THE DIVINE INSTITUTES. BOOK VII--OF A HAPPY LIFE (CHAP. I TO CHAP. XII)
THE DIVINE INSTITUTES
BOOK VII.
OF A HAPPY LIFE.
CHAP. I.--OF THE WORLD, AND THOSE WHO ARE ABOUT TO BELIEVE, AND THOSE WHO ARE
NOT; AND IN THIS THE CENSURE OF THE FAITHLESS.
It is well: the foundations are laid, as the illustrious orator says. But
we have not only laid the foundations, which might be firth and suitable for
the support of the work; but we have raised the entire edifice, with great and
strong buildings, almost to the summit. There remains, a matter which is much
easier, either to cover or adorn it; without which, however, the former works are
both useless and displeasing. For of what avail is it, either to be freed from
false religions(1) or to understand the true(2) one? Of what avail, either to
see the vanity of false wisdom,(3) or to know what is true?(4) Of what avail is
it, I say, to defend that heavenly justice?(5) Of what avail to hold the
worship of God(2) with great difficulties, which is the greatest virtue, unless the
divine reward of everlasting blessedness attends it? Of which subject we must
speak in this book, lest all that is gone before should appear vain and
unprofitable: if. we should leave this, on account of which they were undertaken, in
uncertainty, lest any one should by chance think that such great labours are
undertaken in vain; while he distrusts their heavenly reward, which God has
appointed for him who shall have despised the present sweet enjoyments of earth in
comparison of solitary and unrewarded(6) virtue. Let us satisfy this part of
our subject also, both by the testimonies of the sacred writings and also by
probable arguments, that it may be equally manifest that future things are to be
preferred to those which are present; heavenly things to earthly: and eternal
things to those which are temporal: since the rewards of vices are temporal, those
of virtues are eternal.
I will therefore set forth the system of the world, that it may easily be
understood both when and how it was made by God; which Plato, who discoursed
about the making of the world, could neither know nor explain, inasmuch as he was
ignorant of the heavenly mystery, which is not learned except by the teaching
of prophets and God; and therefore he said that it was created for eternity.
Whereas the case is far different, since whatever is of a solid and heavy body,
as it received a beginning at some time, so it must needs have an end. For
Aristotle, when he did not see how so great a magnitude of things could perish, and
wished to escape this objection,(7) said that the world always had existed, and
always would exist. He did not at all see, that whatever material thing exists
must at some time have had a beginning, and that nothing can exist at all
unless it bad a beginning. For when we see that earth, and water, and fire perish,
are consumed, and extinguished, which are clearly parts of the world, it is
understood that that is altogether mortal the members of which are mortal. Thus it
comes to pass, that whatever is liable to destruction must have been produced.
But everything which comes within the sight of the eyes must of necessity be
material, and capable of dissolution. Therefore Epicurus alone, following the
authority of Democritus, spoke truly in this matter, who said that it had a
beginning at some time, and that it would at some time perish. Nor, however, was he
able to assign any reason, either through what causes or at what time this work
of such magnitude should be destroyed. But since God has revealed this to us,
and we do not arrive at it by conjectures, but by instruction from heaven, we
will carefully teach it, that it may at length be evident to those who are
desirous of the truth, that the philosophers did not see nor comprehend the truth;
but that they had so slight a knowledge of it, that they by no means perceived
from what source that fragrance(2) of wisdom, which was so pleasant and
agreeable, breathed upon them.
In the meantime, I think it necessary to admonish those who are about to
read this, that depraved and vicious minds, since the acuteness of their mind is
blunted by earthly passions, which weigh down all the perceptions and render
them weak, will either altogether fail to understand these things which we
relate, or, even if they shall understand them, they will dissemble and be unwilling
for them to be true: because they are drawn away by vices, and they knowingly
favour their own evils, by the pleasantness of which they are captivated, and
they desert the way of virtue, by the bitterness of which they are offended. For
they who are inflamed with avarice and a certain insatiable thirst for
riches--because, when they have sold or squandered the things in which they delight,
they are unable to live in a simple style--undoubtedly prefer that by which they
are compelled to renounce their eager desires. Also, they who, urged on by the
incitements of lusts, as the poet says,(3)
"Rush into madness and fire,"
say that we bring forward things plainly incredible; because the precepts
about self-restraint wound their ears, which restrain them from their pleasures, to
which they have given(4) up their soul, together with their body. But those
who, swollen with ambition or inflamed with the love of power, have bestowed all
their efforts on the acquisition of honours, will not, even if we should bear
the sun himself in our hands, believe that teaching which commands them to
despise all power and honour, and to live in humility, and in such humility that
they may be able to receive an injury, and if they have received one, be unwilling
to return it. These are the men who cry out(5) in any way against the truth
with closed eyes. But they who are or shall be of sound mind, that is, not so
immersed in vices as to be incurable, will both believe these things, and will
readily approach them; and whatever things we say, they will appear to them open,
and plain, and simple, and that which is chiefly necessary, true and
unassailable.
No one favours virtue but he who is able to follow it; but it is not easy
for all to follow it: they can do so whom poverty and want have exercised, and
made capable of virtue. For if the endurance of evils is virtue, it follows
that they are not capable of virtue who have always lived in the enjoyment of
good things; because they have never experienced evils, nor can they endure them,
through their long-continued use and desire of good things, which alone they
know. Thus it comes to pass that the poor and humble, who are unencumbered, more
readily believe God than the rich, who are entangled with many hindrances;(6)
yea, rather, in chains and fetters they are enslaved to the nod of desire, their
mistress, which has ensnared them with inextricable bonds; nor are they able
to look up to heaven, since their mind is bent down to the earth, and fixed on
the ground. But the way of virtue does not admit those carrying great burthens.
The path is very narrow by which justice leads man to heaven; no one can keep
this unless he is unencumbered and lightly equipped. For those wealthy men, who
are loaded with many and great burthens, proceed along the way of death, which
is very broad, since destruction rules with extended sway. The precepts which
God gives for justice, and the things which we bring forward under the teaching
of God respecting virtue and the truth, are bitter and as poisons to these. And
if they shall dare to oppose these things, they must own themselves to be
enemies of virtue and justice. I will now come to the remaining part of the
subject, that an end may be put to the work. But this remains, that we should treat of
the judgment of God, which will then be established when our Lord shall return
to the earth to render to every one either a reward or punishment, according
to his desert. Therefore, as we spoke in the fourth book concerning His first
advent,(7) so in this book we will relate His second advent, which the Jews also
both confess and hope for; but in vain, since He must return to the
confusion(8) of those for whose call He had before come. For they who impiously treated
Him with violence in His humiliation, will experience Him in His power as a
conqueror; and, God requiting them, they will suffer all those things which they
read and do not understand; inasmuch as, being polluted with all sins, and
moreover sprinkled with the blood of the Holy One, they were devoted to eternal
punishment by that very One on whom they laid wicked hands. But we shall have a
separate subject against the Jews, in which we shall convict them of error and
guilt.
CHAP. II.--OF THE ERROR OF THE PHILOSOPHERS, AND OF THE DIVINE WISDOM, AND OF
THE GOLDEN AGE.
Now let us instruct those who are ignorant of the truth. It has been so
determined by the arrangement of the Most High God, that this unrighteous age,
having run the course(1) of its appointed times, should come to an end; and all
wickedness being immediately extinguished, and the souls of the righteous being
recalled to a happy life, a quiet, tranquil, peaceful, in short, golden age,
as the poets call it, should flourish, under the rule of God Himself. This was
especially the cause of all the errors of the philosophers, that they did not
comprehend the system of the world, which comprises the whole of wisdom. But it
cannot be comprehended by our own perception and innate intelligence, which they
wished to do by themselves without a teacher. Therefore they fell into various
and ofttimes contradictory opinions, out of which they had no way of escape,
And they remained fixed in the same mire, as the comic writer(2) says,
since their conclusion does not correspond with their assumptions;(3) inasmuch as
they had assumed things to be true which could not be affirmed, and proved
without the knowledge of the truth and of heavenly things. And this knowledge, as I
have often said already, cannot exist in a man unless it is derived from the
teaching of God. For if a man is able to understand divine things, he will be
able also to perform them; for to understand is, as it were, to follow in their
track. But he is not able to do the things which God does, because he is clothed
with a mortal body; therefore he cannot even understand those things which God
does. And whether this is possible is easy for every one to measure, from the
immensity of the divine actions and works. For if you will contemplate the
world, with all the things which it contains, you will assuredly understand how
much the work of God surpasses the works of men. Thus, as great as is the
difference between divine and human works, so great must be the distance between the
wisdom of God and man. For because God is incorruptible and immortal, and
therefore perfect because He is everlasting, His wisdom also is perfect, as He Himself
is; nor can anything oppose it, because God Himself is subject to nothing.
But because man is subject to passion, his wisdom also is subject to
error; and as many things hinder the life of man, so that it cannot be perpetual, so
also his wisdom must be hindered by many things: so that it is not perfect in
entirely perceiving the truth. Therefore there is no human wisdom, if it
strives by itself to attain to the conception and knowledge of the truth; inasmuch as
the mind of man, being bound up with a frail body, and enclosed in a dark
abode, is neither able to wander at large, nor clearly to perceive the truth, the
knowledge of which belongs to the divine nature. For His works are known to God
alone. But man cannot attain this knowledge by reflection or disputation, but
by learning and hearing from Him who alone is able to know and to teach.
Therefore Marcus Tullius,(4) borrowing from Plato the sentiment of Socrates, who said
that the time had come for himself to depart from life, but that they before
whom he was pleading his cause were still alive, says: Which is better is known
to the immortal gods; but I think that no man knows. Wherefore all the sects of
philosophers must be far removed from the truth, because they who established
them were men; nor can those things have any foundation or firmness which are
unsupported by any utterances of divine voices.
CHAP. III.--OF NATURE, AND OF THE WORLD; AND A CENSURE OF THE STOICS AND
EPICUREANS.
And since we are speaking of the errors of philosophers, the Stoics
divide nature into two parts--the one which effects, the other which affords itself
tractable for action. They say that in the former is contained all the power of
perception, in the latter the material, and that the one cannot act without
the other. How can that which handles and that which is handled be one and the
same thing? If any one should say that the potter is the same as the clay, or
that the clay is the same as the potter, would he not plainly appear to be mad?
But these men comprehend under the one name of nature two things which are most
widely different, God and the world, the Maker and the work; and say that the
one can do nothing without the other, as though God were mixed up in nature with
the world. For sometimes they so mix them together, that God Himself is the
mind of the world, and that the world is the body of God; as though the world and
God began to exist at the same time, and God did not Himself make the world.
And they themselves also confess this at other times, when they say that it was
made for the sake of men, and that God could, if He willed it, exist without the
world, inasmuch as God is the divine and l eternal mind, separate and free
from a body. And since they were unable to understand His power and majesty, they
mixed Him(5) with the world, that is, with His own work. Whence is that saying
of Virgil:(6)--
"A spirit whose celestial flame
Glows in each member of the frame,
And stirs the mighty whole."
What, then, becomes of their own saying, that the world was both made and is
governed by the divine providence? For if He made the world, it follows that He
existed without the world; if He governs it, it is plain that it is not as the
mind governs the body, but as a master rules the house, as a pilot the ship,
as a charioteer the chariot. Nor, however, are they mixed with those things
which they govern. For if all these things which we see are members of God, then
God is rendered insensible by them, since the members are without sensibility,
and mortal, since we see that the members are mortal.
I can enumerate how often lands shaken by sudden motions(1) have either
opened or sunk down precipitously; how often cities and islands have been
overwhelmed by waves, and gone into the deep; marshes have inundated fruitful plains,
rivers and pools have been dried up;(2) mountains also have either fallen
precipitously, or have been levelled with plains. Many districts, and the
foundations of many mountains, are laid waste by latent and internal fire. And this is
not enough, if God does not spare His own members, unless it is permitted man
also to have some power over the body of God. Seas are built up, mountains are cut
down, and the innermost bowels of the earth are dug out to draw forth riches.
Why, should I say that we cannot even plough without lacerating the divine
body? So that we are at once wicked and impious in doing violence to the members of
God. Does God, then, suffer His body to be harassed, and endure to weaken
Himself, or permit this to be done by man? Unless by chance that divine
intelligence which is mixed with the world, and with all parts of the world, abandoned the
first outer aspect(3) of the earth, and plunged itself into the lowest depths,
that it might be sensible of no pain from continual laceration. But if this is
trifling and absurd, then they themselves were as devoid of intelligence as
those are who have not perceived that the divine spirit is everywhere diffused,
and that all things are held together by it, not however in such a manner that
God, who is incorruptible, should Himself be mixed with heavy and corruptible
elements. Therefore that is more correct which they derived from Plato, that the
world was made by God, and is also governed by His providence. It was therefore
befitting that Plato, and those who held the same opinion, should teach and
explain what was the cause, what the reason, for the contriving of so great a
work; why or for the sake of whom He made it.
But the Stoics also say the world was made for the sake of men I hear But
Epicurus is ignorant on what account or who made men themselves. For Lucretius,
when he said that the world was not made by the gods, thus spoke:(4)
"To say, again, that for the sake of men they have willed to set in order
the glorious nature of the world"--
then he introduced:--
"Is sheer folly. For what advantage can our gratitude bestow on immortal
and blessed beings, that for our, sake they should take in hand to administer
aught?"
And with good reason. For they brought forward no reason why the human race
was created or established by God. It is our business to set forth the mystery of
the world and man, of which they, being destitute, were able neither to reach
nor see the shrine of truth. Therefore, as I said a little before, when they
had assumed that which was true, that is, that the world was made by God, and was
made for the sake of men, yet, since their argument failed them in the
consequences, they were unable to defend that which they had assumed. In fine, Plato,
that he might not make the work of God weak and subject to ruin, said that it
would remain for ever. If it was made for the sake of men, and so made as to be
eternal, why then are not they on whose account it was made eternal? If they
are mortal on account of whom it was made, it must also itself be mortal and
subject to dissolution, for it is not of more value than those for whose sake it
was made. But if his argument(5) were consistent, he would understand that it
must perish because it was made, and that nothing can remain for ever except that
which cannot be touched.
But he who says that it was not made for the sake of men has no argument.
For if he says that the Creator contrived these works of such magnitude on His
own account, why then were we produced? Why do we enjoy the world itself? what
means the creation of the human race, and of the other living creatures? why do
we intercept the advantages of others? why, in short, do we grow, decrease,
and perish? What reason is implied in our production itself? what in our
perpetual succession? Doubtless God wished us to be seen, and to frame, as it were,
impressions(6) with various representations of Himself, with which He might
delight Himself. Nevertheless, if it were so, He would esteem living creatures as His
care, and especially man. to whose command He made all things subject. But
with regard to those who say that the world always existed: I omit that point,
that itself cannot exist without some beginning, from which they are unable to
extricate themselves; but I say this, if the world always existed, it can have no
systematic arrangement. For what could arrangement have effected in that which
never had a beginning? For before anything is done or arranged, there is need
of counsel that it may be determined how it should be done; nor can anything
be done without the foresight of a settled plan. Therefore the plan precedes
every work. Therefore that which has not been made has no plan. But the world
has a plan by which it both exists and is governed; therefore also it was made:
if it was made, it will also be destroyed. Let them therefore assign a reason,
I if they can, why it was either made in the beginning or will hereafter be
destroyed.
And because Epicurus or Democritus was unable to teach this, he said that
it was produced of its own accord, the seeds(2) coming together in all
directions; and that when these are again resolved, discord and destruction will
follow. Therefore he perverted(3) that which he had correctly seen, and by his
ignorance of system entirely overthrew the whole system, and reduced the world, and
all things which are done in it, to the likeness of a most trifling dream, if no
plan exists in human affairs. But since the world and all its parts, as we
see, are governed by a wonderful plan; since the framing of the heaven, and the
course of the stars and of the heavenly bodies, which is harmonious(4) even in
variety itself, the constant and wonderful arrangement of the seasons, the varied
fruitfulness of the lands, the level plains, the defences and heapings up of
mountains, the verdure and productiveness of the woods, the most salubrious
bursting forth of fountains, the seasonable over-flowings of rivers, the rich and
abundant flowing(5) in of the sea, the opposite and useful breathing(6) of the
winds, and all things, are fixed with the greatest regularity: who is so blind
as to think that they were made without a cause, in which a wonderful
disposition of most provident arrangement shines forth? If, therefore, nothing at all
exists nor is done without a cause; if the providence of the Supreme God is
manifest from the disposition of things, His excellency from their greatness, and His
power from their government: therefore they are dull and mad who have said
that there is no providence. I should not disapprove if they denied the existence
of gods with this object, that they might affirm the existence of one; but when
they did it with this intent, that they might say that there is none, he who
does not think that they were senseless is himself senseless.
CHAP. IV.--THAT ALL THINGS WERE CREATED FOR SOME USE, EVEN THOSE THINGS WHICH
APPEAR EVIL; ON WHAT ACCOUNT MAN ENJOYS REASON IN SO FRAIL A BODY.
But we have spoken sufficiently on the subject of providence in the first
book. For if it has any existence, as appears from the wonderful nature of its
works, it must be that the same providence created man and the other animals.
Let us therefore see what reason there was for the creation of the human race,
since it is evident, as the Stoics say, that the world was made for the sake of
men, although they make no slight error in this very matter, in saying it was
not made for the sake of man, but of men. For the naming of one individual
comprehends the whole human race. But this arises from the fact that they are
ignorant that one man only was made by God, and they think that men were produced in
all lands and fields like mushrooms. But Hermes was not ignorant that man was
both made by God and after the likeness of God. But I return to my subject.
There is nothing, as I imagine, which was made on its own account; but whatever is
made at all must necessarily be made for some purpose. For who is there either
so senseless or so unconcerned as to attempt to do anything at random, from
which he expects no utility, no advantage? He who builds a house does not build it
merely for this purpose, that it may be a house, but that it may be inhabited.
He who builds a ship does not bestow his labour on this account, only that the
ship may be visible, but that men may sail in it. Likewise he who designs and
forms any vessel does not do it on this account, that he may only appear to
have done it, hut that the vessel when made may contain something necessary for
use. In like manner, other things, whatever are made, are plainly not made
superfluously, but for some useful purposes.
It is plain, therefore, that the world was made by God, not on account of
the world itself; for since it is without sensibility, it neither needs the
warmth of the sun, or light, or the breath of the winds, or the moisture of
showers, or the nourishment of fruits. But it cannot even be said that God made the
world for His own sake, since He can exist without the world, as He did before
it was made; and God Himself does not make use of all those things which are
contained in it, and which are produced. It is evident, therefore, that the world
was constructed for the sake of living beings, since living beings enjoy those
things of which it consists; and that these may live and exist, all things
necessary for them are supplied at fixed times. Again, that the other living beings
were made for the sake of man, is plain from this, that they are subservient
to man, and were given for his protection and service; since, whether they are
of the earth or of the water, they do not perceive the system of the world as
man does. We must here reply to the philosophers, and especially to Cicero, who
says: "Why should God, when He made all things on our account, make so large a
quantity of snakes and vipers? why should He scatter so many pernicious things
by land and by sea?" A very wide subject for discussion, but it must be briefly
touched upon, as in passing. Since man is formed of different and opposing
elements, soul and body, that is, heaven and earth, that which is slight and that
which is perceptible to the senses, that which is eternal and that which is
temporal, that which has sensibility and that which is senseless, that which is
endued with light and that which is dark, reason itself and necessity require that
both good and evil things should be set before man--good things which he may
use, and evil things which he may guard against and avoid.
For wisdom has been given to him on this account, that, knowing the nature
of good and evil things, he may exercise the force of his reason in seeking
the good and avoiding the evil. For because wisdom was not given to the other
animals, they were both defended with natural clothing and were armed; but in the
place of all these He gave to man that which was most excellent, reason only.
Therefore He formed him naked and unarmed, that wisdom might be both his defence
and covering. He placed his defence and ornament not without, but within not
in the body, but in the heart Unless, therefore, there were evils which he
might guard against, and which he might distinguish from good and useful things,
wisdom was not necessary for him. Therefore let Marcus Tullius know that reason
was either given to man that he might take fishes on account of his own use,
and avoid snakes and vipers for the sake of his own safety; or that good and
evil things were set before him on this account, because he had received wisdom,
the whole force of which is occupied in distinguishing things good and evil.(1)
Great, therefore, and right, and admirable is the force, and reason, and power
of man, for whose sake God made the world itself and all things, as many as
exist, and gave him so much honour that He set him over all things, since he alone
could admire the works of God. Most excellently, therefore, does our
Asclepiades,(2) in discussing the providence of the Supreme God in that book which he
wrote to me, say: "And on this account any one may with good reason think that
the divine providence gave the place nearest to itself to him who was able to
understand its arrangement. For that is the sun: who so beholds it as to
understand why it is the sun, and what amount of influence it has upon the other parts
of the system? this is the heaven, who looks up to it? this is the earth, who
inhabits it? this is the sea, who sails upon it? this is fire, who makes use of
it?" Therefore the Supreme God did not arrange these things on account of
Himself, because He stands in need of nothing, but on account of man, who might fitly
make use of them.
CHAP. V.--OF THE CREATION OF MAN, AND OF THE ARRANGEMENT OF THE WORLD, AND OF
THE CHIEF GOOD.
Let us now assign the reason why He made man himself. For if the
philosophers bad known this, they would either have maintained those things which they
had found to be true, or would not have fallen into the greatest errors. For
this is the chief thing; this is the point on which everything turns. And if any
one does not possess this, the truth altogether glides away from him. It is
this, in short, which causes them to be inconsistent with reason;(3)for if this
had shone upon them, if they had known all the mystery(4) of man, the Academy
would never have been in entire opposition(5) to their disputations, and to all
philosophy.As, therefore, God did not make the world for His own sake, because
He does not stand in need of its advantages, but for the sake of man, who has
the use of it, so also He made man himself for His own sake. What advantage is
there to God in man, says Epicurus, that He should make him for His own sake?
Truly, that there might be one who might understand His works; who might be
able both to admire with his understanding, and to express with his voice, the
foresight displayed in their arrangement, the order of their creation, the power
exerted in their completion. And the sum of all these things is, that he should
worship God.(6) For he who understands these things worships Him; he follows
Him with due veneration as the Maker of all things, He as his true Father, who
measures the excellence of His majesty according to the invention, the
commencement, and completion of His works. What more evident argument can be brought
forward that God both made the world for the sake of man, and man for His own sake,
than that he alone of all living creatures has been so formed that his eyes
are directed towards heaven, his face looking towards God, his countenance is in
fellowship with his Parent, so that God appears, as it were, with outstretched
hand to have raised man from the ground, and to have elevated him to the
contemplation of Himself. "What, then," he says, "does the worship paid by man confer
on God, who is blessed, and in want of nothing? Or if He gave such honour to
man as to create the world for his sake, to furnish him with wisdom, to make him
lord of all things living, and to love him as a son, why did He make him
subject to death and decay? why did He expose the object of His love to all evils?
when it was befitting that man should be happy, as though closely connected with
God, and everlasting as He is, to the worship and contemplation of whom he was
formed."
Although we have taught these things for the most part in a scattered
manner in the former books, nevertheless, since the subject now specially requires
it, because we have undertaken to discuss the subject of a happy life, these
things are to be explained by us more carefully and fully, that the arrangement
made by God, and His work and will, may be known. Though He was always able by
His own immortal Spirit to produce innumerable souls, as He produced the angels,
to whom there exists immortality without any danger and fear of evils, yet He
devised an unspeakable work, in what manner He might create an infinite
multitude of souls, which being at first united with frail and feeble bodies, He might
place in the midst between good and evil, that He might set virtue before them
composed as they were of both natures; that they might not attain to
immortality by a delicate and easy course of life, but might arrive at that unspeakable
reward of eternal life with the utmost difficulty and great labours. Therefore,
that He might clothe them with limbs which were heavy and liable to injury,(1)
since they were unable to exist in the middle void, the weight and gravity of
the body sinking downwards, He determined that an abode and dwelling-place
should first be built for them. And thus with unspeakable energy and power He
contrived the surpassing works of the world; and having suspended the light elements
on high, and depressed the heavy ones to the depths below, He strengthened the
heavenly things, and established the earthly. It is not necessary at present
to follow out each point separately, since we discussed them all together in the
second book.
Therefore He placed in the heaven lights, whose regularity, and
brightness, and motion, were most suitably proportioned to the advantage of living
beings. Moreover, He gave to the earth, which He designed as their dwelling-place,
fruitfulness for bringing forth and producing various, things, that by the
abundance of fruits and green herbs it might supply nourishment according to the
nature and requirements of each kind. Then, when He had completed all things which
belonged to the condition of the world, He formed man from the earth itself,
which He prepared for him from the beginning as a habitation; that is, He clothed
and covered his spirit with an earthly body, that, being compacted of
different and opposing materials, he might be susceptible of good and evil; and as the
earth itself is fruitful for the bringing forth of grain, so the body of man,
which was taken from the earth, received the power of producing offspring,
that, inasmuch as he was formed of a fragile substance, and could not exist for
ever, when tim space of his temporal life was past, he might depart, and by a
perpetual succession renew that which he bore, which was frail and feeble. Why,
then, did He make him frail and mortal, when He had built the world for his sake?
First of all, that an infinite number of living beings might be produced, and
that He might fill all the earth with a multitude; in the next place, that He
might set before man virtue, that is, endurance of evils and labours, by which
he might be able to gain the reward of immortality. For since man consists of
two parts, body and soul, of which the one is earthly, the other heavenly, two
lives have been assigned to man: the one temporal, which is appointed for the
body; the other everlasting, which belongs to the soul. We received the former
at our birth we attain to the latter by striving, that immortality might not
exist to man without any difficulty. That earthly one is as the body, and
therefore has an end; but this heavenly one is as the soul, and therefore has no limit.
We received the first when we were ignorant of it, this second knowingly; for
it is given to virtue, not to nature, because God wished that we should procure
life for ourselves in life.
For this reason He has given us this present life, that we may either lose
that true and eternal life by our vices, or win it(3) by virtue. The chief
good is not contained in this bodily life, since, as it was given to us by divine
necessity, so it will again be destroyed by divine necessity. Thus that which
has an end does not contain the chief good. But the chief good is contained in
that spiritual life which we acquire by ourselves, because it cannot contain
evil, or have an end; to which subject nature and the system of the body afford an
argument. For other animals incline towards the ground, because they are
earthly, and are incapable of immortality, which is from heaven; but man is upright
and looks towards heaven,[1] because immortality is proposed to him; which,
however, does not come, unless it is given to man by God. For otherwise there
would be no difference between the just and the unjust, since every man who is born
would become immortal. Immortality, then, is not the consequence[2] of nature,
but the reward and recompense of virtue. Lastly, man does not immediately upon
his birth walk upright, but at first on all fours,[3] because the nature of
his body and of this present life is common to us with the dumb animals;
afterwards, when his strength is confirmed, he raises himself, and his tongue is
loosened so that he speaks plainly, and he ceases to be a dumb animal. And this
argument teaches that man is born mortal; but that he afterwards becomes immortal,
when he begins to live in conformity with the will[4] of God, that is, to follow
righteousness,[5] which is comprised in the worship of God, since God raised
man to a view of the heaven and of Himself. And this takes place when man,
purified in the heavenly laver, lays aside[6] his infancy together with all the
pollution of his past life, and having received an increase of divine vigour,
becomes a perfect and complete man.
Therefore, because God has set forth virtue before man, although the soul
and the body are connected together, yet they are contrary, and oppose one
another. The things which are good for the soul are evil to the body, that is, the
avoiding of riches, the prohibiting of pleasures, the contempt of pain and
death. In like manner, the things which are good for the body are evil to the soul,
that is, desire and lust, by which riches are desired, and the enjoyments of
various pleasures, by which the soul is weakened and destroyed? Therefore it is
necessary, that the just and wise man should be engaged in all evils, since
fortitude is victorious over evils; but the unjust in riches, in honours, in
power. For these goods relate to the body, and are earthly; and these men also lead
an earthly life, nor are they able to attain to immortality. because they have
given themselves up to pleasures which are the enemies of virtue. Therefore
this temporal life ought to be subject to that eternal life, as the body is to the
soul. Whoever, then, prefers the life of the soul must despise the life of the
body; nor will he in any other way be able to strive after that which is
highest, unless he shall have despised the things which are lowest. But he who shall
have embraced the life of the body, and shall have turned his desires
downwards[8] to the earth, is unable to attain to that higher life. But he who prefers
to live well for eternity, will live badly[9] for a time, and will be subjected
to all troubles and labours as long as he shall be on earth, that he may have
divine and heavenly consolation. And he who shall prefer to live well[10] for a
time, will live ill to eternity; for he will be condemned by the sentence of
God to eternal punishment, be cause he has preferred earthly to heavenly goods.
On this account, therefore, God seeks to be worshipped, and to be honoured by
man as a Father, that he may have virtue and wisdom, which alone produce'
immortality. For because no other but Himself is able to confer that immortality,
since He alone possesses it, He will grant[11] to the piety of the man, with
which he has honoured God, this reward, to be blessed to all eternity, and to be
for ever in the presence of God and in the society of God.
N.B.--The following paragraphs to the end of the chapter are wanting many
MSS., and it is very doubtful whether they were written by Lactantius.
Nor can any one shelter himself under the pretext that the fault belongs
to Him who made both good and evil. For why did He will that evil should exist
if He hated it? Why did He not make good only, that no one might sin, no one
commit evil? Although I have explained this in almost all the former books, and
have touched upon it, though slightly, above, yet it must be mentioned
repeatedly, because the whole matter turns on this point. For there could be no virtue
unless He had made contrary things; nor can the power of good be at all manifest,
except from a comparison with evil. Thus evil is nothing else but the
explanation of good. Therefore if evil is taken away, good must also be taken away. If
you shall cut off your left hand or foot, your body will not be entire, nor
will life itself remain the same. Thus, for the due adjustment of the framework of
the body, the left members are most suitably joined with the right. In like
manner, if you make chessmen[1] all alike, no one will play. If you shall give
one colour[2] only to the circus, no one will think it worth while to be a
spectator, all the pleasure of the Circensian games being taken away. For he who
first instituted the games was a favourer of one colour; but he introduced another
as a rival, that there might be a contest, and some partisanship[3] in the
spectacle. Thus God, when He was fixing that which was good, and giving virtue,
appointed also their contraries, with which they might contend. If an enemy and a
fight be wanting, there is no victory. Take away a contest, and even virtue is
nothing. How many are the mutual contests of men, and with what various arts
are they carried on! No one, however, would be regarded as surpassing in bravery,
swiftness, or excellence, if he bad no adversary with whom he might contend.
And where victory is wanting, there also glory and the reward of victory must be
absent together with it. Therefore, that he might strengthen virtue itself by
continual exercise, and might make it perfect from its conflict with evils, He
gave both together, because each of the two without the other is unable to
retain its force. Therefore there is diversity, on which the whole system of truth
depends.
It does not escape my notice what may here be urged in opposition by more
skilful persons. If good cannot exist without evil, how do you say that, before
he had offended God, the first man lived in the exercise of good only, or that
be will hereafter live in the exercise of good only? This question is to be
examined by us, for in the former books I omitted it, that I might here fill up
the subject. We have said above that the nature of man is made up of opposing
elements; for the body, because it is earth, is capable of being grasped, of
temporary duration, senseless, and dark. But the soul, because it is from heaven,
is unsubstantial,[4] everlasting, endued with sensibility, and full of
lustre;[5] and because these qualities are opposed to one another, it follows of
necessity that man is subject to good and evil. Good is ascribed to the soul, because
it is incapable of dissolution; evil to the body, because it is frail. Since,
therefore, the body and the soul are connected and united together, the good and
the evil must necessarily hold together; nor can they be separated from one
another, unless when they (the body and soul) are separated. Finally, the
knowledge of good and of evil was given at the same time to the first man; and when
he understood this, he was immediately driven from the holy place in which there
is no evil; for when he was conversant with that which was good only, he was
ignorant that this itself was good. But after that he had received the knowledge
of good and evil, it was now unlawful for him to remain in that place of
happiness, and he was banished to this common world, that he might at once
experience both of those things with the nature of which he had at once become
acquainted. It is plain, therefore, that wisdom has been given to man that he may
disitinguish good from evil--that he may discriminate between things advantageous and
things disadvantageous, between things useful and things useless--that he may
have judgment and consideration as to what he ought to guard against, what to
desire, what to avoid, and what to follow. Wisdom therefore cannot exist
without evil; and that first author[6] of the human race, as long as he was
conversant with good only, lived as an infant, ignorant of good and evil. But, indeed,
hereafter man must be both wise and happy without any evil; but this cannot take
place as long as the soul is clothed with the abode of the body.
But when a separation shall have been made between the body and the soul,
then evil will be disunited from good; and as the body perishes and the soul
remains, so evil will perish and good be permanent. Then man, having received the
garment of immortality, will be wise and free from evil, as God is. He,
therefore, who wishes that we should be conversant with good only, especially desires
this, that we should live without the body, in which evil is. But if evil is
taken away, either wisdom, as I have said, or the body, will be taken from man;
wisdom, that he may be ignorant of evil; the body, that he may not be sensible
of it. But now, since man is furnished with wisdom to know, and a body to
perceive, God willed that both should exist alike in this life, that virtue and
wisdom may be in agreement. Therefore He placed man in the midst, between both,
that he might have liberty to follow either good or evil. But He mingled with evil
some things which appear good, that is, various and delightful enjoyments,
that by the enticements of these He might lead men to the concealed evil. And He
likewise mingled with good some things which appear evil--that is, hardships,
and miseries, and labours--by the harshness and unpleasantness of which the soul,
being offended, might shrink back from the concealed good. But here the office
of wisdom is needed, that we may see more with the mind than with the body,
which very few are able to do; because while virtue is difficult and rarely to be
found, pleasure is common and public. Thus it necessarily happens that the
wise man is accounted as a fool, who, while he seeks good things which are not
seen, permits those which are seen to slip from his hands; and while he avoids
evils which are not seen, runs into evils which are before the eyes; which happens
to us when we refuse neither torture nor death in behalf of the faith, since
we are driven to the greatest wickedness, so as to betray the faith and deny the
true God, and to sacrifice to dead and death-bearing gods. This is the cause
why God made man mortal, and made him subject to evils, although he had framed
the world for his sake, namely, that he might be capable of virtue, and that
his virtue might reward him with immortality. Now virtue, as we have shown, is
the worship of the true God.
CHAP. VI.--WHY THE WORLD AND MAN WERE CREATED. HOW UNPROFITABLE IS THE WORSHIP
OF FALSE GODS.
Now let us mark the whole argument by a brief definition.[1] The world has
been created for this purpose, that we may be born; we are born for this end,
that we may acknowledge the Maker of the world and of ourselves--God; we
acknowledge Him for this end, that we may worship Him; we worship Him for this end
that we may receive immortality as the reward of our labours, since the worship
of God consists of the greatest labours; for this end we are rewarded with
immortality, that being made like to the angels, we may serve the Supreme Father and
Lord for ever, and may be to all eternity a kingdom to God. This is the sum of
all things, this the secret of God, this the mystery of the world, from which
they are estranged, who, following present gratification, have devoted
themselves to the pursuit of earthly and frail goods, and by means of deadly enjoyments
have sunk as it were in mire and mud their souls, which were born for heavenly
pursuits.
Let us now, in the next place, inquire whether there is anything
reasonable in the worship of these gods; for if they are many, if they are worshipped
only on this account by men, that they may afford them riches, victories,
honours, and all things, which are of no avail except for the present; if we are
produced without cause--if no providence is employed in the production of men--if we
are brought forth by chance for ourselves, and for the sake of our own
pleasure--if we are nothing after death,--what can be so superfluous, so empty, so
vain, as the affairs of man, and the world itself? which, though it is of
incredible magnitude, and constructed with such wonderful arrangement, is nevertheless
occupied with trifling subjects. For why should the breathings of the winds
put the clouds in motion? Why should lightnings shine forth, thunders roar, or
showers fall, that the earth may bring forth its increase, and nourish its
various productions? Why, in short, should all nature labour that nothing may be
wanting of those things by which the life of man is sustained, if it is vain, if we
utterly perish, if there is in us nothing of greater advantage to God? But if
it is unlawful to be spoken, and is not to be thought possible, that that which
you see to be most in accordance with reason was not established on account of
some reason of importance, what reason can there be in these errors of
depraved religions, and in this persuasion of philosophers, by which they imagine that
souls perish? Assuredly there is none; for what have they to say why the gods
so regularly supply to men everything in its season? Is it that we may present
to them corn and wine, and the odour of incense, and the blood of cattle? Which
things cannot be acceptable to the immortals, because they are perishable; nor
can they be of use to beings destitute of bodies, because these things have
been given for the use of those possessed of bodies; and yet if they required
these things, they could bestow them upon themselves when they wished. Whether,
therefore, souls perish or exist for ever, what principle is involved in the
worship of the gods, or by whom was the world established? Why, or when, or how
long, or how far were men produced, or on what account? Why do they arise, die,
succeed one another, are renewed? What do the gods obtain from the worship of
those who after death are about to have no existence? What do they perform, what
do they promise, What do they threaten, which is worthy of men or of gods? Or if
souls remain after death, what do they do or are they about to do respecting
them? What need is there to them of a treasure-house of souls? From what source
do they themselves arise? How, or why, or whence are they so many? Thus it
comes to pass, that if yon depart from that sum of things which we comprised above,
all system is destroyed, and all things return[2] to nothing.
CHAP. VII.--OF THE VARIETY OF PHILOSOPHERS, AND THEIR TRUTH.
And because the philosophers did not comprehend this main point, they were
neither able to comprehend truth, although they for the most part both saw and
explained those things of which the main point itself consists. But different
persons brought forward all these things, and in different ways, not connecting
the causes of things, nor the consequences, nor the reasons, so that they
might join together and complete that main point which comprises the whole. But it
is easy to show that almost the whole truth has been divided by philosophers
and sects. For we do not overthrow philosophy, as the Academics are accustomed to
do, whose plan was to reply to everything, which is rather to calumniate and
mock; but we show that no sect was so much out of the way, and no philosopher so
vain, as not to see something of the truth.[1] But while they are mad with the
desire of contradicting, while they defend their own arguments even though
false, and overthrow those of others even though true, not only has the truth
escaped from them, which they pretended that they were seeking, but they themselves
lost it chiefly through their own fault. But if there had been any one to
collect together the truth which was dispersed amongst individuals and scattered
amongst sects, and to reduce it to a body, he assuredly would not disagree with
us. But no one is able to do this, unless he has experience[2] and knowledge
of the truth. But to know the truth belongs to him only who has been taught by
God. For he cannot in any other way reject the things which are false, or choose
and approve of those which are true; but if even by chance he should effect
this, he would most surely act the part of the philosopher; and though he could
not defend those things by divine testimonies, yet the truth would explain
itself by its own light. Wherefore the error of those is incredible, who, when they
have approved of any sect, and have devoted themselves to it, condemn all
others as false and vain, and arm themselves for battle, neither knowing what they
ought to defend nor what to refute; and make attacks everywhere, without
distinction,[3] upon all things which are brought forward by those who disagree with
them.
On account of these most obstinate contentions of theirs, no philosophy
existed which made a nearer approach to the truth, for the whole truth has been
comprised by these in separate portions.[4] Plato said[5] that the world was
made by God: the prophets[6] speak the same; and the same is apparent from the
verses of the Sibyl. They therefore are in error, who have said either that all
things were produced of their own accord or from an assemblage of atoms;[7] since
so great a world, so adorned and of such magnitude, could neither have been
made nor arranged and set in order without some most skilful author, and that
very arrangement by which all things are perceived to be kept together and to be
governed bespeaks[8] an artificer with a most skilful mind. The Stoics say that
the world, and all things which are in it, were made for the sake of men: the
sacred writings[9] teach us the same thing. Therefore Democritus was in error,
who thought that they were poured forth from the earth like worms, without any
author or plan. For the reason of man's creation belongs to a divine mystery;
and because he was unable to know this, he drew[10] down man's life to nothing.
Aristo asserted that men were born to the exercise of virtue; we are also
reminded of and learn the same from the prophets. Therefore Aristippus is deceived,
who made man subject to pleasure, that is, to evil, as though he were a beast.
Pherecydes and Plato contended that souls were immortal; but this is a peculiar
doctrine in our religion. Therefore Dicaearchus was mistaken, together with
Democritus, who argued that souls perished with the body and were dissolved, Zeno
the Stoic taught that there were infernal regions, and that the abodes of the
good were separated from the wicked; and that the former enjoyed peaceful and
delightful regions, but that the latter suffered punishment in dark places, and
in dreadful abysses of mire: the prophets show the same thing. Therefore
Epicurus was mistaken, who thought that that was an invention[11] of the poets, and
explained those punishments of the infernal regions, which are spoken of, as
happening in this life. Therefore the philosophers touched upon the whole truth,
and every secret of our holy religion; but when others denied it, they were
unable to defend that which they had found, because the system did not agree[12]
with the particulars; nor were they able to reduce to a summary those things which
they had perceived to be true, as we have done above.
CHAP. VIII.--OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.
The one chief good, therefore, is immortality, for the reception of which
we were originally formed and born. To this we direct our course; human nature
regards this; to this virtue exalts us. And because we have discovered this
good, it remains that we should also speak of immortality itself. The arguments of
Plato, although they contribute much to the subject, have little strength to
prove and fill up the truth, since he had neither summed up and collected into
one the plan of the whole of this great mystery, nor had he comprehended the
chief good. For although he perceived the truth respecting the immortality of
the soul, yet he did not speak respecting it as though it were the chief good.
We, therefore, are able to elicit the truth by more certain signs; for we have
not collected it by doubtful surmise,[1] but have known it by divine instruction.
Now Plato thus reasoned, that whatever has perception by itself, and always
moves, is immortal; for that that which has no beginning of motion is not about
to have an end, because it cannot be deserted by itself. But this argument would
give eternal existence even to dumb animals, unless he had made a distinction
by the addition of wisdom. He added, therefore, that he might escape this
common[2] linking together, that the soul of man could not be otherwise than
immortal, since its wonderful skill in invention, its quickness in reflection, and its
readiness in perceiving and learning, its memory of the past, and its
foresight of the future, and its knowledge of innumerable arts and subjects, which
other living creatures do not possess, appear divine and heavenly; because of the
soul, which conceives such great things, and contains such great things, no
origin can be found on earth, since it has nothing of earthly admixture united with
it. But that which is ponderous in man, and liable to dissolution, must be
resolved into earth; whereas that which is slight and subtle is incapable of
division, and when freed from the abode of the body, as from prison, it flies to the
heaven, and to its own nature. This is a brief summary of the tenets of Plato,
which are widely and copiously explained in his own writings.
Pythagoras also was previously of the same sentiments, and his teacher
Pherecydes, whom Cicero reported to have been the first who discoursed respecting
the immortality of the soul. And although all these excelled in eloquence,
nevertheless in this contest at least, those who argued against this opinion had no
less authority; Dicaearchus first, then Democritus, and lastly Epicurus: so
that the matter itself, respecting which they were contending, was called into
doubt. Finally, Tullius also having set forth the opinions of all these
respecting immortality and death, declared that he did not know what was the truth.
"Which of these opinions is true," he said, "some God may see."[3] And again he
says in another place: "Since each of these opinions had most learned defenders,
it cannot be divined what is certainty." But we have no need of divination,
since the divinity itself has laid open to us the truth.
CHAP. IX.--OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL, AND OF VIRTUE.
By these arguments, therefore, which neither Plato nor any other invented,
the immorality of souls can be proved and perceived: which arguments we will
briefly collect, since my discourse hastens on to relate the great judgment of
God, which will be celebrated on the earth at the approaching end of the
world.[4] Before all things, since God cannot be seen by man, lest any one should
imagine from this circumstance that God does not exist, because He was not seen by
mortal eyes, among other wonderful arrangements s He also made many things the
power of which is manifest, but the substance is not seen, as the voice, smell,
the wind, that by the token and example of these things we might perceive God
from His power and operation and works, although He did not fall under the
notice of our eyes. What is clearer than the voice, or stronger than the wind, or
more forcible than smell? Yet these, when they are borne through the air and
come to our senses, and impel them by their efficacy, are not distinguished by the
eyesight, but are perceived by other parts of the body. In like manner, God is
not to be perceived by us through the sight or other frail sense; but He is to
be beheld by the eyes of the mind, since we see His illustrious and wonderful
works. For as to those who have altogether denied the existence of God, I
should not only refuse to call them philosophers, but even deny them the name of
men, who, with a close resemblance to dumb animals, consisted of body only,
discerning nothing with their mind, and referring all things to the bodily senses,
who thought that nothing existed but that which they beheld with their eyes. And
because they saw that adversity befell the wicked, or prosperity happened to
the good, they believed that all things were carried on by fortune, and that the
world was established by nature, and not by providence.
Hence they at once fell into the absurdities[6] which necessarily followed
such a sentiment. But if there is a God who is incorporeal, invisible, and
eternal, therefore it is credible that the soul, since it is not seen, does not
perish after its departure from the body; for it is manifest that something
exists which perceives and is vigorous, and yet does not come into sight. But, it
is said, it is difficult to comprehend with the mind how the soul can retain
its perception without those parts of the body in which the office of perception
is contained. What about God? Is it easy to comprehend how He is vigorous
without a body? But if they believe in the existence of gods who, if they exist, are
plainly destitute of bodies, it must be that human souls exist in the same
way, since it is perceived from reason itself, and discernment, that there is a
certain resemblance in man and God. Finally, that proof which even Marcus
Tullius[1] saw is of sufficient strength: that the immortality of the soul may be
discerned from the fact that there is no other animal which has any knowledge of
God; and religion is almost the only thing which distinguishes man from the dumb
creation. And since this falls to man alone, it assuredly testifies that we may
aim at, desire, and cultivate that which is about to be familiar and very near.
Can any one, when he has considered the nature of other animals, which the
providence of the Supreme God has made abject, with bodies bending down and
prostrated to the earth, so that it may be understood from this that they have no
intercourse with heaven, fail to understand that man alone of all animals is
heavenly and divine, whose body raised from the ground,[2] elevated countenance,
and upright position, goes in quest of its origin, and despising, as it were,
the lowliness of the earth, reaches forth to that which is on high, because he
perceives that the highest good is to be sought by him in the highest place,
and mindful of his condition in which God made him illustrious, looks towards his
Maker? And Trismegistus most rightly called this looking a contemplation of
God,[3] which has no existence in the dumb animals. Since therefore wisdom, which
is given to man alone, is nothing else but the knowledge of God, it is evident
that the soul does not perish, nor undergo dissolution, but that it remains
for ever, because it seeks after and loves God, who is everlasting, by the
impulse of its very nature perceiving either from what source it has sprung, or to
what it is about to return. Moreover, it is no slight proof of immortality that
man alone makes use of the heavenly element. For, since the nature of the world
consists of two elements[4] which are opposed to one another--fire and
water--of which the one is assigned to the heaven, the other to the earth, the other
living creatures, because they are of the earth and mortal, make use of the
element which is earthly and heavy: man alone makes use of fire, which is an element
light, rising upward,[5] and heavenly. But those things which are weighty
depress to death, and those which are light elevate to life; because life is on
high, and death below. And as there cannot be light without fire, so there cannot
be life without light. Therefore fire is the element of light and life; from
which it is evident that man who uses it is a partaker of an immortal condition,
because that which causes life is familiar to him.
The gift of virtue also to man alone is a great proof that souls are
immortal. For this will not be in accordance with nature if the soul is
extinguished; for it is injurious to this present life. For that earthly life, which we
lead in common with dumb animals, both seeks pleasure, by the varied and agreeable
fruits of which it is delighted, and avoids pain, the harshness of which, by
its unpleasant sensations, injures the nature of living beings, and endeavours
to lead them to death, which dissolves the living being. If, therefore, virtue
both prohibits man from those goods which are naturally desired, and impels him
to endure evils which are naturally avoided, it follows that virtue is an evil,
and opposed to nature; and he must necessarily be judged foolish who pursues
it, since he injures himself both by avoiding present goods, and by seeking
equally evils, without hope of greater advantage. For when it is permitted us to
enjoy the sweetest pleasures, should we not appear to be without sense if we
should not prefer to live in lowliness, in want, in contempt and ignominy, or not
to live at all, but to be tormented with pain, and to die, when from these evils
we should gain nothing to compensate us for the pleasure which we have given
up? But if virtue is not an evil, and acts honourably, inasmuch as it despises
vicious and shameful pleasures, and bravely, inasmuch as it neither fears pain
nor death, that it may discharge its duty, therefore it must obtain some greater
good than those things are which it despises. But when death has been
undergone, what further good can be hoped for except immortality?
CHAP. X.--OF VICES AND VIRTUES, AND OF LIFE AND DEATH.
Let us now in turn pass on to those things which are opposed to virtue,
that from these also the immortality of the soul may be inferred. All vices are
for a time; for they are excited for the present. The impetuosity of anger is
appeased when vengeance has been taken; the pleasure of the body puts an end[6]
to lust; desire is destroyed either by the full enjoyment of the objects which
it seeks, or by the excitement of other affections; ambition, when it has gained
the honours which it wished for, loses[1] its strength; likewise the other
vices are unable to stand their ground and remain, but they are ended by the very
enjoyment which they desire. Therefore they withdraw and return. But virtue is
perpetual, without any intermission; nor can he who has once taken it up depart
from it. or if it should have any interruption[2] if we can at any time do
without it, vices, which always oppose virtue, will return. Therefore it has not
been grasped, if it deserts its post, if at any time it withdraws itself. But
when it has established for itself a firm abode, it must necessarily be engaged
in every act; nor can it faithfully drive away and put to flight vices, unless
it shall fortify with a perpetual guard the breast which it inhabits. Therefore
the uninterrupted duration[3] of virtue itself shows that the soul of man, if
it has received virtue, remains permanent, because virtue is perpetual, and it
is the human mind alone which receives virtue. Since, therefore, vices are
contrary to virtue, the whole systems must of necessity differ from and be contrary
to each other. Because vices are commotions and perturbations of the soul;
virtue, on the contrary, is mildness and tranquillity of mind. Because vices are
temporary, and of short duration; virtue is perpetual and constant, and always
consistent with itself. Because the fruits of vices, that is, pleasures, equally
with themselves, are short and temporary, therefore the fruit and reward of
virtue are everlasting. Because the advantage of vices is immediate, therefore
that of virtue is future.
Thus it happens that in this life there is no reward of virtue, because
virtue itself still exists. For as, when vices are completed in their
performance, pleasure and their rewards follow; so, when virtue has been ended, its reward
follows. But virtue is never ended except by death, since its highest office
is in the undergoing of death: therefore the reward of virtue is after death. In
fine, Cicero, in his Yusculan Disputations,[4] perceived, though with doubt,
that the chief good does not happen to man except after death. "A man will go,"
he says, "with confident spirit, if circumstances shall so happen, to death in
which we have ascertained that there is either the chief good or no evil."
Death, therefore, does not extinguish man, but admits him to the reward of virtue.
But he who has contaminated himself,[5] as the same writer says, with vices and
crimes, and has been the slave of pleasure, he truly, being condemned, shall
suffer eternal punishment, which the sacred writings call the second death,
which is both eternal and full of the severest torments.[6] For as two lives are
proposed to man, of which the one belongs to the soul, the other to the body; so
also two deaths are proposed,--one relating to the body, which all must
undergo according to nature, the other relating to the soul, which is acquired by
wickedness and avoided by virtue. As this life is temporary and has fixed limits,
because it belongs to the body; so also death is in like manner temporary and
has a fixed end, because it affects the body.
CHAP. XI.--OF THE LAST TIMES, AND OF THE SOUL AND BODY.
Therefore, when the times which God has appointed for death shall be
completed, death itself shall be ended. And because temporal death follows temporal
life, it follows that souls rise again to everlasting life, because temporal
death has received an end. Again, as the life of the soul is everlasting, in
which it receives the divine and unspeakable fruits of its immortality; also its
death must be eternal, in which it suffers perpetual punishments and infinite
torments for its faults. Therefore things are in this position, that they who
are happy in this life, pertaining to the body and the earth, are about to be
miserable for ever, because they have already enjoyed the good things which they
preferred, which happens to those who adore false gods and neglect the true
God. In the next place, they who, following righteousness, have been miserable,
and despised, and poor in this life, and have often been harassed with insults
and injuries on account of righteousness itself, because virtue cannot otherwise
be attained, are about to be always happy, that since they have already
endured evils, they may also enjoy goods. Which plainly happens to those who, having
despised gods of the earth and frail goods, follow the heavenly religion of
God, whose goods are everlasting, as He Himself who gave them. What shall I say of
the works of the body and soul? Do not they show that the soul is not subject
to death? For, as to the body, since it is itself frail and mortal, whatever
works it contrives are equally perishable. For Tullius says that there is nothing
which is wrought by the hands of man which is not at some time reduced to
destruction, either through injury caused by men, or through length of time, which
is the destroyer of all things.
But truly we see that the productions of the mind are immortal. For as
many as, devoting themselves to the contempt of present things, have handed down
to memory the monuments of their genius and great deeds, have plainly gained by
these an imperishable name for their mind and virtue. Therefore, if the deeds
of the body are mortal for this reason, because the body itself is mortal, it
follows that the soul is shown to be immortal from this, because we see that its
productions are not mortal. In the same manner also, the desires of the body
and of the soul declare that the one is mortal, the other everlasting. For the
body desires nothing except what is temporal, that is, food, drink, clothing,
rest, and pleasure; and it cannot desire or attain to these very things without
the assent and assistance[1] of the soul. But the soul of itself desires many
things which do not extend[2] to the duty or enjoyment of the body; and those are
not frail, but eternal, as the fame of virtue, as the remembrance of the name.
For the soul even in opposition to the body desires the worship of God, which
consists in abstinence from desires and lusts, in the enduring of pain, in the
contempt of death. From which it is credible that the soul does not perish, but
is separated from the body, because the body can do nothing without the soul,
but the soul can do many and great things without the body. Why should I
mention that those things which are visible to the eyes, and capable of being
touched by the hand, cannot be eternal, because they admit of external violence; but
those things which neither come under the touch nor tinder the sight, but are
apparent only in their force and method and effect, are eternal because they
suffer no violence from without? But if the body is mortal on this account,
because it is equally open to the sight and to the touch, therefore the soul is
immortal for this reason, because it can be neither touched nor seen.
CHAP. XII.--OF THE SOUL AND THE BODY, AND OF THEIR UNION AND SEPARATION AND
RETURN.
Now let us refute the arguments of those who maintain the opposite
opinions, which Lucretius has related in his third book. Since, he says, the soul is
born together with the body, it must necessarily die with the body. But the
two cases are not similar. For the body is solid, and capable of being grasped[3]
both by the eyes and the hand; but the soul is slight,[4] and eluding the
touch and sight. The body is formed from the earth, and made firm; the soul has in
it nothing concrete, nothing of earthly weight, as Plato maintained. For it
could not have such great force, such great skill, such great rapidity, unless it
derived its origin from heaven. The body, therefore, since it is made up of a
ponderous and corruptible element, and is tangible and visible, is corrupted and
dies; nor is it able to repel violence, because it comes under the sight and
under the touch; but the soul, which by its slightness avoids all touch, can be
dissolved by no attack. Therefore, although they are joined and connected
together from birth, and the one which is formed of earthly material[5] is, as it
were, the vessel of the other, which is drawn out from heavenly fineness, when
any violence has separated the two, which separation is called death, then each
returns into its own nature; that which was of earth is resolved into earth;
that which is of heavenly breath remains fixed, and flourishes always, since the
divine spirit is everlasting. In fine, the same Lucretius, forgetting what he
asserted, and what dogma he defended, wrote these verses:[6]--
"That also which before was from the earth passes back into the earth, and
that which was sent from the borders of ether is carried again by the quarters
of heaven."[7]
But this language was not for him to employ, who contended that souls perished
with the bodies; but he was overcome by the truth, and the true system stole
upon him unawares. Moreover, that very inference which he draws, that the soul
suffers dissolution, that is, that it perishes together with the body, since
they are produced together, is both false, and is capable of being turned to the
opposite direction. For the body does not perish together with the soul; but
when the soul departs it remains entire for many days. and frequently by medical
preparations it remains entire for a very long time. For if they both perished
together, as they are produced together, the soul would not hastily depart and
desert the body, but both would be dispersed alike at one point of time; and the
body also, while the breath still remained in it, would dissolve and perish as
quickly as the soul departs: yes, truly, the body, being dissolved, the soul
would vanish, as moisture poured forth from a broken vessel. For if the earthly
and frail body after the departure of the soul does not immediately flow away
and waste into earth, from which it has its origin, therefore the soul, which is
not frail, endures to eternity, since its origin is eternal. He says, since
the understanding increases in boys, and is vigorous in young men, and is
lessened in the aged, it is evident that it is mortal. First, the soul is not the same
thing as the mind; for it is one thing that we live, another that we reflect.
For it is the mind of those who are asleep which is at rest,[8] not the soul;
and in those who are mad, the mind is extinguished, the soul remains; and
therefore they are not said to be without a soul, but to be deprived of their
mind.[1] Therefore the mind, that is, the understanding, is either increased or
lessened according to age. The soul is always in its own condition; and from the time
when it receives the power of breathing, it remains the same even to the end,
until, being sent forth from the confinement of the body, it flies back to its
own abode. In the next place, the soul, although inspired by God, yet, because
it is shut up in a dark abode of earthly flesh, does not possess knowledge,
which belongs to divinity. Therefore it hears and learns all things, and receives
wisdom by learning and hearing; and old age does not lessen wisdom, but
increases it, if the age of youth has been passed in virtue; and if excessive old age
shall have enfeebled the limbs, it is not the fault of the mind if the sight
has vanished, if the tongue has become benumbed, if the hearing has grown deaf,
but it is the fault of the body. But, it is said, the memory fails. What wonder,
if the mind is oppressed by the ruin of the falling house, and forgets the
past, not about to be divine on any other condition than if it shall have escaped
the prison in which it is confined?
But the soul, be says, is also subject to pain and grief, and loses its
senses through drunkenness, whence it is evidently frail and mortal. On this
account, therefore, virtue and wisdom are necessary, that both grief, which is
contracted by the suffering and the sight of unworthy objects, may be repelled by
fortitude, and that pleasure may be overcome, not only by abstaining from
drinking, but also from other things. For if it be destitute of virtue, if it be
given up to pleasure, and thus rendered effeminate, it will become subject to
death, since virtue, as we have shown, is the contriver of immortality, as pleasure
is of death. But death, as I have set forth, does not entirely extinguish and
destroy, but visits with eternal torments. For the soul cannot entirely perish,
since it received its origin from the Spirit of God, which is eternal. The
soul, he says, is sensible even of disease of the body, and suffers forgetfulness
of itself; and as it grows ill, so also it is often healed. This is therefore
the reason why virtue is especially to be used, that the mind--not the
soul[2]--may not be harassed by any pain of the body, or undergo oblivion of itself. And
since this has its seat in a certain part of the body, when any violence of
disease has vitiated that part, it is moved from its place; and as though shaken,
it departs from its station, about to return when a cure and health shall have
remodelled its abode. For, since the soul is united with the body, if it is
destitute of virtue, it grows sick by the contagion of the body, and from sharing
its frailty the weakness extends to the mind. But when it shall be disunited
from the body it will flourish by itself; nor will it now be assailed by any,
condition of frailty, because it has laid aside its frail covering. As the eye, he
says, when torn out and separated from the body, can see nothing, so also the
soul, when separated, can perceive nothing, because it is itself also a part of
the body. This is false, and dissimilar to the case supposed; for the soul is
not a part of the body, but in the body. As that which is contained in a vessel
is not a part of the vessel, and these things which are in a house are not
said to be a part of the house; so the mind is not a part of the body, because the
body is either the vessel or the receptacle of the soul.
Now, that is a much more empty argument which says that the soul appears to
be mortal because it is not quickly sent forth from the body, but gradually
unfolds itself from all the members, beginning from the extremity of the feet; as
though, if it were eternal, it would burst forth in a single moment of time,
which takes place in those who die by the sword. But they who are slain by
disease are longer in breathing forth their spirit, so that as the limbs grow cold
the soul is breathed forth. For, since it is contained in the material of the
blood, as light is in the oil, that material being consumed by the heat of
fevers, the extremities of the limbs must grow cold; since the more slender veins
are extended into the extremities of the body, and the extreme and smaller
streams are dried up when the fountain-spring fails. It must not, however, be
supposed that, because the perception of the body fails, the sensibility of the soul
is extinguished and perishes. For it is not the soul that becomes senseless when
the body fails, but it is the body which becomes senseless when the soul takes
its departure, because it draws all sensibility with it. But since the soul by
its presence gives sensibility to the body, and causes it to live, it is
impossible that it should not live and perceive by itself, since it is in itself
both consciousness and life. For as to that which says,
"But if our mind were immortal, it would not when dying complain so much
of its dissolution as it would rejoice in passing abroad and quitting its
vesture like a snake,"[3]
I never saw any one who complained of his dissolution in death; but he perhaps
had seen some Epicurean philosophizing even in death, and with his latest
breath discoursing about his dissolution.
How can it be known whether he feels that he is in a state of dissolution,
or that he is being set free from the body, when his tongue grows dumb at his
departure? For as long as he perceives and has the power of speech, he is not
yet dissolved; when he has suffered dissolution, he is now unable either to
perceive or to speak, so that either he is not yet able to complain of his
dissolution, or he is no longer able. But, it is said, he understands before he
undergoes dissolution, that he must undergo it. Why should I mention that we see many
of the dying, not complaining that they are undergoing dissolution, but
testifying that they are passing out, and setting forth on their journey and walking?
and they signify this by gesture, or if they still are able, they express it
also by their voice. From which it is evident that it is not a dissolution which
takes place, but a separation; and this shows that the soul continues to exist.
Other arguments of the Epicurean system are opposed to Pythagoras, who
contends that souls migrate from bodies worn out with old age and death, and gain
admission[1] into those which are new and recently born; and that the same souls
are always reproduced at one time in a man, at another time in a sheep, at
another in a wild beast, at another in a bird; and that they are immortal on this
account, because they often change their abodes, consisting of various and
dissimilar bodies. And this opinion of a senseless man, since it is ridiculous and
more worthy of a stage-player than of a school of philosophy, ought not even to
have been refuted seriously; for he who does this appears to be afraid lest any
one should believe it. Therefore we must pass by those things which have been
discussed in behalf of falsehood against falsehood; it is sufficient to have
refuted those things which are against the truth.