus; though the very birds, which they imagine
to be driven away by fear of his scythe, settle upon the images which are
skilfully made, that is, which altogether resemble men, build their nests there,
and defile them. But Flaccus, as a writer of satire, ridiculed the folly of men.
But they who make the images fancy that they are performing a serious business.
In short, that very great poet, a man of sagacity in other things, in this
alone displayed folly, not like a poet, but after the manner of an old woman, when
even in those most highly-finished(3) books he orders this to be done:--
"And let the guardianship of Priapus of the Hellespont,(4) who drives away
thieves and birds with his willow scythe, preserve them."
Therefore they adore mortal things, as made by mortals. For they may be
broken, or burnt, or be destroyed. For they are often apt to be broken to pieces,
when houses fall through age, and when, consumed by conflagration, they waste away
to ashes; and in many instances, unless aided by their own magnitude, or
protected by diligent watchfulness, they become the prey of thieves. What madness is
it, then, to fear those objects for which either the downfall of a building,
or fires, or thefts, may be feared! What folly, to hope for protection from
those things which are unable to protect themselves! What perversity, to have
recourse to the guardianship of those which, when injured, are themselves unavenged,
unless vengeance is exacted by their worshippers! Where, then, is truth? Where
no violence can be applied to religion; where there appears to be nothing
which can be injured; where no sacrilege can be committed.
But whatever is subjected to the eyes and to the hands, that, in truth,
because it is perishable, is inconsistent with the whole subject of immortality.
It is in vain, therefore, that men set off and adorn their gods with gold,
ivory, and jewels, as though they were capable of deriving any pleasure from these
things. What is the use of precious gifts to insensible objects? Is it the
same which the dead have? For as they embalm the bodies of the dead, wrap them in
spices and precious garments, and bury them in the earth, so they honour the
gods, who when they were made did not perceive it, and when they are worshipped
have no knowledge of it; for they did not receive sensibility on their
consecration. Persius was displeased that golden vessels should be carried into the
temples, since he thought it superfluous that that should be reckoned among
religious offerings which was not an instrument of sanctity, but of avarice. For
these are the things which it is better to offer as a gift to the god whom you
would rightly worship:--
"Written law(5) and the divine law of the conscience, and the
sacredrecesses of the mind, and the breast imbued with nobleness."(6)
A noble and wise sentiment. But he ridiculously added this: that there is this
gold in the temples, as there are doll(7) presented to Venus by the virgin;
which perhaps he may have despised on account of their smallness. For he did not
see that the very images and statues of the gods, wrought in gold and ivory by
the hand of Polycletus, Euphranor, and Phidias, were nothing more than large
dolls, not dedicated by virgins, to whose sports some indulgence may be granted,
but by bearded men. Therefore Seneca deservedly laughs at the folly even of
old men. We are not (he says) boys twice,(8) as is commonly said, but are always
so. But there is this difference, that when men we have greater subjects of
sport. Therefore men offer to these dolls, which are of large size, and adorned as
though for the stage, both perfumes, and incense, and odours: they sacrifice
to these costly and fattened victims, which have a mouth,(9) but one that is not
suitable for eating; to these they bring robes and costly garments, though
they have no need of clothing; to these they dedicate gold and silver, of which
they who receive them are as destitute(10) as they who have given them.
And not without reason did Dionysius, the despot of Sicily, when after a
victory he had become master of Greece,(11) despise, and plunder and jeer at
such gods, for he followed up his sacrilegious acts by jesting words. For when he
had taken off a golden robe from the statue of the Olympian Jupiter, he ordered
that a woollen garment should be placed upon him, saying that a golden robe
was heavy in summer and cold in winter, but that a woollen one was adapted to
each season. He also took off the golden beard from AEsculapius, saying that it
was unbecoming and unjust, that while his father Apollo was yet smooth and
beardless, the son should be seen to wear a beard before his father. He also took
away the bowls, and spoils, and some little images(1) which were held in the
extended hands of the statues, and said that he did not take them away, but received
them: for that it would be very foolish and ungrateful to refuse to receive
good things, when offered voluntarily by those from whom men were accustomed to
implore them. He did these things with impunity, because he was a king and
victorious. Moreover, his usual good fortune also followed him; for he lived even to
old age, and handed down the kingdom in succession to his son. In his case,
therefore, because men could not punish his sacrilegious deeds, it was befitting
that the gods should be their own avengers. But if any humble person shall have
committed any such crime, there are at hand for his punishment the scourge,
fire, the rack,(2) the cross, and whatever torture men can invent in their anger
and rage. But when they punish those who have been detected in the act of
sacrilege, they themselves distrust the power of their gods. For why should they not
leave to them especially the opportunity of avenging themselves, if they think
that they are able to do so? Moreover, they also imagine that it happened
through the will of the deities that the sacrilegious robbers were discovered and
arrested; and their cruelty is instigated not so much by anger as by fear, lest
they themselves should be visited with punishment if they failed to avenge the
injury done to the gods. And, in truth, they display incredible shallowness in
imagining that the gods will injure them on account of the guilt of others, who
by themselves were unable to injure those very persons by whom they were
profaned and plundered. But, in fact, they have often themselves also inflicted
punishment on the sacrilegious: that may have occurred even by chance, which has
sometimes happened, but not always. But I will show presently how that occurred.
Now in the meantime I will ask, Why did they not punish so many and such great
acts of sacrilege in Dionysius, who insulted the gods openly, and not in
secret? Why did they not repel this sacrilegious man, possessed of such power, from
their temples, their ceremonies, and their images? Why, even when he had carried
off their sacred things, had he a prosperous voyage--as he himself, according
to his custom, testified in joke? Do you see, he said to his companions who
feared shipwreck, how prosperous a voyage the immortal gods themselves give to the
sacrilegious? But perhaps he had learnt from Plato that the gods have no(3)
power.
What of Caius Verres? whom his accuser Tully compares to this same
Dionysius, and to Phalaris, and to all tyrants. Did he not pillage the whole of
Sicily, carrying away the images of the gods, and the ornaments of the temples? It is
idle to follow up each particular instance: I would fain make mention of one,
in which the accuser, with all the force of eloquence--in short, with every
effort of voice and of body--lamented about Ceres of Catina, or of Henna: the one
of whom was of such great sanctity, that it was unlawful for men to enter the
secret recesses of her temple; the other was of such great antiquity, that all
accounts relate that the goddess herself first discovered grain in the soil of
Henna, and that her virgin daughter was carried away from the same place.
Lastly, in the times of the Gracchi, when the state was disturbed both by seditions
and by portents, on its being discovered in the Sibylline predictions that the
most ancient Ceres ought to be appeased, ambassadors were sent to Henna. This
Ceres, then, either the most holy one, whom it was unlawful for men to behold
even for the sake of adoration, or the most ancient one, whom the senate and
people of Rome had appeased with sacrifices and gifts, was carried away with
impunity by Caius Verres from her secret anti ancient recesses, his robber slaves
having been sent in. The same orator, in truth, when he affirmed that he had been
entreated by the Sicilians to undertake the cause of the province, made use of
these words: "That they had now not even any gods in their cities to whom they
might betake themselves, since Verres had taken away the most sacred images from
their most venerable shrines." As though, in truth, if Verres had taken them
away from the cities and shrines, he had also taken them from heaven. From which
it appears that those gods have nothing in them more than the material of
which they are made. And not without reason did the Sicilians have recourse to you,
O Marcus Tullius, that is, to a man; since they had for three years
experienced that those gods had no power. For they would have been most foolish if they
had fled for protection against the injuries of men, to those who were unable to
be angry with Caius Verres on their own behalf. But, it will be urged, Verres
was condemned on account of these deeds. Therefore he was not punished by the
gods, but by the energy of Cicero, by which he either crushed his defenders or
withstood his influence.(1) Why should I say that, in the case of Verres
himself, that was not so much a condemnation as a respite from labour? So that, as
the immortal gods had given a prosperous voyage to Dionysius when he was carrying
off the spoils of gods, so also they appear to have bestowed on Verres quiet
repose, in which he might with tranquility enjoy the fruits of his sacrilege.
For when civil wars afterwards raged, being removed from all danger and
apprehension, under the cloak of condemnation he heard of the disastrous misfortunes and
miserable deaths of others; and he who appeared to have fallen while all
retained their position, he alone, in truth, retained his position while all fell;
until the proscription of the triumvirs,-- that very proscription, indeed, which
carried off Tully, the avenger of the violated majesty of the gods,--carried
him off, satiated at once with the enjoyment of the wealth which he had gained
by sacrilege, and with life, and worn out by old age. Moreover, he was fortunate
in this very circumstance, that before his own death he heard of the most
cruel end of his accuser; the gods doubtless providing that this sacrilegious man
and spoiler of their worship should not die before he had received consolation
from revenge.
CHAP. V.--THAT GOD ONLY, THE CREATOR OF ALL THINGS, IS TO BE WORSHIPPED, AND
NOT THE ELEMENTS OR HEAVENLY BODIES; AND THE OPINION OF THE STOICS IS REFUTED,
WHO THINK THAT THE STARS AND PLANETS ARE GODS.
How much better, therefore, is it, leaving vain and insensible objects, to
turn our eyes in that direction where is the seat and dwelling-place of the
true God; who suspended the earth(2) on a firm foundation, who bespangled the
heaven with shining stars; who lighted up the sun, the most bright and matchless
light for the affairs of men, in proof of His own single majesty; who girded the
earth with seas, and ordered the rivers to flow with perpetual course!
"He also commanded the plains to extend themselves, the valleys to sink
down, the woods to be covered with foliage, the stony mountains to rise."(3)
All these things truly were not the work of Jupiter, who was born seventeen
hundred years ago; but of the same, "that framer of all things, the origin of a
better world,"(3) who is called God, whose beginning cannot be comprehended, and
ought not to be made the subject of inquiry. It is sufficient for man, to his
full and perfect wisdom, if he understands the existence of God: the force and
sum of which understanding is this, that he look up to and honour the common
Parent of the human race, and the Maker of wonderful things. Whence some persons
of dull and obtuse mind adore as gods the elements, which are both created
objects and are void of sensibility; who, when they admired the works of God, that
is, the heaven with its various lights, the earth with its plains and
mountains, the seas with their rivers and lakes and fountains, struck with admiration
of these things, and forgetting the Maker Himself, whom they were unable to see,
began to adore and worship His works. Nor were they able at all to understand
how much greater and more wonderful He is, who made these things out of
nothing. And when they see that these things, in obedience to divine laws, by a
perpetual necessity are subservient to the uses and interests of men, they
nevertheless regard them as gods, being ungrateful towards the divine bounty, so that
they preferred their own works to their most indulgent God and Father. But what
wonder is it if uncivilized or ignorant men err, since even philosophers of the
Stoic sect are of the same opinion, so as to judge that all the heavenly bodies
which have motion are to be reckoned in the number of gods; inasmuch as the
Stoic Lucilius thus speaks in Cicero:(4) "This regularity, therefore, in the
stars, this great agreement of the times in such various courses during all
eternity, are unintelligible to me with out the exercise of mind, reason, and design;
land when we see these things in the constellations, we cannot but place these
very objects in the number of the gods." And he thus speaks a little before:
"It remains," he says, "that the motion of the stars is voluntary; and he who
sees these things, would act not only unlearnedly, but also impiously, if he
should deny it." We in truth firmly deny it; and we prove that you, O
philosophers, are not only unlearned and impious, but also blind, foolish, and senseless,
who have surpassed in shallowness the ignorance of the uneducated. For they
regard as gods only the sun and moon, but you the stars also.
Make known to us, therefore, the mysteries of the stars, that we may erect
altars anti temples to each; that we may know with what rites and on what day
to worship each, with what names and with what prayers we should call on them;
unless perhaps we ought to worship gods so innumerable without any
discrimination, and gods so minute in a mass. Why should I mention that the argument by
which they infer that all the heavenly bodies are gods, tends to the opposite
conclusion? For if they imagine that they are gods on this account, because they
have their courses fixed and in accordance with reason, they are in error. For it
is evident from this that they are not gods, because it is not permitted them
to deviate(1) from their prescribed orbits. But if they were gods, they would
be borne hither and thither in all directions without any necessity, as living
creatures on the earth, who wander hither and thither as they please, because
their wills are unrestrained, and each is borne wherever inclination may have led
it. Therefore the motion of the stars is not voluntary, but of necessity,
because they obey(2) the laws appointed for them. But when he was arguing about the
courses of the stars, while he understood from the very harmony of things and
times that they were not by chance, he judged that they were voluntary; as
though they could not be moved with such order and arrangement, unless they
contained within them an understanding acquainted with its own duty. Oh, how difficult
is truth to those who are ignorant of it! how easy to those who know it! If,
he says, the motions of the stars are not by chance, nothing else remains but
that they are voluntary; nay, in truth, as it is plain that they are not by
chance, so is it clear that they are not voluntary. Why, then, in completing their
courses, do they preserve their regularity? Undoubtedly God, the framer of the
universe, so arranged and contrived them, that they might rim through their
courses(3) in the heaven with a divine and wonderful order, to accomplish the
variations of the successive seasons. Was Archimedes(4) of Sicily able to contrive a
likeness and representation of the universe in hollow brass, in which he so
arranged the sun and moon, that they effected, as it were every day, motions
unequal and resembling the revolutions of the heavens, and that sphere, while it
revolved,(5) exhibited not only the approaches and withdrawings of the sun, or
the increase and waning of the moon, but also the unequal courses of the stars,
whether fixed or wandering? Was it then impossible for God to plan and create
the originals,(6) when the skill of man was able to represent them by imitation?
Would the Stoic, therefore, if he should have seen the figures of the stars
painted and fashioned in that brass, say that they moved by their own design, and
not by the genius of the artificer? There is therefore in the stars design,
adapted to the accomplishment of their courses; but it is the design of God, who
both made and governs all things, not of the stars themselves, which are thus
moved. For if it had been His will that the sun should remain.(7) fixed, it is
plain that there would be perpetual day. Also if the stars had no motions, who
doubts that there would have been eternal night? But that there might be
vicissitudes of day and night, it was His will that the stars should move, and move
with such variety that there might not only be mutual interchanges of light and
darkness, by which alternate courses(8) of labour and rest might be established,
but also interchanges of cold and heat, that the power and influence of the
different seasons might be adapted either to the production or the ripening of the
crops. And because philosophers did not see this skill of the divine power in
contriving the movements of the stars, they supposed them to be living, as
though they moved with feet and of their own accord, and not by the divine
intelligence. But who does not understand why God contrived them? Doubtless lest, as
the light of the sun was withdrawn, a night of excessive darkness should become
too oppressive with its foul and dreadful gloom, and should be injurious to the
living. And so He both bespangled the heaven with wondrous variety, and
tempered the darkness itself with many and minute lights. How much more wisely
therefore does Naso judge, than they who think that they are devoting themselves to
the pursuit of wisdom, in thinking that those lights were appointed by God to
remove the gloom of darkness! He concludes the book, in which he briefly comprises
the phenomena of nature, with these three verses:--
"These images, so many in number, and of such a figure, God placed in
theheaven; and having scattered them through the gloomy darkness, Heordered them to
give a bright light to the frosty night." But if it isimpossible that the
stars should be gods, it follows that the sun andmoon cannot be gods, since they
differ from the light of the stars inmagnitude only, and not in their design. And
if these are not gods,the same is true of the heaven, which contains them all.
CHAP. VI.--THAT NEITHER THE WHOLE UNIVERSE NOR THE ELEMENTS ARE GOD, NOR ARE
THEY POSSESSED OF LIFE.
In like manner, if the land on which we tread, and which we subdue and
cultivate for food, is not a god, then the plains and mountains will not be gods;
and if these are not so, it follows that the whole of the earth cannot appear
to be God. In like manner, if the water, which is adapted to the wants(1) of
living creatures for the purpose of drinking and bathing, is not a god, neither
are the fountains gods from which the water flows. And if the fountains are not
gods, neither are the rivers, which are collected from the fountains. And if the
rivers also are not gods, it follows that the sea, which is made up of rivers,
cannot be considered as God. But if neither the heaven, nor the earth, nor the
sea, which are the parts of the world, can be gods, it follows that the world
altogether is not God; whereas the same Stoics contend that it is both living
and wise, and therefore God. But in this they are so inconsistent, that nothing
is said by them which they do not also overthrow. For they argue thus: It is
impossible that that which produces from itself sensible objects should itself be
insensible. But the world produces man, who is endowed with sensibility;
therefore it must also itself be sensible. Also they argue: that cannot be without
sensibility, a part of which is sensible; therefore, because man is sensible,
the world, of which man is a part, also possesses sensibility. The
propositions(2) themselves are true, that that which produces a being endowed with sense is
itself sensible; and that that possesses sense, a part of which is endowed with
sense. But the assumptions by which they draw their conclusions are false; for
the world does not produce man, nor is man a part of the world. For the same
God who created the world, also created man from the beginning: and man is not a
part of the world, in the same manner in which a limb is a part of the body;
for it is possible for the world to be without man, as it is for a city or house.
Now, as a house is the dwelling-place of one man, and a city of one people, so
also the world is the abode(3) of the whole human race; and that which is
inhabited is one thing, that which inhabits another. But these persons, in their
eagerness to prove that which they had falsely assumed, that the world is
possessed of sensibility, and is God, did not perceive the consequences of their own
arguments. For if man is a part of the world, and if the world is endowed with
sensibility because man is sensible, therefore it follows that, because man is
mortal, the world must also of necessity be mortal, and not only mortal, but
also liable to all kinds of disease and suffering. And, on the contrary, if the
world is God, its parts also are plainly immortal: therefore man also is God,
because he is, as you say, a part of the world. And if man, then also both beasts
of burden and cattle, and the other kinds of beasts and of birds, and fishes,
since these also in the same manner are possessed of sensibility, and are parts
of the world. But this is endurable; for the Egyptians worship even these. But
the matter comes to this: that even frogs, and gnats, and ants appear to be
gods, because these also have sensibility, and are parts of the world. Thus
arguments drawn from a false source always lead to foolish and absurd conclusions.
Why should I mention that the same philosophers assert that the world was
constructed(4) for the sake of gods and men as a common dwelling? Therefore the
world is neither god, nor living, if it has been made: for a living "creature is
not made, but born; and if it has been built, it has been built as a house or
ship is built. Therefore there is a builder of the world, even God; and the
world which has been made is distinct from Him who made it. Now, how inconsistent
and absurd is it, that when they affirm that the heavenly fires(5) and the other
elements of the world are gods, they also say that the world itself is God!
How is it possible that out of a great heap of gods one God can be made up? If
the stars are gods, it follows that the world is not God, but the dwelling-place
of gods. But if the world is God, it follows that all the things which are in
it are not gods, but members(6) of God, which clearly cannot by themselves(7)
take the name of God. For no one can rightly say that the members of one man are
many men; but, however, there is no similar comparison between a living being
and the world. For because a living being is endowed with sensibility, its
members also have sensibility; nor do they become senseless s unless they are
separated from the body. But what resemblance does the world present to this? Truly
they themselves tell us, since they do not deny that it was made, that it might
be, as it were, a common abode for gods and men. If, therefore, it has been
constructed as an abode, it is neither itself God, nor are the elements which are
its parts; because a house cannot bear rule over itself, nor can the parts of
which a house consists. Therefore they are refuted not only by the truth, but
even by their own words. For as a house, made for the purpose of being inhabited,
has no sensibility by itself, and is subject to the master who built or
inhabits it; so the world, having no sensibility of itself, is subject to God its
Maker, who made it for His own use.
CHAP. VII.--OF GOD, AND THE RELIGIOUS RITES OF THE FOOLISH; OF AVARICE, AND
THE AUTHORITY OF ANCESTORS.
The foolish, therefore, err in a twofold manner: first, in preferring the
elements, that is, the works of God, to God Himself; secondly, in worshipping
the figures of the elements themselves under human form. For they form the
images of the sun and moon after the fashion of men; also those of fire, and earth,
and sea, which they call Vulcan, Vesta, and Neptune. Nor do they openly
sacrifice to the elements themselves. Men are possessed with so great a fondness for
representations,(1) that those things which are true are now esteemed of less
value: they are delighted, in fact, with gold, and jewels, and ivory. The beauty
and brilliancy of these things dazzle their eyes, and they think that there is
no religion where these do not shine. And thus, under pretence of worshipping
the gods, avarice and desire are worshipped. For they believe that the gods love
whatever they themselves desire, whatever it is, on account of which thefts
and robberies and murders daily rage, on account of which wars overthrow nations
and cities throughout the whole world. Therefore they consecrate their spoils
and plunder to the gods, who must undoubtedly be weak, and destitute of the
highest excellence, if they are subject to desires. For why should we think them
celestial if they long for anything from the earth, or happy if they are in want
of anything, or uncorrupted if they take pleasure in those things in the
pursuit of which the desire of men is not unreservedly condemned? They approach the
gods, therefore not so much on account of religion, which can have no place in
badly acquired and corruptible things, as that they may gaze upon(2) the gold,
and view the brilliancy of polished marble or ivory, that they may survey with
unwearied contemplation garments adorned with precious stones and colours, or
cups studded with glittering jewels. And the more ornamented are the temples, and
the more beautiful the images, so much the greater majesty are they believed
to have: so entirely is their religion confined(3) to that which the desire of
men admires.
These are the religious institutions handed down to them by their
ancestors, which they persist in maintaining and defending with the greatest obstinacy.
Nor do they consider of what character they are; but they feel assured of
their excellence and truth on this account. because the ancients have handed them
down; anti so great is the authority of antiquity, that it is said to be a crime
to inquire into it. And thus it is everywhere believed as ascertained truth.
In short, in Cicero,(4) Cotta thus speaks to Lucilius: "You know, Balbus, what
is the opinion of Cotta, what the opinion of the pontiff. Now let me understand
what are your sentiments: for since you are a philosopher, I ought to receive
from you a reason for your religion; but in the case of our ancestors it is
reasonable to believe them, though no reason is alleged by them." If you believe,
why then do you require a reason, which may have the effect of causing you not
to believe? But if you require a reason, and think that the subject demands
inquiry, then you do not believe; for you make inquiry with this view, that you may
follow it when you have ascertained it. Behold, reason teaches you that the
religious institutions of the gods are not true: what will you do? Will you
prefer to follow antiquity or reason? And this, indeed, was not imparted(5) to you
by another, but was found out and chosen by yourself, since you have entirely
uprooted all religious systems. If you prefer reason, you must abandon the
institutions and authority of our ancestors, since nothing is right but that which
reason prescribes. But if piety advises you to follow your ancestors, then admit
that they were foolish, who complied with religious institutions invented
contrary to reason; and that you are senseless, since you worship that which you
have proved to be false. But since the name of ancestors is so greatly objected to
us, let us see, I pray, who those ancestors were from whose authority it is
said to be impious to depart.(6)
Romulus, when he was about to found the city, called together the
shepherds among whom he had grown up; and since their number appeared inadequate to the
rounding of the city, he established an asylum. To this all the most abandoned
men flocked together indiscriminately from the neighbouring places, without
any distinction of condition. Thus he brought together the people from all these;
and he chose into the senate those who were oldest, and called them Fathers,
by whose advice he might direct all things. And concerning this senate,
Propertius the elegiac poet thus speaks:--
"The trumpet used to call the ancient Quirites to an assembly;(7) those
hundred in the field often formed the senate. The senate-house, whichnow is
raised aloft and shines with the well-robed senate, receivedthe Fathers clothed in
skins, rustic spirits."
These are the Fathers whose decrees learned and sagacious men obey with the
greatest devotion; and all posterity must judge that to be true and unchangeable
which an hundred old men clothed in skins established at their will; who,
however, as has been mentioned in the first book,(1) were enticed by Pompilius to
believe the truth of those sacred rites which he himself delivered. Is there any
reason why their authority should be so highly esteemed by posterity, since
during their life no one either high or low judged them worthy of affinity?(2)
CHAP. VIII.--OF THE USE OF REASON IN RELIGION; AND OF DREAMS, AUGURIES,
ORACLES, AND SIMILAR PORTENTS.
It is therefore right, especially in a matter on which the whole plan of
life turns, that every one should place confidence in himself, and use his own
judgment and individual capacity for the investigation and weighing of the
truth, rather than through confidence in others to be deceived by their errors, as
though he himself were without understanding. God has given wisdom to all
alike,(3) that they might be able both to investigate things which they have not
heard, and to weigh things which they have heard. Nor, because they preceded us in
time did they also outstrip us in wisdom; for if this is given equally to all,
we cannot be anticipated(4) in it by those who precede us. It is incapable of
diminution, as the light and brilliancy of the sun; because, as the sun is the
light of the eyes, so is wisdom the light of man's heart. Wherefore, since
wisdom--that is, the inquiry after truth--is natural to all, they deprive themselves
of wisdom, who without any judgment approve of the discoveries of their
ancestors, and like sheep are led by others. But this escapes their notice, that the
name of ancestors being introduced, they think it impossible that they
themselves should have more knowledge because they are called descendants, or that the
others should be unwise because they are called ancestors.(5) What, therefore,
prevents us from taking a precedent(6) from them, that as they handed down to
posterity their false inventions, so we who have discovered the truth may hand
down better things to our posterity? There remains therefore a great subject of
inquiry, the discussion of which does not come from talent, but from knowledge:
and this must be explained at greater length, that nothing at all may be left
in doubt. For perhaps some one may have recourse to those things which are
handed down by many and undoubted authorities; that those very persons, whom we
have shown to be no gods, have often displayed their majesty both by prodigies,
and dreams, and auguries, and oracles. And, indeed, many wonderful things may be
enumerated, and especially this, that Accius Navius, a consummate augur, when
he was warning Tarquinius Priscus to undertake the commencement of nothing new
without the previous sanction of auguries,(7) and the king, detracting from(8)
the credit due to his art, told him to consult the birds, and then to announce
to him whether it was possible for that which he himself had conceived in his
mind to be accomplished, and Navius affirmed that it was possible; then take this
whetstone, he said, and divide it with a razor. But the other without any
hesitation took and cut it.
In the next place is the fact of Castor and Pollux having been seen in the
Latin war at the lake of Juturna washing off the sweat of their horses, when
their temple which adjoins the fountain had been open of its own accord. In the
Macedonian war the same deities, mounted on white horses, are said to have
presented themselves to Publius Vatienus as he went to Rome at night, announcing
that King Perseus had been vanquished and taken captive on that day, the truth
of which was proved by letters received from Paulus(9) a few days afterwards.
That also is wonderful, that the statue of Fortune, in the form(10) of a woman,
is reported to have spoken more than once; also that the statue of Juno
Moneta,(11) when, on the capture of Veii, one of the soldiers, being sent to remove it,
sportively and in jest asked whether she wished to remove to Rome, answered
that she wished it. Claudia also is set forth as an example of a miracle. For
when, in accordance with the Sibylline books, the Idaean mother was sent for, and
the ship in which she was conveyed had grounded on a shoal of the river Tiber,
and could not be moved by any force, they report that Claudia, who had been
always regarded as unchaste on account of her excess in personal adornment, with
bended knees entreated the goddess, if she judged her to be chaste, to follow
her girdle; anti thus the ship, which could not be moved by all the strong
men,(12) was moved by a single woman. It is equally wonderful, that during the
prevalence of a pestilence, AEsculapius, being called from Epidaurus, is said to have
released the city of Rome from the long-continued plague.
Sacrilegious persons can also be mentioned, by the immediate punishment of
whom the gods are believed to have avenged the injury done to them. Appius
Claudius the censor having, against the advice of the oracle, transferred the
sacred rites of Hercules to the public slaves,(1) was deprived of his eyesight; and
the Potitian gens, which abandoned(2) its privilege, within the space of one
year became extinct. Likewise the censor Fulvius, when he had taken away the
marble tiles from the temple of the Lacinian(3) Juno, to cover the temple of the
equestrian Fortuna, which he had built at Rome, was deprived of his senses, and
having lost his two sons who were serving in Illyricum, was consumed with the
greatest grief of mind. Turullius also, the lieutenant of Mark Antony, when he
had cut down a grove of AEsculapius in Cos,(4) and built a fleet, was afterwards
slain at the same place by the soldiers of Caesar. To these examples is added
Pyrrhus, who, having taken away money from the treasure of the Locrian
Proserpine, was shipwrecked, and dashed against the shores near to the temple of the
goddess, so that nothing was found uninjured except that money. Ceres of Miletus
also gained for herself great veneration among men. For when the city had been
taken by Alexander, and the soldiers had rushed in to plunder her temple, a
flame of fire suddenly thrown upon them blinded them all.
There are also found dreams which seem to show the power of the gods. For
it is said that Jupiter presented himself to Tiberius Atinius, a plebeian, in
his sleep, and enjoined him to announce to the consuls and senate, that in the
last Circensian(5) games a public dancer had displeased him, because a certain
Antonius Maximus had severely scourged a slave under the furca(6) in the middle
of the circus, and had led him to punishment, and that on this account the
games ought to be repeated. And when he had neglected this command, he is said on
the same day to have lost his son, and to have been himself seized by a severe
disease; and that when he again perceived the same image asking whether he had
suffered sufficient punishment for the neglect of his command, he was carried on
a litter to the consuls; and having explained the whole matter in the senate,
he regained strength of body, and returned to his house on foot. And that dream
also was not less wonderful, to which it is said that Augustus Caesar owed his
preservation. For when in the civil war with Brutus he was afflicted with a
severe disease, and had determined to abstain from battle, the image of Minerva
presented itself to his physician Artorius, advising him that Caesar should not
confine himself to the camp on account of his bodily infirmity. He was
therefore carried on a litter to the army, and on the same day the camp was taken by
Brutus. Many other examples of a similar nature may be brought forward; but I
fear that, if I shall delay too long in the setting forth of contrary subjects, I
may either appear to have forgotten my purpose, or may incur the charge of
loquacity.
CHAP. IX.--OF THE DEVIL, THE WORLD, GOD, PROVIDENCE, MAN, AND HIS WISDOM.
I will therefore set forth the method of all these things, that difficult
and obscure subjects may be more easily understood; and I will bring to light
all these deceptions(7) of the pretended deity, led by which men have departed
very far from the way of truth. But I will retrace the matter far back from
its source; that if any, unacquainted with the truth and ignorant, shall apply
himself to the reading of this book, he may be instructed, and may understand
what can in truth be "the source and origin of these evils;" and having received
light, may perceive his own errors and those of the whole human race.
Since God was possessed(8) of the greatest foresight for planning, and of
the greatest skill for carrying out in action, before He commenced this
business of the world,--inasmuch as there was in Him, and always is, the fountain of
full and most complete goodness,--in order that goodness might spring as a
stream from Him, and might flow forth afar, He produced a Spirit like to Himself,
who might be endowed with the perfections of God the Father. But how He willed
that, I will endeavour to show in the fourth book.(9) Then He made another being,
in whom the disposition of the divine origin did not remain. Therefore he was
infected with his own envy as with poison, and passed from good to evil; and at
his own will, which had been given to him by God unfettered,(10) he acquired
for himself a contrary name. From which it appears that the source of all evils
is envy. For he envied his predecessor,(11) who through his stedfastness(12) is
acceptable and dear to God the Father. This being, who from good became evil
by his own act, is called by the Greeks diabolus:(1) we call him accuser,
because he reports to God the faults to which he himself entices us. God, therefore,
when He began the fabric of the world, set over the whole work that first and
greatest Son, and used Him at the same time as a counsellor and artificer, in
planning, arranging, and accomplishing, since He is complete both in
knowledge,(2) and judgment, and power; concerning whom I now speak more sparingly, because
in another place(3) both His excellence, and His name, and His nature must be
related by us. Let no one inquire of what materials God made these works so
great and wonderful: for He made all things out of nothing.
Nor are the poets to be listened to, who say that in the beginning was a
chaos, that is, a confusion of matter and the elements; but that God afterwards
divided all that mass, and having separated each object from the confused
heap, and arranged them in order, He constructed and adorned the world. Now it is
easy to reply to these persons, who do not understand the power of God: for they
believe that He can produce nothing, except out of materials already
existing(4) and prepared; in which error philosophers also were involved. For Cicero,
while discussing the nature of the gods,(5) thus speaks: "First of all,
therefore, it is not probable(6) that the matter(7) from which all things arose was made
by divine providence, but that it has, and has had, a force and nature of its
own. As therefore the builder, when he is about to erect any building, does not
himself make the materials, but uses those which are already prepared, and the
statuary(8) also uses the wax; so that divine providence ought to have had
materials at hand, not of its own production, but already prepared for use. But if
matter was not made by God, then neither was the earth, and water, and air,
and fire, made by God." Oh, how many faults there are in these ten lines First,
that he who in almost all his other disputations and books was a maintainer of
the divine providence, and who used very acute arguments in assailing those who
denied the existence of a providence, now himself, as a traitor or deserter,
endeavoured to take away providence; in whose case, if you wish to oppose(9) him,
neither consideration nor labour is required: it is only necessary to remind
him of his own words. For it will be impossible for Cicero to be more strongly
refuted by any one than by Cicero himself. But let us make this concession to
the custom and practice of the Academics,(10) that men are permitted to speak
with great freedom, and to entertain what sentiments they may wish. Let us examine
the sentiments themselves. It is not probable, he says, that matter was made
by God. By what arguments do you prove this? For you gave no reason for its
being improbable. Therefore, on the contrary, it appears to me exceedingly
probable; nor does it appear so without reason, when I reflect that there is something
more in God, whom you verily reduce to the weakness of man, to whom you allow
nothing else but the mere workmanship. In what respect, then, will that divine
power differ from man, if God also, as man does, stands in need of the
assistance of another? But He does stand in need of it, if He can construct nothing
unless He is furnished with materials by another. But if this is the case, it is
plain that His power is imperfect, and he who prepared the material(11) must be
judged more powerful. By what name, therefore, shall he be called who excels
God in power?--since it is greater to make that which is one's own, than to
arrange those things which are another's. But if it is impossible that anything
should be more powerful than God, who must necessarily be of perfect strength,
power, and intelligence, it follows that He who made the things which are
composed of matter, made matter also. For it was neither possible nor befitting that
anything should exist without the exercise of God's power, or against His
will. But it is probable, he says, that matter has, and always has had, a force
and nature of its own.(12) What force could it have, without any one to give it?
what nature, without any one to produce it? If it had force, it took that
force from some one. But from whom could it take it, unless it were from God?
Moreover, if it had a nature, which plainly is so called from being produced, it
must have been produced. But from whom could it have derived its existence,
except God? For nature, from which you say that all things had their origin, if it
has no understanding, can make nothing. But if it has the power of producing
and making, then it has understanding, and must be God. For that force can be
called by no other name, in which there is both the foresight(13) to plan, and the
skill and power to carry into effect. Therefore Seneca, the most intelligent
of all the Stoics, says better, who saw "that nature was nothing else but God."
Therefore he says, "Shall we not praise God, who possesses natural excellence?"
For He did not learn it from any one. Yes, truly, we will praise Him; for
although it is natural to Him, He gave it to Himself,(1) since God Himself is
nature. When, therefore, you assign the origin of all things to nature, and take it
from God, you are in the same difficulty:--
"You pay your debt by borrowing,(2) Geta."
For while simply changing the name, you clearly admit that it was made by the
same person by whom you deny that it was made.
There follows a most senseless comparison. "As the builder," he says,
"when he is about to erect any building, does not himself make the materials, but
uses those which are already prepared, and the statuary also the wax; so that
divine providence ought to have had materials at hand, not of its own production,
but already prepared for use." Nay rather it ought not; for God will have less
power if He makes from materials already provided, which is the part of man.
The builder will erect nothing without wood, for he cannot make the wood itself;
and not to be able to do this is the part of human weakness. But God Himself
makes the materials for Himself, because He has the power. For to have the power
is the property of God; for if He is not able, He is not God. Man produces his
works out of that which already exists, because through his mortality he is
weak, and through his weakness his power is limited and moderate; but God
produces His works out of that which has no existence, because through His eternity He
is strong, and through His strength His power is immense, which has no end or
limit, like the life of the Maker Himself. What wonder, then, if God, when He
was about to make the world, first prepared the material from which to make it,
and prepared it out of that which had no existence? Because it is impossible
for God to borrow anything from another source, inasmuch as all things are in
Himself and from Himself. For if there is anything before Him, and if anything has
been made, but not by Him, He will therefore lose both the power and the name
of God. But it may be said matter was never made, like God, who out of matter
made this world. In that case, it follows that two eternal principles are
established, and those indeed opposed to one another, which cannot happen without
discord and destruction. For those things which have a contrary force and method
must of necessity come into collision. In this manner it will be impossible
that both should be eternal, if they are opposed to one another, because one must
overpower the other. Therefore the nature of that which is eternal cannot be
otherwise than simple, so that all things descended from that source as from a
fountain. Therefore either God proceeded from matter, or matter from God. Which
of these is more true, is easily understood. For of these two, one is endued
with sensibility, the other is insensible. The power of making anything cannot
exist, except in that which has sensibility, intelligence, reflection, and the
power of motion. Nor can anything be begun, or made, or completed, unless it shall
have been foreseen by reason how it shall be made before it exists, and how it
shall endure(3) after it has been made. In short, he only makes anything who
has the will to make it, and hands to complete that which he has willed. But
that which is insensible always lies inactive and torpid; nothing can originate in
that source where there is no voluntary motion. For if every animal is
possessed of reason, it is certain that it cannot be produced from that which is
destitute of reason, nor can that which is not present in the original source(4) be
received from any other quarter. Nor, however, let it disturb any one, that
certain animals appear to be born from the earth. For the earth does not give
birth to these of itself, but the Spirit of God, without which nothing is produced.
Therefore God did not arise from matter, because a being endued with
sensibility can never spring from one that is insensible, a wise one from one that is
irrational, one that is incapable of suffering from one that can suffer, an
incorporeal being from a corporeal one; but matter is rather from God. For whatever
consists of a body solid, and capable of being handled, admits of an external
force. That which admits of force is capable of dissolution; that which is
dissolved perishes; that which perishes must necessarily have had an origin; that
which had an origin had a source(5) from which it originated, that is, some
maker, who is intelligent, foreseeing, and skilled in making. There is one
assuredly, and that no other than God. And since He is possessed of sensibility,
intelligence, providence, power, and vigour, He is able to create and make both
animated and inanimate objects, because He has the means of making everything. But
matter cannot always have existed, for if it had existed it would be incapable
of change. For that which always was, does not cease always to be; and that
which had no beginning must of necessity be without an end. Moreover, it is easier
for that which had a beginning to be without an end, than for that which had no
beginning to have an end. Therefore if matter was not made, nothing can be
made from it. But if nothing can be made from it, then matter itself can have no
existence. For matter is that out of which something is made. But everything out
of which anything is made, inasmuch as it has received the hand of the
artificer, is destroyed,(1) and begins to be some other thing. Therefore, since matter
had an end, at the time when the world was made out of it, it also had a
beginning. For that which is destroyed(1) was previously built up; that which is
loosened was previously bound up; that which is brought to an end was begun. If,
then, it is inferred from its change and end, that matter had a beginning, from
whom could that beginning have been, except from God? God, therefore, is the
only being who was not made; and therefore He can destroy other things, but He
Himself cannot be destroyed. That which was in Him will always be permanent,
because He has not been produced or sprung from any other source; nor does His
birth depend on any other object, which being changed may cause His dissolution. He
is of Himself, as we said in the first book;(2) and therefore He is such as He
willed that He should be, incapable of suffering, unchangeable, incorruptible,
blessed, and eternal.
But now the conclusion, with which Tully finished the sentiment, is much
more absurd.(3) "But if matter," he says, "was not made by God, the earth
indeed, and water, and air, and fire, were not made by God." How skilfully he avoided
the danger! For he stated the former point as though it required no proof,
whereas it was much more uncertain than that on account of which the statement was
made. If matter, he says, was not made by God, the world was not made by God.
He preferred to draw a false inference from that which is false, than a true
one from that which is true. And though uncertain things ought to be proved from
those which are certain, he drew a proof from an uncertainty, to overthrow that
which was certain. For, that the world was made by divine providence (not to
mention Trismegistus, who proclaims this; not to mention the verses of the
Sibyls, who make the same announcement; not to mention the prophets,(4) who with one
impulse and with harmonious(5) voice. bear witness that the world was made,(6)
and that it was the workmanship of God), even the philosophers almost
universally agree; for this is the opinion of the Pythagoreans, the Stoics, and the
Peripatetics, who are the chief of every sect.(7) In short, from those first seven
wise men,(8) even to Socrates and Plato, it was held as an acknowledged and
undoubted fact; until many ages afterwards(9) the crazy Epicurus lived, who alone
ventured to deny that which is most evident, doubtless through the desire of
discovering novelties, that he might found a sect in his own name. And because
he could find out nothing new, that he might still appear to disagree with the
others, he wished to overthrow old opinions. But in this all the philosophers
who snarled(10) around him, refuted him. It is more certain, therefore, that the
world was arranged by providence, than that matter was collected(11) by
providence. Wherefore he ought not to have supposed that the world was not made by
divine providence, because its matter was not made by divine providence; but
because the world was made by divine providence, he ought to have concluded that
matter also was made by the Deity. For it is more credible that matter was made by
God, because He is all-powerful, than that the world was not made by God,
because nothing can be made without mind, intelligence, and design. But this is not
the fault of Cicero, but of the sect. For when he had undertaken a
disputation, by which he might take away the nature of the gods, respecting which
philosophers prated, in his ignorance of the truth he imagined that the Deity must
altogether be taken away. He was able therefore to take away the gods, for they had
no existence. But when he attempted to overthrow the divine providence, which
is in the one God, because he had begun to strive against the truth, his
arguments failed, and he necessarily fell into this pitfall, from which he was unable
to withdraw himself. Here, then, I hold him firmly fixed; I hold him fastened
to the spot, since Lucilius, who disputed on the other side, was silent. Here,
then, is the turning-point;(12) on this everything depends. Let Cotta
disentangle himself, if he can, from this difficulty;(13) let him bring forward
arguments by which he may prove that matter has always existed, which no providence
made. Let him show how anything ponderous and heavy either could exist without an
author or could be changed, and how that which always was ceased to be, so that
that which never was might begin to be. And if he shall prove these things,
then, and not till then, will I admit that the world itself was not established
by divine providence, and yet in making this admission I shall hold him fast by
another snare. For he will turn round again to the same point, to which he will
be unwilling to return, so as to say that both the matter of which the world
consists, and the world which consists of matter, existed by nature; though I
contend that nature itself is God. For no one can make wonderful things, that is,
things existing with the greatest order, except one who has intelligence,
foresight, and power. And thus it will come to be seen that God made all things,
and that nothing at all can exist which did not derive its origin from God.
But the same, as often as he follows the Epicureans,(1) and does not admit
that the world was made by God, is wont to inquire by what hands by what
machines, by what levers, by what contrivance, He made this work of such magnitude.
He might see, if he could have lived at that time in which God made it. But,
that man might not look into the works of God, He was unwilling to bring him into
this world until all things were completed. But he could not be brought in:
for how could he exist while the heaven above was being built, and the
foundations of the earth beneath were being laid; when humid things, perchance, either
benumbed with excessive stiffness were becoming congealed, or seethed with fiery
heat and rendered solid were growing hard? Or how could he live when the sun
was not yet established, and neither corn nor animals were produced? Therefore
it was necessary that man should be last made, when the finishing(2) hand had
now been applied to the world and to all other things. Finally, the sacred
writings teach that man was the last work of God, and that he was brought into this
world as into a house prepared and made ready; for all things were made on his
account. The poets also acknowledge the same. Ovid, having described the
completion of the world, and the formation of the other animals, added:(3)--
"An animal more sacred than these, and more capacious of a lofty mind, was
yet wanting, and which might exercise dominion over the rest. Man was
produced."
So impious must we think it to search into those things which God wished to be
kept secret! But his inquiries were not made through a desire of hearing or
learning, but of refuting; for he was confident that no one could assert that. As
though, in truth, it were to be supposed that these things were not made by
God, because it cannot be plainly seen in what manner they were created! If you
had been brought up in a well-built and ornamented house, and had never seen a
workshop,(4) would you have supposed that that house was not built by man,
because you did not know how it was built? You would assuredly ask the same question
about the house which you now ask about the world--by what hands, with what
implements, man had contrived such great works; and especially if you should see
large stones, immense blocks,(5) vast columns, the whole work lofty and
elevated, would not these things appear to you to exceed the measure of human
strength, because you would not know that these things were made not so much by
strength as by skill and ingenuity?
But if man, in whom nothing is perfect, nevertheless effects more by skill
than his feeble strength would permit, what reason is there why it should
appear to you incredible, when it is alleged that the world was made by God, in
whom, since He is perfect, wisdom can have no limit, and strength no measure? His
works are seen by the eyes; but how He made them is not seen even by the mind,
because, as Hermes says, the mortal cannot draw nigh to (that is, approach
nearer, and follow up with the understanding) the immortal, the temporal(6) to the
eternal, the corruptible to the incorruptible. And on this account the earthly
animal is as yet incapable of perceiving(7) heavenly things, because it is shut
in and held as it were in custody by the body, so that it cannot discern all
things with free and unrestrained perception. Let him know, therefore, how
foolishly he acts, who inquires into things which are indescribable. For this is to
pass the limits of one's own condition, and not to understand how far it is
permitted man to approach. In short, when God revealed the truth to man, He wished
us only to know those things which it concerned man to know for the attainment
of life; but as to the things which related to a profane and eager
curiosity(8) He was silent, that they might be secret. Why, then, do you inquire into
things which you cannot know, and if you knew them you would not be happier. It is
perfect wisdom in man, if he knows that there is but one God, and that all
things were made by Him.