ON THE SOUL AND THE RESURRECTION
ON THE SOUL AND THE RESURRECTION
ARGUMENT
THE mind, in times of bereavement, craves a certainty gained by reasoning
as to the existence of the soul after death.
First, then: Virtue will be impossible, if deprived of the life of
eternity, her only advantage.
But this is a moral argument. The case calls for speculative and
scientific treatment.
How is the objection that the nature of the soul, as of real things, is
material, to be met?
Thus; the truth of this doctrine would involve the truth of Atheism;
whereas Atheism is refuted by the fact of the wise order that reigns in the world.
In other words, the spirituality of God cannot be denied: and this proves the
possibility of spiritual or immaterial existence: and therefore, that of the soul.
But is God, then, the same thing as the soul?
No: but man is "a little world in himself;" and we may with the same right
conclude from this Microcosm to the actual existence of an immaterial soul, as
from the phenomena of the world to the reality of God's existence.
A Definition of the soul is then given, for the sake of clearness in the
succeeding discussion. It is a created, living, intellectual being, with the
power, as long as it is provided with organs, of sensuous perception. For "the
mind sees," not the eye; take, for instance, the meaning of the phases of the
moon. The objection that the "organic machine" of the body produces all thought is
met by the instance of the water-organ. Such machines, if thought were really
an attribute of matter, ought to build themselves spontaneously: whereas they
are a direct proof of an invisible thinking power in man. A work of Art means
mind: there is a thing perceived, and a thing not perceived.
But still, what is this thing not perceived?
If it has no sensible quality whatever--Where is it?
The answer is, that the same question might be asked about the Deity
(Whose existence is not denied).
Then the Mind and the Deity are identical?
Not so: in its substantial existence, as separable from matter, the soul
is like God; but this likeness does not extend to sameness; it resembles God as
a copy the original.
As being "simple and uncompounded" the soul survives the dissolution of
the composite body, whose scattered elements it will continue to accompany, as if
watching over its property till the Resurrection, when it will clothe itself
in them anew.
The soul was defined "an intellectual being." But anger and desire are not
of the body either. Are there, then, two or three souls?--Answer. Anger and
desire do not belong to the essence of the soul, but are only among its varying
states; they are not originally part of ourselves, and we can and must rid
ourselves of them, and bring them, as long as they continue to mark our community
with the brute creation, into the service of the good. They are the "tares" of
the heart, while they serve any other purpose.
But where will the soul "accompany its elements"?--Hades is not a
particular spot; it means the Invisible; those passages in the Bible in which the
regions under the earth are alluded to are explained as allegorical, although the
partizans of the opposite interpretation need not be combated.
But how will the soul know the scattered elements of the once familiar
form? This is answered by two illustrations (not analogies). The skill of the
painter, the force that has united numerous colours to form a single tint, will, if
(by some miracle) that actual tint was to fall back into those various
colours, be cognizant of each one of these last, e. g. the tone and size of the drop
of gold, of red, &c.; and could at will recombine them. The owner of a cup of
clay would know its fragments (by their shape) amidst a mass of fragments of clay
vessels of other shapes, or even if they were plunged again into their native
clay. So the soul knows its elements amidst their "kindred dust"; or when each
one has flitted back to its own primeval source on the confines of the
Universe.
But how does this harmonize with the Parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus?
The bodies of both were in the grave: and so all that is said of them is
in a spiritual sense. But the soul can suffer still, being cognizant, not only
of the elements of the whole body, but of those that formed each member, e. g.
the tongue. By the relations of the Rich Man are meant the impressions made on
his soul by the things of flesh and blood.
But if we must have no emotions in the next world, how shall there be
virtue, and how shall there be love of God? For anger, we saw, contributed to the
one, desire to the other.
We shall be like God so far that we shall always contemplate the
Beautiful in Him. Now, God, in contemplating Himself, has no desire and hope, no regret
and memory. The moment of fruition is always present, and so His Love is
perfect, without the need of any emotion. So will it be with us. God draws "that
which belongs to Him" to this blessed passionlessness; and in this very drawing
consists the torment of a passion-laden soul. Severe and long-continued pains in
eternity are thus decreed to sinners, not because God hates them, nor for the
sake alone of punishing them; but "because what belongs to God must at any cost
be preserved for Him." The degree of pain which must be endured by each one is
necessarily proportioned to the measure of the wickedness.
God will thus be "all in all"; yet the loved one's form will then be
woven, though into a more ethereal texture, of the same elements as before. (This
is not Nirvana.)
Here the doctrine of the Resurrection is touched. The Christian
Resurrection and that of the heathen philosophies coincide in that the soul is reclothed
from some elements of the Universe. But there are fatal objections to the
latter under its two forms
Transmigration pure and simple;
The Platonic Soul-rotation.
The first--1. Obliterates the distinction between the mineral or
vegetable, and the spiritual, world.
2. Makes it a sin to eat and drink.
Both--3. Confuse the moral choice.
4. Make heaven the cradle of vice, and earth of virtue.
5. Contradict the truth that they assume, that there is no change in
heaven.
6. Attribute every birth to a vice, and therefore are either Atheist or
Manichaean.
7. Make a life a chapter of accidents.
8. Contradict facts of moral character. God is the cause of our life, both
in body and soul. But when and how does the soul come into existence? The how
we can never know.
There are objections to seeking the material for any created thing either
in God, or outside God. But we may regard the whole Creation as the realized
thoughts of God. (Anticipation of Malebranche.)
The when may be determined. Objections to the existence of soul before
body have been given above. But soul is necessary to life, and the embryo lives.
Therefore soul is not born after body. So body and soul are born together.
As to the number of souls, Humanity itself is a thought of God not yet
completed, as these continual additions prove. When it is completed, this
"progress of Humanity" will cease, by there being no more births: and no births, no
deaths.
Before answering objections to the Scriptural doctrine of the
Resurrection, the passages that contain it are mentioned: especially Psalm cxviii. 27
(LXX.).
The various objections to it, to the Purgatory to follow, and to the
Judgment, are then stated; especially that:
A man is not the same being (physically) two days together. Which phase of
him, then, is to rise again, be tortured (if need be), and judged?
They are all answered by a Definition of the Resurrection, i.e. the
restoration of man to his original state. In that, there is neither age nor infancy;
and the "coats of skins" are laid aside.
When the process of purification has been completed, the better attributes
of the soul appear--imperishability, life, honour, grace, glory, power, and,
in short, all that belongs to human nature as the image of Deity.
ON THE SOUL AND THE RESURRECTION
BASIL, great amongst the saints, had departed from this life to God; and
the impulse to mourn for him was shared by all the churches. But his sister the
Teacher was still living; and so I journeyed to her(1), yearning for an
interchange of sympathy over the loss of her brother. My soul was fight
sorrow-stricken by this grievous blow, and I sought for one who could feel it equally, to
mingle my tears with. But when we were in each other's presence the sight of the
Teacher awakened all my pain; for she too was lying in a state of prostration
even unto death. Well, she gave in to me for a little while, like a skilful
driver, in the ungovernable violence of my grief; and then she tried to cheek me by
speaking, and to correct with the curb of her reasonings the disorder of my
soul. She quoted the Apostle's words about the duty of not being "grieved for
them that sleep" because only "men without hope" have such feelings. With a heart
still fermenting with my pain, I asked--
(2)How can that ever be practised by mankind? There is such an instinctive
and deep-seated abhorrence of death in all! Those who look on a death-bed can
hardly bear the sight; and those whom death approaches recoil from him all they
can. Why, even the law that controls us puts death highest on the list of
crimes, and highest on the list of punishments. By what device, then, can we bring
ourselves to regard as nothing a departure from life even in the case of a
stranger, not to mention that of relations, when so be they cease to live? We see
before us the whole course of human life aiming at this one thing, viz. how we
may continue in this life; indeed it is for this that houses have been invented
by us to live in; in order that our bodies may not be prostrated in their
environments by cold or heat. Agriculture, again, what is it but the providing of
our sustenance? In fact all thought about how we are to go on living is
occasioned by the fear of dying. Why is medicine so honoured amongst men? Because it is
thought to carry on the combat with death to a certain extent by its methods.
Why do we have corslets, and long shields, and greaves, and helmets, and all the
defensive armour, and inclosures of fortifications, and ironbarred gates,
except that we fear to die? Death then being naturally so terrible to us, how can
it be easy for a survivor to obey this command to remain unmoved over friends
departed?
Why, what is the especial pain you feel, asked the Teacher, in the mere
necessity itself of dying? This common talk of unthinking persons is no
sufficient accusation.
What! is there no occasion for grieving, I replied to her, when we see one
who so lately lived and spoke becoming all of a sudden lifeless and
motionless, with the sense of every bodily organ extinct, with no sight or hearing in
operation, or any other faculty of apprehension that sense possesses; and if you
apply fire or steel to him, even if you were to plunge a sword into the body, or
cast it to the beasts of prey, or if you bury it beneath a mound, that dead
man is alike unmoved at any treatment? Seeing, then, that this change is observed
in all these ways, and that principle of life, whatever it might be,
disappears all at once out of sight, as the flame of an extinguished lamp which burnt on
it the moment before neither remains upon the wick nor passes to some other
place, but completely disappears, how can such a change be borne without emotion
by one who has no clear ground to rest upon? We hear the departure of the
spirit, we see the shell that is left; but of the part that has been separated we
are ignorant, both as to its nature, and as to the place whither it has fled; for
neither earth, nor air, nor water, nor any other element can show as residing
within itself this force that has left the body, at whose withdrawal a corpse
only remains, ready for dissolution.
Whilst I was thus enlarging on the subject, the Teacher signed to me with
her hand(4), and said: Surely what alarms and disturbs your mind is not the
thought that the soul, instead of lasting for ever, ceases with the body's
dissolution!
I answered rather audaciously, and without due consideration of what I
said, for my passionate grief had not yet given me back my judgment. In fact, I
said that the Divine utterances seemed to me like mere commands compelling us to
believe that the soul lasts for ever; not, however, that we were led by them to
this belief by any reasoning. Our mind within us appears slavishly to accept
the opinion enforced, but not to acquiesce with a spontaneous impulse. Hence our
sorrow over the departed is all the more grievous; we do not exactly know
whether this vivifying principle is anything by itself; where it is, or how it is;
whether, in fact, it exists in any way at all anywhere. This uncertainty(5)
about the real state of the case balances the opinions on either side; many adopt
the one view, many the other; and indeed there are certain persons, of no small
philosophical reputation amongst the Greeks, who have held and maintained this
which I have just said.
Away, she cried, with that pagan nonsense! For therein the inventor of
lies fabricates false theories only to harm the Truth. Observe this, and nothing
else; that such a view about the soul amounts to nothing less than the
abandoning of virtue, and seeking the pleasure of the moment only; the life of eternity,
by which alone virtue claims the advantage, must be despaired of.
And pray how, I asked, are we to get a firm and unmovable belief in the
soul's continuance? I, too, am sensible of the fact that human life will be
bereft of the most beautiful ornament that life has to give, I mean virtue, unless
an undoubting confidence with regard to this be established within us. What,
indeed, has virtue to stand upon in the case of those persons who conceive of this
present life as the limit of their existence, and hope for nothing beyond?
Well, replied the Teacher, we must seek where we may get a beginning for
our discussion upon this point; and if you please, let the defence of the
opposing views be undertaken by yourself; for I see that your mind is a little
inclined to accept such a brief. Then, after the conflicting belief has been stated,
we shall be able to look for the truth.
When she made this request, and I had deprecated the suspicion that I was
making the objections in real earnest, instead of only wishing to get a firm
ground for the belief about the soul by calling into court(6) first what is aimed
against this view, I began--
Would not the defenders of the opposite belief say this: that the body,
being composite, must necessarily be resolved into that of which it is composed?
And when the coalition of elements in the body ceases, each of those elements
naturally gravitates towards its kindred element with the irresistible bias of
like to like; the heat in us will thus unite with heat, the earthy with the
solid, and each of the other elements also will pass towards its like. Where, then,
will the soul be after that? If one affirm that it is in those elements, one
will be obliged to admit that it is identical with them, for this fusion could
not possibly take place between two things of different natures. But this being
granted, the soul must necessarily be viewed as a complex thing, fused as it is
with qualities so opposite. But the complex is not simple, but must be classed
with the composite, and the composite is necessarily dissoluble; and
dissolution means the destruction of the compound; and the destructible is not immortal,
else the flesh itself, resolvable as it is into its constituent elements,
might so be called immortal. If, on the other hand, the soul is something other
than these elements, where can our reason suggest a place for it to be, when it is
thus, by virtue of its alien nature, not to be discovered in those elements,
and there is no other place in the world, either, where it may continue, in
harmony with its own peculiar character, to exist? But, if a thing can be found
nowhere, plainly it has no existence.
The Teacher sighed gently at these words of mine, and then said; Maybe
these were the objections, or such as these, that the Stoics and Epicureans
collected at Athens made in answer to the Apostle. I hear that Epicurus carried his
theories in this very direction. The framework of things was to his mind a
fortuitous(7) and mechanical affair, without a Providence penetrating its
operations; and, as a piece with this, he thought that human life was like a bubble,
existing only as long as the breath within was held in by the enveloping
substance(8), inasmuch as our body was a mere membrane, as it were, encompassing a
breath; and that on the collapse of the inflation the imprisoned essence was
extinguished. To him the visible was the limit of existence; he made our senses the
only means of our apprehension of things; he completely dosed the eyes of his
soul, and was incapable of seeing anything in the intelligible and immaterial
world, just as a man, who is imprisoned in a cabin whose walls and roof obstruct the
view outside, remains without a glimpse of all the wonders of the sky. Verily,
everything in the universe that is seen to be an object of sense is as an
earthen wall, forming in itself a barrier between the narrower souls and that
intelligible world which is ready for their contemplation; and it is the earth and
water and fire alone that such behold; whence comes each of these elements, in
what and by what they are encompassed, such souls because of their narrowness
cannot detect. While the sight of a garment suggests to any one the weaver of it,
and the thought of the shipwright comes at the sight of the ship, and the hand
of the builder is brought to the mind of him who sees the building, these
little souls gaze upon the world, but their eyes are blind to Him whom all this
that we see around us makes manifest; and so they propound their clever and
pungent doctrines about the soul's evanishment;--body from elements, and elements
from body, and, besides, the impossibility of the soul's self-existence (if it is
not to he one of these elements, or lodged in one); for if these opponents
suppose that by virtue of the soul not being akin to the elements it is nowhere
after death, they must propound, to begin with, the absence of the soul from the
fleshly life as well, seeing that the body itself is nothing but a concourse of
those elements; and so they must not tell us that the soul is to be found there
either, independently vivifying their compound. If it is not possible for the
soul to exist after death, though the elements do, then, I say, according to
this teaching our life as well is proved to be nothing else but death. But if on
the other hand they do not make the existence of the soul now in the body a
question for doubt, how can they maintain its evanishment when the body is
resolved into its elements? Then, secondly, they must employ an equal audacity against
the God in this Nature too. For how can they assert that the intelligible and
immaterial Unseen can be dissolved and diffused into the wet and the soft, as
also into the hot and the dry, and so hold together the universe in existence
through being, though not of a kindred nature with the things which it
penetrates, yet not thereby incapable of so penetrating them? Let them, therefore, remove
from their system the very Deity Who upholds the world.
That is the very point, I said, upon which our adversaries cannot fail to
have doubts; viz. that all things depend on God and are encompassed by Him, or,
that there is any divinity at all transcending the physical world.
It would be more fitting, she cried, to be silent about such doubts, and
not to deign to make any answer to such foolish and wicked propositions; for
there is a Divine precept forbidding us to answer a fool in his folly; and he must
be a fool, as the Prophet declares, who says that there is no God. But since
one needs must speak, I will urge upon you an argument which is not mine nor
that of any human being (for it would then be of small value, whosoever spoke it),
but an argument which the whole Creation enunciates by the medium of its
wonders to the audience(9) of the eye, with a skilful and artistic utterance that
reaches the heart. The Creation proclaims outright the Creator; for the very
heavens, as the Prophet says, declare the glory of God with their unutterable
words. We see the universal harmony in the wondrous sky and on the wondrous earth;
how elements essentially opposed to each other are all woven together in an
ineffable union to serve one common end, each contributing its particular force to
maintain the whole; how the unmingling and mutually repellent do not fly apart
from each other by virtue of their peculiarities, any more than they are
destroyed, when compounded, by such contrariety; how those elements which are
naturally buoyant move downwards, the heat of the sun, for instance, descending in the
rays, while the bodies which possess weight are lifted by becoming rarefied
in vapour, so that water contrary to its nature ascends, being conveyed through
the air to the upper regions; how too that fire of the firmament so penetrates
the earth that even its abysses feel the heat; how the moisture of the rain
infused into the soil generates, one though it be by nature, myriads of differing
germs, and animates in due proportion each subject of its influence; how very
swiftly the polar sphere revolves, how the orbits within it move the contrary
way, with all the eclipses, and conjunctions, and measured intervals(1) of the
planets. We see all this with the piercing eyes of mind, nor can we fail to be
taught by means of such a spectacle that a Divine power, working with skill and
method, is manifesting itself in this actual world, and, penetrating each
portion, combines those portions with the whole and completes the whole by the
portions, and encompasses the universe with a single all-controlling force,
self-centred and self-contained, never ceasing from its motion, yet never altering the
position which it holds.
And pray how, I asked, does this belief in the existence of God prove
along with it the existence of the human soul? For God, surely, is not the same
thing as the soul, so that, if the one were believed in, the other must
necessarily be believed in.
She replied: It has been said by wise men that man is a little world(2) in
himself and contains all the elements which go to complete the universe. If
this view is a true one (and so it seems), we perhaps shall need no other ally
than it to establish the truth of our conception of the soul. And our conception
of it is this; that it exists, with a rare and peculiar nature of its own,
independently of the body with its gross texture. We get our exact knowledge of
this outer world from the apprehension of our senses, and these sensational
operations themselves lead us on to the understanding of the super-sensual world of
fact and thought, and our eye thus becomes the interpreter of that almighty
wisdom which is visible in the universe, and points in itself to the Being Who
encompasses it. Just so, when we look to our inner world, we find no slight grounds
there also, in the known, for conjecturing the unknown; and the unknown there
also is that which, being the object of thought and not of sight, eludes the
grasp of sense.
I rejoined, Nay, it may be very possible to infer a wisdom transcending
the universe from the skilful and artistic designs observable in this harmonized
fabric of physical nature; but, as regards the soul, what knowledge is possible
to those who would trace, from any indications the body has to give, the
unknown through the known?
Most certainly, the Virgin replied, the soul herself, to those who wish to
follow the wise proverb and know themselves, is a competent(3) instructress;
of the fact, I mean, that she is an immaterial and spiritual thing, working and
moving in a way corresponding to her peculiar nature, and evincing these
peculiar emotions through the organs of the body. For this bodily organization
exists the same even in those who have just been reduced by death to the state of
corpses, but it remains without motion or action because the force of the soul
is no longer in it. It moves only when there is sensation in the organs, and not
only that, but the mental force by means of that sensation penetrates with its
own impulses and moves whither it will all those organs of sensation.
What then, I asked, is the soul? Perhaps there may be some possible means
of delineating its nature; so that we may have some comprehension of this
subject, in the way of a sketch.
Its definition, the Teacher replied, has been attempted in different ways
by different writers, each according to his own bent; but the following is our
opinion about it. The soul is an essence created, and living, and intellectual,
transmitting from itself to an organized and sentient body the power of living
and of grasping objects of sense, as long as a natural constitution capable of
this holds together.
Saying this she pointed to the physician(4) who was sitting to watch her
state, and said There is a proof of what I say close by us. How, I ask, does
this man, by putting his fingers to feel the pulse, hear in a manner, through this
sense of touch, Nature calling loudly to him and telling him of her peculiar
pain; in fact, that the disease in the body is an inflammatory one(5), and that
the malady originates in this or that internal organ; and that there is such
and such a degree of fever? How too is he taught by the agency of the eye other
facts of this kind, when he looks to see the posture of the patient and watches
the wasting of the flesh? As, too, the state of the complexion, pale somewhat
and bilious, and the gaze of the eyes, as is the case with those in pain,
involuntarily inclining to sadness, indicate the internal condition, so the ear gives
information of the like, ascertaining the nature of the malady by the
shortness of the breathing and by the groan that comes with it. One might say that even
the sense of smell in the expert is not incapable of detecting the kind of
disorder, but that it notices the secret suffering of the vitals in the particular
quality of the breath. Could this be so if there were not a certain force of
intelligence present in each organ of the senses? What would our hand have
taught us of itself, without thought conducting it from feeling to understanding the
subject before it? What would the ear, as separate from mind, or the eye or
the nostril or any other organ have helped towards the settling of the question,
all by themselves? Verily, it is most true what one of heathen culture is
recorded to have said, that it is the mind that sees and the mind that hears(6).
Else, if you will not allow this to be true, you must tell me why, when you look
at the sun, as you have been trained by your instructor to look at him, you
assert that he is not in the breadth of his disc of the size he appears to the
many, but that he exceeds by many times the measure of the entire earth. Do you not
confidently maintain that it is so, because you have arrived by reasoning
through phenomena at the conception of such and such a movement, of such distances
of time and space, of such causes of eclipse? And when you look at the waning
and waxing moon you are taught other truths by the visible figure of that
heavenly body, viz. that it is in itself devoid of light, and that it revolves in the
circle nearest to the earth, and that it is lit by light from the sun; just as
is the case with mirrors, which, receiving the sun upon them, do not reflect
rays of their own, but those of the sun, whose light is given back from their
smooth flashing surface. Those who see this, but do not examine it, think that
the light comes from the moon herself. But that this is not the case is proved by
this; that when she is diametrically facing the sun she has the whole of the
disc that looks our way illuminated; but, as she traverses her own circle of
revolution quicker from moving in a narrower space, she herself has completed this
more than twelve times before the sun has once travelled round his; whence it
happens that her substance is not always covered with light. For her position
facing him is not maintained in the frequency of her revolutions; but, while
this position causes the whole side of the moon which looks to us to be illumined,
directly she moves sideways her hemisphere which is turned to us necessarily
becomes partially shadowed, and only that which is turned to him meets his
embracing rays; the brightness, in fact, keeps on retiring from that which can no
longer see the sun to that which still sees him, until she passes right across
the sun's disc and receives his rays upon her hinder part; and then the fact of
her being in herself totally devoid of light and splendour causes the side
turned to us to be invisible while the further hemisphere is all in light; and this
is called the completion(7) of her waning. But when again, in her own
revolution, she has passed the sun and she is transverse to his rays, the side which was
dark just before begins to shine a little, for the rays move from the
illumined part to that so lately invisible. You see what the eye does teach; and yet it
would never of itself have afforded this insight, without something that looks
through the eyes and uses the data of the senses as mere guides to penetrate
from the apparent to the unseen. It is needless to add the methods of geometry
that lead us step by step through visible delineations to truths that lie out of
sight, and countless other instances which all prove that apprehension is the
work of an intellectual essence deeply seated in our nature, acting through the
operation of our bodily senses.
But what, I asked, if, insisting on the great differences which, in spite
of a certain quality of matter shared alike by all elements in their visible
form, exist between each particular kind of matter (motion, for instance, is not
the same in all, some moving up, some down; nor form, nor quality either), some
one were to say that there was in the same manner incorporated in, and
belonging to, these elements a certain force(8) as well which effects these
intellectual insights and operations by a purely natural effort of their own (such
effects, for instance, as we often see produced by the mechanists, in whose hands
matter, combined according to the rules of Art, thereby imitates Nature,
exhibiting resemblance not in figure alone but even in motion, so that when the piece of
mechanism sounds in its resonant part it mimics a human voice, without,
however, our being able to perceive anywhere any mental force working out the
particular figure, character, sound, and movement); suppose, I say, we were to affirm
that all this was produced as well in the organic machine of our natural
bodies, without any intermixture of a special thinking substance but owing simply to
an inherent motive power of the elements within us accomplishing(9) by itself
these operations--to nothing else, in fact, but an impulsive movement working
for the cognition of the object before us; would not then the fact stand proved
of the absolute nonexistence(1) of that intellectual and impalpable Being, the
soul, which you talk of?
Your instance, she replied, and your reasoning upon it, though belonging
to the counter-argument, may both of them be made allies of our statement, and
will contribute not a little to the confirmation of its truth.
Why, how can you say that?
Because, you see, so to understand, manipulate, and dispose the soulless
matter, that the art which is stored away in such mechanisms becomes almost like
a soul to this material, in all the various ways in which it mocks movement,
and figure, and voice, and so on, may be turned into a proof of there being
something in man whereby he shows an innate fitness to think out within himself,
through the contemplative and inventive faculties, such thoughts, and having
prepared such mechanisms in theory, to put them into practice by manual skill, and
exhibit in matter the product of his mind. First, for instance, he saw, by dint
of thinking, that to produce any sound there is need of some wind; and then,
with a view to produce wind in the mechanism, he previously ascertained by a
course of reasoning and close observation of the nature of elements, that there is
no vacuum at all in the world, but that the lighter is to be considered a
vacuum only by comparison with the heavier; seeing that the air itself, taken as a
separate subsistence, is crowded quite full. It is by an abuse of language that
a jar is said to be "empty"; for when it is empty of any liquid it is none the
less, even in this state, full, in the eyes of the experienced. A proof of
this is that a jar when put into a pool of water is not immediately filled, but at
first floats on the surface, because the air it contains helps to buoy up its
rounded sides; till at last the hand of the drawer of the water forces it down
to the bottom, and, when there, it takes in water by its neck; during which
process it is shown not to have been empty even before the water came; for there
is the spectacle of a sort of combat going on in the neck between the two
elements, the water being forced by its weight into the interior, and therefore
streaming in; the imprisoned air on the other hand being straitened for room by the
gush of the water along the neck, and so rushing in the contrary direction;
thus the water is checked by the strong current of air, and gurgles and bubbles
against it. Men observed this, and devised in accordance with this property of
the two elements a way of introducing air to work their mechanism(2). They made a
kind of cavity of some hard stuff, and prevented the air in it from escaping
in any direction; and then introduced water into this cavity through its mouth,
apportioning the quantity of water according to requirement; next they allowed
an exit in the opposite direction to the air, so that it passed into a pipe
placed ready to hand, and in so doing, being violently constrained by the water,
became a blast; and this, playing on the structure of the pipe, produced a note.
Is it not clearly proved by such visible results that there is a mind of some
kind in man, something other than that which is visible, which, by virtue of an
invisible thinking nature of its own, first prepares by inward invention such
devices, and then, when they have been so matured, brings them to the light and
exhibits them in the subservient matter? For if it were possible to ascribe
such wonders, as the theory of our opponents does, to the actual constitution of
the elements, we should have these mechanisms building themselves
spontaneously; the bronze would not wait for the artist, to be made into the likeness of a
man, but would become such by an innate force; the air would not require the
pipe, to make a note, but would sound spontaneously by its own fortuitous flux and
motion; and the jet of the water upwards would not be, as it now is the result
of an artificial pressure forcing it to move in an unnatural direction, but
the water would rise into the mechanism of its own accord, finding in that
direction a natural channel. But if none of these results are produced spontaneously
by elemental force, but, on the contrary, each element is employed at will by
artifice; and if artifice is a kind of movement and activity of mind, will not
the very consequences of what has been urged by way of objection show us Mind as
something other than the thing perceived?
That the thing perceived, I replied, is not the same as the thing not
perceived, I grant; but I do not discover any answer to our question in such a
statement; it is not yet dear to me what we are to think that thing not-perceived
to be; all I have been shown by your argument is that it is not anything
material; and I do not yet know the fitting name for it. I wanted especially to know
what it is, not what it is not.
We do learn, she replied, much about many things by this very same method,
inasmuch as, in the very act of saying a thing is "not so and so," we by
implication interpret the very nature of the thing in question(3). For instance,
when we say a "guileless," we indicate a good man; when we say "unmanly," we have
expressed that a man is a coward; and it is possible to suggest a great many
things in like fashion, wherein we either convey the idea of goodness by the
negation of badness(4), or vice versa. Well, then, if one thinks so with regard to
the matter now before us, one will not fail to gain a proper conception of it.
The question is,--What are we to think of Mind in its very essence? Now granted
that the inquirer has had his doubts set at rest as to the existence of the
thing in question, owing to the activities which it displays to us, and only
wants to know what it is, he will have adequately discovered it by being told that
it is not that which our senses perceive, neither a colour, nor a form, nor a
hardness, nor a weight, nor a quantity, nor a cubic dimension, nor a point, nor
anything else perceptible in matter; supposing, that is,(5) that there does
exist a something beyond all these.
Here I interrupted her discourse: If you leave all these out of the
account I do not see how you can possibly avoid cancelling along with them the very
thing which you are in search of. I cannot at present conceive to what, as apart
from these, the perceptive activity is to cling. For on all occasions in
investigating with the scrutinizing intellect the contents of the world, we must, so
far as we put our hand(6) at all on what we are seeking, inevitably touch, as
blind men feeling along the walls for the door, some one of those things
aforesaid; we must come on colour, or form, or quantity, or something else on your
list; and when it comes to saying that the thing is none of them, our feebleness
of mind induces us to suppose that it does not exist at all.
Shame on such absurdity! said she, indignantly interrupting. A fine
conclusion this narrow-minded, grovelling view of the world brings us to! If all that
is not cognizable by sense is to be wiped out of existence, the all-embracing
Power that presides over things is admitted by this same assertion not to be;
once a man has been told about the non-material and invisible nature of the
Deity, he must perforce with such a premise reckon it as absolutely non-existent.
If, on the other hand, the absence of such characteristics in His case does not
constitute any limitation of His existence, how can the Mind of man be squeezed
out of existence along with this withdrawal one by one of each property of
matter?
Well, then, I retorted, we only exchange one paradox for another by
arguing in this way; for our reason will be reduced to the conclusion that the Deity
and the Mind of man are identical, if it be true that neither can be thought
of, except by the withdrawal of alI the data of sense.
Say not so, she replied; to talk so also is blasphemous. Rather, as the
Scripture tells you, say that the one is like the other. For that which is "made
in the image" of the Deity necessarily possesses a likeness to its prototype in
every respect; it resembles it in being intellectual, immaterial, unconnected
with any notion of weight(7), and in eluding any measurement of its
dimensions(8); yet as regards its own peculiar nature it is something different from that
other. Indeed, it would be no longer an "image," if it were altogether
identical with that other; but(9) where we have A in that uncreate prototype we have a
in the image; just as in a minute particle of glass, when it happens to face
the light, the complete disc of the sun is often to be seen, not represented
thereon in proportion to its proper size, but so far as the minuteness of the
particle admits of its being represented at all. Thus do the reflections of those
ineffable qualities of Deity shine forth within the narrow limits of our nature;
and so our reason, following the leading of these reflections, will not miss
grasping the Mind in its essence by clearing away from the question all corporeal
qualities; nor on the other hand will it bring the pure(1) and infinite
Existence to the level of that which is perishable and little; it will regard this
essence of the Mind as an object of thought only, since it is the "image" of an
Existence which is such; but it will not pronounce this image to be identical
with the prototype. Just, then, as we have no doubts, owing to the display of a
Divine mysterious wisdom in the universe, about a Divine Being and a Divine
Power existing in it all which secures its continuance (though if you required a
definition of that Being you would therein find the Deity completely sundered
from every object in creation, whether of sense or thought, while in these last,
too, natural distinctions are admitted), so, too, there is nothing strange in
the soul's separate existence as a substance (whatever we may think that
substance to be) being no hindrance to her actual existence, in spite of the elemental
atoms of the world not harmonizing with her in the definiton of her being. In
the case of our living bodies, composed as they are from the blending of these
atoms, there is no sort of communion, as has been just said, on the score of
substance, between the simplicity and invisibility of the soul, and the grossness
of those bodies; but, notwithstanding that, there is not a doubt that there is
in them the soul's vivifying influence exerted by a law which it as beyond the
human understanding to comprehend(1). Not even then, when those atoms have
again been dissolved(3) into themselves, has that bond of a vivifying influence
vanished; but as, while the framework of the body still holds together, each
individual part is possessed of a soul which penetrates equally every component
member, and one could not call that soul hard and resistent though blended with
the solid, nor humid, or cold, or the reverse, though it transmits life to all
and each of such parts, so, when that framework is dissolved, and has returned to
its kindred elements, there is nothing against probability that that simple
and incomposite essence which has once for all by some inexplicable law grown
with the growth of the bodily framework should continually remain beside the atoms
with which it has been blended, and should in no way be sundered from a union
once formed. For it does not follow that because the composite is dissolved the
incomposite must be dissolved with it(4).
That those atoms, I rejoined, should unite and again be separated, and
that this constitutes the formation and dissolution of the body, no one would
deny. But we have to consider this. There are great intervals between these atoms;
they differ from each other, both in position, and also in qualitative
distinctions and peculiarities. When, indeed, these atoms have all converged upon the
given subject, it is reasonable that that intelligent and undimensional essence
which we call the soul should cohere with that which is so united; but once
these atoms are separated from each other, and have gone whither their nature
impels them, what is to become of the soul when her vessel s is thus scattered in
many directions? As a sailor, when his ship has been wrecked and gone to pieces,
cannot float upon all the pieces at once(6) which have been scattered this way
and that over the surface of the sea (for he seizes any bit that comes to
hand, and lets all the rest drift away), in the same way the soul, being by nature
incapable of dissolution along with the atoms, will, if she finds it hard to be
parted from the body altogether, cling to some one of them; and if we take
this view, consistency will no more allow us to regard her as immortal for living
in one atom than as mortal for not living in a number of them.
But the intelligent and undimensional, she replied, is neither contracted
nor diffused(7) (contraction and diffusion being a property of body only); but
by virtue of a nature which is formless and bodiless it is present with the
body equally in the contraction and in the diffusion of its atoms, and is no more
narrowed by the compression which attends the uniting of the atoms than it is
abandoned by them when they wander off to their kindred, however wide the
interval is held to be which we observe between alien atoms. For instance, there is a
great difference between the buoyant and light as contrasted with the heavy
and solid; between the hot as contrasted with the cold; between the humid as
contrasted with its opposite; nevertheless it is no strain to an intelligent
essence to be present in each of those elements to which it has once cohered; this
blending with opposites does not split it up. In locality, in peculiar qualities,
these elemental atoms are held to be far removed from each other; but an
undimensional nature finds it no labour to cling to what is locally divided, seeing
that even now it is possible for the mind at once to contemplate the heavens
above us and to extend its busy scrutiny beyond the horizon, nor is its
contemplative power at all distracted by these excursions into distances so great. There
is nothing, then, to hinder the soul's presence in the body's atoms, whether
fused in union or decomposed in dissolution. Just as in the amalgam of gold and
silver a certain methodical force is to be observed which has fused the
metals, and if the one be afterwards smelted out of the other, the law of this
method nevertheless continues to reside in each, so that while, the amalgam is
separated this method does not suffer division along with it (for you cannot
make fractions out of the indivisible), in the same way this intelligent essence
of the soul is observable in the concourse of the atoms, and does not undergo
division when they are dissolved; but it remains with them, and even in their
separation it is co-extensive with them, yet not itself dissevered nor
discounted(8) into sections to accord with the number of the atoms. Such a condition
belongs to the material and spacial world, but that which is intelligent and
undimensional is not liable to the circumstances of space. Therefore the soul exists
in the actual atoms which she has once animated, and there is no force to tear
her away from her cohesion with them. What cause for melancholy, then, is there
herein, that the visible is exchanged for the invisible; and wherefore is it
that your mind has conceived such a hatred of death?
Upon this I recurred to the definition which she had previously given of
the soul, and I said that to my thinking her definition had not indicated(9)
distinctly enough all the powers of the soul which are a matter of observation. It
declares the soul to be an intellectual essence which imparts to the organic
body a force of life by which the senses operate. Now the soul is not thus
operative only in our scientific and speculative intellect; it does not produce
results in that world only, or employ the organs of sense only for this their
natural work. On the contrary, we observe in our nature many emotions of desire and
many of anger; and both these exist in us as qualities of our kind, and we see
both of them in their manifestations displaying further many most subtle
differences. There are many states, for instance, which are occasioned by desire;
many others which on the other hand proceed from anger; and none of them are of
the body; but that which is not of the body is plainly intellectual. Now(1) our
definition exhibits the soul as something intellectual; so that one of two
alternatives, both absurd, must emerge when we follow out this view to this end;
either anger and desire are both second souls in us, and a plurality of souls must
take the place of the single soul, or the thinking faculty in us cannot be
regarded as a soul either (if they are not), the intellectual element adhering
equally to all of them and stamping them all as souls, or else excluding every one
of them equally from the specific qualities of soul.
You are quite justified, she replied, in raising this question, and it has
ere this been discussed by many elsewhere; namely, what we are to think of the
principle of desire and the principle of anger within us. Are they
consubstantial with the soul, inherent in the soul's very self from her first
organization(2), or are they something different, accruing to us afterwards? In fact, while
all equally allow that these principles are to be detected in the soul,
investigation has not yet discovered exactly what we are to think of them so as to
gain some fixed belief with regard to them. The generality of men still fluctuate
in their opinions about this, which are as erroneous as they are numerous. As
for ourselves, if the Gentile philosophy, which deals methodically with all
these points, were really adequate for a demonstration, it would certainly be
superfluous to add(3) a discussion on the soul to those speculations, But while the
latter proceeded, on the subject of the soul, as far in the direction of
supposed consequences as the thinker pleased, we are not entitled to such licence, I
mean that of affirming what we please; we make the Holy Scriptures the rule
and the measure of every tenet; we necessarily fix our eyes upon that, and
approve that alone which may be made to harmonize with the intention of those
writings. We must therefore neglect the Platonic chariot and the pair of horses of
dissimilar forces yoked to it, and their driver, whereby the philosopher
allegorizes these facts about the soul; we must neglect also all that is said by the
philosopher who succeeded him and who followed out probabilities by rules of
art(4), and diligently investigated the very question now before us, declaring that
the soul was mortal s by reason of these two principles; we must neglect all
before and since their time, whether they philosophized in prose or in verse, and
we will adopt, as the guide of our reasoning, the Scripture, which lays it
down as an axiom that there is no excellence in the soul which is not a property
as well of the Divine nature. For he who declares the soul to be God's likeness
asserts that anything foreign to Him is outside the limits of the soul;
similarity cannot be retained in those qualities which are diverse from the original.
Since, then, nothing of the kind we are considering is included in the
conception of the Divine nature, one would be reasonable in surmising that such things
are not consubstantial with the soul either. Now to seek to build up our
doctrine by rule of dialectic and the science which draws and destroys conclusions,
involves a species of discussion which we shall ask to be excused from, as being
a weak and questionable way of demonstrating truth. Indeed, it is clear to
every one that that subtle dialectic possesses a force that may be turned both
ways, as well for the overthrow of truth(6) as for the detection of falsehood; and
so we begin to suspect even truth itself when it is advanced in company with
such a kind of artifice, and to think that the very ingenuity of it is trying to
bias our judgment and to upset the truth. If on the other hand any one will
accept a discussion which is in a naked unsyllogistic form, we will speak upon
these points by making our study of them so far as we can follow the chain(7) of
Scriptural tradition. What is it, then, that we assert? We say that the fact of
the reasoning animal man being capable of understanding and knowing is most
surely(8) attested by those outside our faith; and that this definition would
never have sketched our nature so, if it had viewed anger and desire and all
such-like emotions as consubstantial with that nature. In any other case, one would
not give a definition of the subject in hand by putting a generic instead of a
specific quality; and so, as the principle of desire and the principle of anger
are observed equally in rational and irrational natures, one could not rightly
mark the specific quality by means of this generic one. But how can that
which, in defining a nature, is superfluous and worthy of exclusion be treated as a
part of that nature, and, so, available for falsifying the definition? Every
definition of an essence looks to the specific quality of the subject in hand;
and whatever is outside that speciality is set aside as having nothing to do with
the required definition. Yet, beyond question, these faculties of anger and
desire are allowed to be common to all reasoning and brute natures anything
common is not identical with that which is peculiar; it is imperative therefore that
we should not range these faculties amongst those whereby humanity is
exclusively meant: but just as one may perceive the principle(9) of sensation, and that
of nutrition and growth in man, and yet not shake thereby the given definition
of his soul (for the quality A being in the soul does not prevent the quality
B being in it too), so, when one detects in humanity these emotions of anger
and desire, one cannot on that account fairly quarrel with this definition, as if
it fell short of a full indication of man's nature.
What then, I asked the Teacher, are we to think about this? For I cannot
yet see how we can fitly repudiate faculties which are actually within us.
You see, she replied, there is a battle of the reason with them and a
struggle to rid the soul of them; and there are men in whom this struggle has ended
in success; it was so with Moses, as we know; he was superior both to anger
and to desire; the history testifying of him in both respects, that he was meek
beyond all men (and by meekness it indicates the absence of all anger and a mind
quite devoid of resentment), and that he desired none of those things about
which we see the desiring faculty in the generality so active. This could not
have been so, if these faculties were nature, and were referable to the contents
of man's essence(1). For it is impossible for one who has come quite outside of
his nature to be in Existence at all. But if Moses was at one and the same time
in Existence and not in these conditions, then(2) it follows that these
conditions are something other than nature and not nature itself. For if, on the one
hand, that is truly nature in which the essence of the being is found, and, on
the other, the removal of these conditions is in our power, so that their
removal not only does no harm, but is even beneficial to the nature, it is clear
that these conditions are to be numbered amongst externals, and are affections,
rather than the essence, of the nature; for the essence is that thing only which
it is. As for anger, most think it a fermenting of the blood round the heart;
others an eagerness to inflict pain in return for a previous pain; we would take
it to be the impulse to hurt one who has provoked us. But none of these
accounts of it tally with the definition of the soul. Again, if we were to define
what desire is in itself, we should call it a seeking for that which is wanting,
or a longing for pleasurable enjoyment, or a pain at not possessing that upon
which the heart is set, or a state with regard to some pleasure which there is no
opportunity of enjoying. These and such-like descriptions all indicate desire,
but they have no connection with the definition of the soul. But it is so with
regard to all those other conditions also which we see to have some relation
to the soul, those, I mean, which are mutually opposed to each other, such as
cowardice and courage, pleasure and pain, fear and contempt, and so on; each of
them seems akin to the principle of desire or to that of anger, while they have
a separate definition to mark their own peculiar nature. Courage and contempt,
for instance, exhibit a certain phase of the irascible impulse; the
dispositions arising from cowardice and fear exhibit on the other hand a diminution and
weakening of that same impulse. Pain, again, draws its material both from anger
and desire. For the impotence of anger, which consists in not being able to
punish one who has first given pain, becomes itself pain; and the despair of
getting objects of desire and the absence of things upon which the heart is set
create in the mind this same sullen state. Moreover, the opposite to pain, I mean
the sensation of pleasure(3), like pain, divides itself between anger and desire;
for pleasure is the leading motive of them both. All these conditions, I say,
have some relation to the soul, and yet they are not the soul(4), but only like
warts growing out of the soul's thinking part, which are reckoned as parts of
it because they adhere to it, and yet are not that actual thing which the soul
is in its essence.
And yet, I rejoined to the virgin, we see no slight help afforded for
improvement to the virtuous from all these conditions. Daniel's desire was his
glory; and Phineas' anger pleased the Deity. We have been told, too, that fear is
the beginning of wisdom, and learnt from Paul that salvation is the goal of the
"sorrow after a godly sort." The Gospel bids us have a contempt for danger; and
the "not being afraid with any amazement" is nothing else but a describing of
courage, and this last is numbered by Wisdom amongst the things that are good.
In all this Scripture shows that such conditions are not to be considered
weaknesses; weaknesses would not have been so employed for putting virtue into
practice.
I think, replied the Teacher, that I am myself responsible for this
confusion arising from different accounts of the matter; for I did not state it as
distinctly as I might have, by introducing a certain order of consequences for
our consideration. Now, however, some such order shall, as far as it is possible,
be devised, so that our essay may advance in the way of logical sequence and
so give no room for such contradictions. We declare, then, that the speculative,
critical, and world-surveying faculty of the soul is its peculiar property by
virtue of its very nature(5), and that thereby the soul preserves within itself
the image of the divine grace; since our reason surmises that divinity itself,
whatever it may be in its inmost nature, is manifested in these very
things,--universal supervision and the critical discernment between good and evil. But
all those elements of the soul which lie on the border-land(6) and are capable
from their peculiar nature of inclining to either of two opposites (whose
eventual determination to the good or to the bad depends on the kind of use they are
put to), anger, for instance, and fear, and any other such-like emotion of the
soul divested of which human nature(7) cannot be studied--all these we reckon
as accretions from without, because in the Beauty which is man's prototype no
such characteristics are to be found. Now let the following statement s be
offered as a mere exercise (in interpretation). I pray that it may escape the sneers
of cavilling hearers. Scripture informs us that the Deity proceeded by a sort
of graduated and ordered advance to the creation of man. After the foundations
of the universe were laid, as the history records, man did not appear on the
earth at once; but the creation of the brutes preceded his, and the plants
preceded them. Thereby Scripture shows that the vital forces blended with the world of
matter according to a gradation; first, it infused itself into insensate
nature; and in continuation of this advanced into the sentient world; and then
ascended to intelligent and rational beings. Accordingly, while all existing things
must be either corporeal or spiritual, the former are divided into the animate
and inanimate. By animate, I mean possessed of life: and of the things
possessed of life, some have it with sensation, the rest have no sensation. Again, of
these sentient things, some have reason, the rest have not. Seeing, then, that
this life of sensation could not possibly exist apart from the matter which is
the subject of it, and the intellectual life could not be embodied, either,
without growing in the sentient, on this account the creation of man is related as
coming last, as of one who took up into himself every single form of life, both
that of plants and that which is seen in brutes. His nourishment and growth he
derives from vegetable life; for even in vegetables such processes are to be
seen when aliment is being drawn in by their roots and given off in fruit and
leaves. His sentient organization he derives from the brute creation. But his
faculty of thought and reason is incommunicable(9), and is a peculiar gift in our
nature, to be considered by itself. However, just as this nature has the
instinct acquisitive of the necessaries to material existence--an instinct which,
when manifested in us men, we call Appetite--and as we admit this appertains to
the vegetable form of life, since we can notice it there too like so many
impulses working naturally to satisfy themselves with their kindred aliment and to
issue in germination, so all the peculiar conditions of the brute creation are
blended with the intellectual part of the soul. To them, she continued, belongs
anger; to them belongs fear; to them all those other opposing activities within
us; everything except the faculty of reason and thought. That alone, the choice
product, as has been said, of all our life, bears the stamp of the Divine
character. But since, according to the view which we have just enunciated, it is not
possible for this reasoning faculty to exist in the life of the body without
existing by means of sensations, and since sensation is already found subsisting
in the brute creation, necessarily as it were, by reason of this one
condition, our soul has touch with the other things which are knit up with it(1); and
these are all those phaenomena within us that we call "passions"; which have not
been allotted to human nature for any bad purpose at all (for the Creator would
most certainly be the author of evil, if in them, so deeply rooted as they are
in our nature, any necessities of wrong-doing were found), but according to
the use which our free will puts them to, these emotions of the soul become the
instruments of virtue or of vice. They are like the iron which is being
fashioned according to the volition of the artificer, and receives whatever shape the
idea which is in his mind prescribes, and becomes a sword or some agricultural
implement. Supposing, then, that our reason, which is our nature's choicest
part, holds the dominion over these imported emotions (as Scripture allegorically
declares in the command to men to rule over the brutes), none of them will be
active in the ministry of evil; fear will only generate within us obedience(2),
and anger fortitude, and cowardice caution; and the instinct of desire will
procure for us the delight that is Divine and perfect. But if reason drops the
reins and is dragged behind like a charioteer who has got entangled in his car,
then these instincts are changed into fierceness, just as we see happens amongst
the brutes. For since reason does not preside over the natural impulses that
are implanted(3) in them, the more irascible animals, under the generalship of
their anger, mutually destroy each other; while the bulky and powerful animals
get no good themselves from their strength, but become by their want of reason
slaves of that which has reason. Neither are the activities of their desire for
pleasure employed on any of the higher objects; nor does any other instinct to
be observed in them result in any profit to themselves. Thus too, with
ourselves, if these instincts are not turned by reasoning into the fight direction, and
if our feelings get the mastery of our mind, the man is changed from a
reasoning into an unreasoning being, and from godlike intelligence sinks by the force
of these passions to the level of the brute.
Much moved by these words, I said: To any one who reflects indeed, your
exposition, advancing as it does in this consecutive manner, though plain and
unvarnished, bears sufficiently upon it the stamp of correctness and hits the
truth. And to those who are expert only in the technical methods of proof a mere
demonstration suffices to convince; but as for ourselves, we were agreed(4) that
there is something more trustworthy than any of these artificial conclusions,
namely, that which the teachings of Holy Scripture point to: and so I deem that
it is necessary to inquire, in addition to what has been said, whether this
inspired teaching harmonizes with it all.
And who, she replied, could deny that truth is to be found only in that
upon which the seal of Scriptural testimony is set? So, if it is necessary that
something from the Gospels should be adduced in support of our view, a study of
the Parable of the Wheat and Tares will not be here out of place. The
Householder there sowed good seed; (and we are plainly the "house"). But the "enemy,"
having watched for the time when men slept, sowed that which was useless in that
which was good for food, setting the tares in the very middle of the wheat. The
two kinds of seed grew up together; for it was not possible that seed put into
the very middle of the wheat should fail to grow up with it. But the
Superintendent of the field forbids the servants to gather up the useless crop, on
account of their growing at the very root of the contrary sort; so as not to root up
s the nutritious along with that foreign growth. Now we think that Scripture
means by the good seed the corresponding impulses of the soul, each one of
which, if only they are cultured for good, necessarily puts forth the fruit of
virtue within us. But since there has been scattered(6) amongst these the bad seed
of the error of judgment as to the true Beauty which is alone in its intrinsic
nature such, and since this last has been thrown into the shade by the growth of
delusion which springs up along with it (for the active principle of desire
does not germinate and increase in the direction of that natural Beauty which was
the object of its being sown in us, but it has changed its growth so as to
move towards a bestial and unthinking states this very error as to Beauty carrying
its impulse towards this result; and in the same way the seed of anger does
not steel us to be brave, but only arms us to fight with our own people; and the
power of loving deserts its intellectual objects and becomes completely mad for
the immoderate enjoyment of pleasures of sense; and so in like manner our
other affections put forth the worse instead of the better growths),--on account of
this the wise Husbandman leaves this growth that has been introduced amongst
his seed to remain there, so as to secure our not being altogether stripped of
better hopes by desire having been rooted out along with that good-for-nothing
growth. If our nature suffered such a mutilation, what will there be to lift us
up to grasp the heavenly delights? If love is taken from us, how shall we be
united to God? If anger is to be extinguished, what arms shall we possess against
the adversary? Therefore the Husbandman leaves those bastard seeds within us,
not for them always to overwhelm the more precious crop, but in order that the
land itself (for so, in his allegory, he calls the heart) by its native
inherent power, which is that of reasoning, may wither up the one growth and may
render the other fruitful and abundant: but if that is not done, then he commissions
the fire to mark the distinction in the crops. If, then, a man indulges these
affections in a due proportion and holds them in his own power instead of being
held in theirs, employing them for an instrument as a king does his subjects'
many hands, then efforts towards excellence more easily succeed for him. But
should he become theirs, and, as when any slaves mutiny against their master, get
enslaved (7) by those slavish thoughts and ignominiously bow before them; a
prey to his natural inferiors, he will be forced to turn to those employments
which his imperious masters command. This being so, we shall not pronounce these
emotions of the soul, which lie in the power of their possessors for good or
ill, to be either virtue or vice. But, whenever their impulse is towards what is
noble, then they become matter for praise, as his desire did to Daniel, and his
anger to Phineas, and their grief to those who nobly mourn. But if they
incline to baseness, then these are, and they are called, bad passions.
She ceased after this statement and allowed the discussion a short
interval, in which I reviewed mentally all that had been said; and reverting to that
former course of proof in her discourse, that it was not impossible that the
soul after the body's dissolution should reside in its atoms, I again addressed
her. Where is that much-talked-of and renowned Hades(8), then? The word is in
frequent circulation both in the intercourse of daily life, and in the writings of
the heathens and in our own; and all think that into it, as into a place of
safe-keeping, souls migrate from here. Surely you would not call your atoms that
Hades.
Clearly, replied the Teacher, you have not quite attended to the argument.
In speaking of the soul's migration from the seen to the unseen, I thought I
had omitted nothing as regards the question about Hades. It seems to me that,
whether in the heathen or in the Divine writings, this word for a place in which
souls are said to be means nothing else but a transition to that Unseen world
of which we have no glimpse.
And how, then, I asked, is it that some think that by the underworld(9) is
meant an actual place, and that it harbours within itself(1) the souls that
have at last flitted away from human life, drawing them towards itself as the
right receptacle for such natures?
Well, replied the Teacher, our doctrine will be in no ways injured by such
a supposition. For if it is true, what you say(2), and also that the vault of
heaven prolongs itself so uninterruptedly that it encircles all things with
itself, and that the earth and its surroundings are poised in the middle, and that
the motion of all the revolving bodies(3) is round this fixed and solid
centre, then, I say, there is an absolute necessity that, whatever may happen to each
one of the atoms on the upper side of the earth, the same will happen on the
opposite side, seeing that one single substance encompasses its entire bulk. As,
when the sun shines above the earth, the shadow is spread over its lower part,
because its spherical shape makes it impossible for it to be clasped all round
at one and the same time by the rays, and necessarily, on whatever side the
sun's rays may fall on some particular point of the globe, if we follow a
straight diameter, we shall find shadow upon the opposite point, and so, continuously,
at the opposite end of the direct line of the rays shadow moves round that
globe, keeping pace with the sun, so that equally in their turn both the upper
half and the under half of the earth are in light and darkness; so, by this
analogy, we have reason to be certain that, whatever in our hemisphere is observed to
befall the atoms, the same will befall them in that other. The environment of
the atoms being one and the same on every side of the earth, I deem it right
neither to contradict nor yet to favour those who raise the objection that we
must regard either this or the lower region as assigned to the souls released. As
long as this objection does not shake our central doctrine of the existence of
those souls after the life in the flesh, there need be no controversy about the
whereabouts to our mind, holding as we do that place is a property of body
only, and that soul, being immaterial, is by no necessity of its nature detained
in any place.
But what, I asked, if your opponent should shield himself(4) behind the
Apostle, where he says that every reasoning creature, in the restitution of all
things, is to look towards Him Who presides over the whole? In that passage in
the Epistle to the Philippians(5) he makes mention of certain things that are
"under the earth" "every knee shall bow" to Him "of things in heaven, and things
in earth, and things under the earth."
We shall stand by our doctrine, answered the Teacher, even if we should
hear them adducing these words. For the existence of the soul (after death) we
have the assent of our opponent, and so we do not make an objection as to the
place, as we have just said.
But if some were to ask the meaning of the Apostle in this utterance, what
is one to say? Would you remove all signification of place from the passage?
I do not think, she replied, that the divine Apostle divided the
intellectual world into localities, when he named part as in heaven, part as on earth,
and part as under the earth. There are three states in which reasoning
creatures can be: one from the very first received an immaterial life, and we call it
the angelic: another is in union with the flesh, and we call it the human: a
third is released by death from fleshly entanglements, and is to be found in souls
pure and simple. Now I think that the divine Apostle in his deep wisdom looked
to this, when he revealed the future concord of all these reasoning beings in
the work of goodness; and that he puts the unembodied angel-world "in heaven,"
and that still involved with a body "on earth," and that released from a body
"under the earth"; or, indeed, if there is any other world to be classed under
that which is possessed of reason (it is not left out); and whether any one
choose to call this last "demons" or "spirits," or anything else of the kind, we
shall not care. We certainly believe, both because of the prevailing opinion, and
still more of Scripture teaching, that there exists another world of beings
besides, divested of such bodies as ours are, who are opposed to that which is
good and are capable of hurting the lives of men, having by an act of will lapsed
from the nobler view(6), and by this revolt from goodness personified in
themselves the contrary principle; and this world is what, some say, the Apostle
adds to the number of the "things under the earth," signifying in that passage
that when evil shall have been some day annihilated in the long revolutions of the
ages, nothing shall be left outside the world of goodness, but that even from
those evil spirits(7) shall rise in harmony the confession of Christ's
Lordship. If this is so, then no one can compel us to see any spot of the underworld in
the expression, "things under the earth"; the atmosphere spreads equally over
every part of the earth, and there is not a single corner of it left unrobed by
this circumambient air.
When she had finished, I hesitated a moment, and then said: I am not yet
satisfied about the thing which we have been inquiring into; after all that has
been said my mind is still in doubt; and I beg that our discussion may be
allowed to revert to the same line of reasoning as before(8), omitting only that
upon which we are thoroughly agreed. I say this, for I think that all but the most
stubborn controversialists will have been sufficiently convinced by our debate
not to consign the soul after the body's dissolution to annihilation and
nonentity, nor to argue that because it differs substantially from the atoms it is
impossible for it to exist anywhere in the universe; for, however much a being
that is intellectual and immaterial may fail to coincide with these atoms, it is
in no ways hindered (so far) from existing in them; and this belief of ours
rests on two facts: firstly, on the soul's existing in our bodies in this present
life, though fundamentally different from them: and secondly, on the fact that
the Divine being, as our argument has shown, though distinctly something other
than visible and material substances, nevertheless pervades each one amongst
all existences, and by this penetration of the whole keeps the world in a state
of being; so that following these analogies we need not think that the soul,
either, is out of existence, when she passes from the world of forms to the
Unseen. But how, I insisted, after the united whole of the atoms has assumed(9),
owing to their mixing together, a form quite different--the form in fact with
which the soul has been actually domesticated--by what mark, when this form, as we
should have expected, is effaced along with the resolution of the atoms, shall
the soul follow along (them), now that that familiar form ceases to persist?
She waited a moment and then said: Give me leave to invent a fanciful
simile in order to illustrate the matter before us: even though that which I
suppose may be outside the range of possibility. Grant it possible, then, in the art
of painting not only to mix opposite colours, as painters are always doing, to
represent a particular tint(1), but also to separate again this mixture and to
restore to each of the colours its natural dye. If then white, or black, or
red, or golden colour, or any other colour that has been mixed to form the given
tint, were to be again separated from that union with another and remain by
itself, we suppose that our artist will none the less remember the actual nature of
that colour, and that in no case will he show forgetfulness, either of the
red, for instance, or the black, if after having become quite a different colour
by composition with each other they each return to their natural dye. We
suppose, I say, that our artist remembers the manner of the mutual blending of these
colours, and so knows what sort of colour was mixed with a given colour and what
sort of colour was the result, and how, the other colour being ejected from
the composition, (the original colour) in consequence of such release resumed its
own peculiar hue; and, supposing it were required to produce the same result
again by composition, the process will be all the easier from having been
already practised in his previous work. Now, if reason can see any analogy in this
simile, we must search the matter in hand by its light. Let the soul stand for
this Art of the painter(2); and let the natural atoms stand for the colours of
his art; and let the mixture of that tint compounded of the various dyes, and the
return of these to their native state (which we have been allowed to assume),
represent respectively the concourse, and the separation of the atoms. Then, as
we assume in the simile that the painter's Art tells him the actual dye of
each colour, when it has returned after mixing to its proper hue, so that he has
an exact knowledge of the red, and of the black, and of any other colour that
went to form the required tint by a specific way of uniting with another kind--a
knowledge which includes its appearance both in the mixture, and now when it is
in its natural state, and in the future again, supposing all the colours were
mixed over again in like fashion--so, we assert, does the soul know the natural
peculiarities of those atoms whose concourse makes the frame of the body in
which it has itself grown, even after the scattering of those atoms. However far
from each other their natural propensity and their inherent forces of repulsion
urge them, and debar each from mingling with its opposite, none the less will
the soul be near each by its power of recognition, and will persistently cling
to the familiar atoms, until their concourse after this division again takes
place in the same way, for that fresh formation of the dissolved body which will
properly be, and be called, resurrection.
You seem, I interrupted, in this passing remark to have made an excellent
defence of the faith in the Resurrection. By it, I think, the opponents of this
doctrine might be gradually led to consider it not as a thing absolutely
impossible that the atoms should again coalesce and form the same man as before.
That is very true, the Teacher replied. For we may hear these opponents
urging the following difficulty. "The atoms are resolved, like to like, into the
universe; by what device, then, does the warmth, for instance, residing in such
and such a man, after joining the universal warmth, again dissociate itself
from this connection with its kindred(3), so as to form this man who is being
'remoulded'? For if the identical individual particle does not return and only
something that is homogeneous but not identical is fetched, you will have
something else in the place of that first thing, and such a process will cease to be a
resurrection and will be merely the creation of a new man. But if the same man
is to return into himself, he must be the same entirely, and regain his
original formation in every single atom of his elements."
Then to meet such an objection, I rejoined, the above opinion about the
soul will, as I said, avail; namely, that she remains after dissolution in those
very atoms in which she first grew up, and, like a guardian placed over private
property, does not abandon them when they are mingled with their kindred
atoms, and by the subtle ubiquity of her intelligence makes no mistake about them,
with all their subtle minuteness, but diffuses herself along with those which
belong to herself when they are being mingled with their kindred dust, and
suffers no exhaustion in keeping up with the whole number of them when they stream
back into the universe, but remains with them, no matter in what direction or in
what fashion Nature may arrange them. But should the signal be given by the
All-disposing Power for these scattered atoms to combine again, then, just as when
every one of the various ropes that hang from one block answer at one and the
same moment(4) to the pull from that centre, so, following this force of the
soul which acts upon the various atoms, all these, once so familiar with each
other, rush simultaneously together and form the cable of the body by means of the
soul, each single one of them being wedded to its former neighbour and
embracing an old acquaintance.
The following illustration also, the Teacher went on, might be very
properly added to those already brought forward, to show that the soul has not need
of much teaching in order to distinguish its own from the alien amongst the
atoms. Imagine a potter with a supply of clay; and let the supply be a large one;
and let part of it have been already moulded to form finished vessels, while the
rest is still waiting to be moulded; and suppose the vessels themselves not to
be all of similar shape, but one to be a jug, for instance, and another a
wine-jar, another a plate, another a cup or any other useful vessel; and further,
let not one owner possess them all, but let us fancy for each a special owner.
Now as long as these vessels are unbroken they are of course recognizable by
their owners, and none the less so, even should they be broken in pieces; for from
those pieces each will know, for instance, that this belongs to a jar(5), and,
again, what sort of fragment belongs to a cup. And if they are plunged again
into the unworked clay, the discernment between what has been already worked and
that clay will be a more unerring one still. The individual man is as such a
vessel; he has been moulded out of the universal matter, owing to the concourse
of his atoms; and he exhibits in a form peculiarly his own a marked distinction
from his kind; and when that form has gone to pieces the soul that has been
mistress of this particular vessel will have an exact knowledge of it, derived
even from its fragments; nor will she leave this property, either, in the common
blending with all the other fragments, or if it be plunged into the still
formless part of the matter from which the atoms have come(6); she always remembers
her own as it was when compact in bodily form, and after dissolution she never
makes any mistake about it, led by marks still clinging to the remains.
I applauded this as well devised to bring out the natural features of the
case before us; and I said: It is very well to speak like this and to believe
that it is so; but suppose some one were to quote against it our Lord's
narrative about those who are in hell, as not harmonizing with the results of our
inquiry, how are we to be prepared with an answer?
The Teacher answered: The expressions of that narrative of the Word are
certainly material; but still many hints are interspersed in it to rouse the
skilled inquirer to a more discriminating study of it. I mean that He Who parts the
good from the bad by a great gulf, and makes the man in torment crave for a
drop to be conveyed by a finger, and the man who has been ill-treated in this
life rest on a patriarch's bosom, and Who relates their previous death and
consignment to the tomb, takes an intelligent searcher of His meaning far beyond a
superficial interpretation. For what sort of eyes has the Rich Man to lift up in
hell, when he has left his bodily eyes in that tomb? And how can a disembodied
spirit feel any flame? And what sort of tongue can he crave to be cooled with
the drop of water, when he has lost his tongue of flesh? What is the finger that
is to convey to him this drop? What sort of place is the "bosom" of repose? The
bodies of both of them are in the tomb, and their souls are dis-embodied, and
do not consist of parts either; and so it is impossible to make the framework
of the narrative correspond with the truth, if we understand it literally; we
can do that only by translating each detail into an equivalent in the world of
ideas. Thus we must think of the gulf as that which parts ideas which may not be
confounded from running together, not as a chasm of the earth. Such a chasm,
however vast it were, could be traversed with no difficulty by a disembodied
intelligence; since intelligence can in no time (7) be wherever it will. What then,
I asked, are the fire and the gulf and the other features in the picture? Are
they not that which they are said to be? I think, she replied, that the Gospel
signifies by means of each of them certain doctrines with regard to our
question of the soul. For when the patriarch first says to the Rich Man, "Thou in thy
lifetime receivedst thy good things," and in the same way speaks of the Poor
Man, that he, namely, has done his duty in bearing his share of life's evil
things, and then, after that, adds with regard to the gulf that it is a barrier
between them, he evidently by such expressions intimates a very important truth;
and, to my thinking, it is as follows. Once man's life had but one character; and
by that I mean that it was to be found only in the category of the good and
had no contact with evil. The first of God's commandments attests the truth of
this; that, namely, which gave to man unstinted enjoyment of all the blessings of
Paradise, forbidding only that which was a mixture of good and evil and so
composed of contraries, but making death the penalty for transgressing in that
particular. But man, acting freely by a voluntary impulse, deserted the lot that
was unmixed with evil, and drew upon himself that which was a mixture of
contraries. Yet Divine Providence did not leave that recklessness of ours without a
corrective. Death indeed, as the fixed penalty for breaking the law, necessarily
fell upon its transgressors; but God divided the life of man into two parts,
namely, this present life, and that "out of the body" hereafter; and He placed on
the first a limit of the briefest possible time, while He prolonged the other
into eternity; and in His love for man He gave him his choice, to have the one
or the other of those things, good or evil, I mean, in which of the two parts
he liked: either in this short and transitory life, or in those endless ages,
whose limit is infinity. Now these expressions "good" and "evil are equivocal;
they are used in two senses, one relating to mind and the other to sense; some
classify as good whatever is pleasant to feeling: others are confident that only
that which is perceptible by intelligence is good and deserves that name.
Those, then, whose reasoning powers have never been exercised and who have never
had a glimpse of the better way soon use up on gluttony in this fleshly life the
dividend of good which their constitution can claim, and they reserve none of
it for the after life; but those who by a discreet and sober-minded calculation
economize the powers of living are afflicted by things painful to sense here,
but they reserve their good for the succeeding life, and so their happier lot is
lengthened out to last as long as that eternal life. This, in my opinion, is
the "gulf"; which is not made by the parting of the earth, but by those
decisions in this life which result in a separation into opposite characters. The man
who has once chosen pleasure in this life, and has not cured his
inconsiderateness by repentance, places the land of the good beyond his own reach; for he has
dug against himself the yawning impassable abyss of a necessity that nothing
can break through. This is the reason, I think, that the name of Abraham's bosom
is given to that good situation of the soul in which Scripture makes the
athlete of endurance repose. For it is related of this patriarch first, of all up to
that time born, that he exchanged the enjoyment of the present for the hope of
the future; he was stripped of all the surroundings in which his life at first
was passed, and resided amongst foreigners, and thus purchased by present
annoyance future blessedness. As then figuratively (8) we call a particular circuit
of the ocean a "bosom," so does Scripture seem to me to express the idea of
those measureless blessings above by the word "bosom," meaning a place into which
all virtuous voyagers of this life are, when they have put in from hence,
brought to anchor in the waveless harbour of that gulf of blessings (9). Meanwhile
the denial of these blessings which they witness becomes in the others a flame,
which burns the soul and causes the craving for the refreshment of one drop out
of that ocean of blessings wherein the saints are affluent; which nevertheless
they do not get. If, too, you consider the "tongue," and the "eye," and the
"finger," and the other names of bodily organs, which occur in the conversation
between those disembodied souls, you will be persuaded that this conjecture of
ours about them chimes in with the opinion we have already stated about the
soul. Look closely into the meaning of those words. For as the concourse of atoms
forms the substance of the entire body, so it is reasonable to think that the
same cause operates to complete the substance of each member of the body. If,
then, the soul is present with the atoms of the body when they are again mingled
with the universe, it will not only be cognizant of the entire mass which once
came together to form the whole body, and will be present with it, but, besides
that, will not fail to know the particular materials of each one of the
members, so as to remember by what divisions amongst the atoms our limbs were
completely formed. There is, then, nothing improbable in supposing that what is present
in the complete mass is present also in each division of the mass. If one,
then, thinks of those atoms in which each detail of the body potentially inheres,
and surmises that Scripture means a "finger" and a "tongue" and an "eye" and
the rest as existing, after dissolution, only in the sphere of the soul, one will
not miss the probable truth. Moreover, if each detail carries the mind away
from a material acceptation of the story, surely the "hell" which we have just
been speaking of cannot reasonably be thought a place so named; rather we are
there told by Scripture about a certain unseen and immaterial situation in which
the soul resides. In this story of the Rich and the Poor Man we are taught
another doctrine also, which is intimately connected with our former discoveries.
The story makes the sensual pleasure-loving man, when he sees that his own case
is one that admits of no escape, evince forethought for his relations on earth;
and when Abraham tells him that the life of those still in the flesh is not
unprovided with a guidance, for they may find it at hand, if they will, in the Law
and the Prophets, he still continues entreating that Just x Patriarch, and
asks that a sudden and convincing message, brought by some one risen from the
dead, may be sent to them. What then, I asked, is the doctrine here? Why, seeing
that Lazarus' soul is occupied (2) with his present blessings and turns round to
look at nothing that he has left, while the rich man is still attached, with a
cement as it were, even after death, to the life of feeling, which he does not
divest himself of even when he has ceased to live, still keeping as he does
flesh and blood in his thoughts (for in his entreaty that his kindred may be
exempted from his sufferings he plainly shows that he is not freed yet from fleshly
feeling), -- in such details of the story (she continued) I think our Lord
teaches us this; that those still living in the flesh must as much as ever they can
separate and free themselves in a way from its attachments by virtuous
conduct, in order that after death they may not need a second death to cleanse them
from the remnants that are owing to this cement (3) of the flesh, and, when once
the bonds are loosed from around the soul, her soaring (4) up to the Good may
be swift and unimpeded, with no anguish of the body to distract her. For if any
one becomes wholly and thoroughly carnal in thought, such an one, with every
motion and energy of the soul absorbed in fleshly desires, is not parted from
such attachments, even in the disembodied state; just as those who have lingered
long in noisome places do not part with the unpleasantness contracted by that
lengthened stay, even when they pass into a sweet atmosphere. So (5) it is that,
when the change is made into the impalpable Unseen, not even then will it be
possible for the lovers of the flesh to avoid dragging away with them under any
circumstances some fleshly foulness; and thereby their torment will be
intensified, their soul having been materialized by such surroundings. I think too that
this view of the matter harmonizes to a certain extent with the assertion made
by some persons that around their graves shadowy phantoms of the departed are
often seen 6. If this is really so, an inordinate attachment of that particular
soul to the life in the flesh is proved to have existed, causing it to be
unwilling, even when expelled from the flesh, to fly clean away and to admit the
complete change of its form into the impalpable; it remains near the frame even
after. the dissolution of the frame, and though now outside it, hovers
regretfully over the place where its material is and continues to haunt it.
Then, after a moment's reflection on the meaning of these latter words, I
said: I think that a contradiction now arises between what you have said and
the result of our former examination of the passions. For if, on the one hand,
the activity of such movements within us is to be held as arising from our
kinship with the brutes, such movements I mean as were enumerated in our previous
discussion (7), anger, for instance, and fear, desire of pleasure, and so on,
and, on the other hand, it was affirmed that virtue consists in the good
employment of these movements, and vice in their bad employment, and in addition to this
we discussed the actual contribution of each of the other passions to a
virtuous life, and found that through desire above all we are brought nearer God,
drawn up, by its chain as it were, from earth towards Him, -- I think (I said)
that that part of the discussion is in a way opposed to that which we are now
aiming at.
How so? she asked.
Why, when every unreasoning instinct is quenched within us after our
purgation, this principle of desire will not exist any more than the other
principles; and this being removed, it looks as if the striving after the better way
would also cease, no other emotion remaining in the soul that can stir us up to
the appetence of Good.
To that objection, she replied, we answer this. The speculative and
critical faculty is the property of the soul's godlike part; for it is by these that
we grasp the Deity also. If, then whether by forethought here, or by purgation
hereafter, our soul becomes free from any emotional connection with the brute
creation, there will be nothing to impede its contemplation of the Beautiful;
for this last is essentially capable of attracting in a certain way every being
that looks towards it. If, then, the soul is purified of every vice, it will
most certainly be in the sphere of Beauty. The Deity is in very substance
Beautiful; and to the Deity the soul will in its state of purity have affinity, and
will embrace It as like itself. Whenever this happens, then, there will be no
longer need of the impulse of Desire to lead the way to the Beautiful. Whoever
passes his time in darkness, he it is who will be under the influence of a desire
for the light; but whenever he comes into the light, then enjoyment takes the
place of desire, and the power to enjoy renders desire useless and out of date.
It will therefore be no detriment to our participation in the Good, that the
soul should be free from such emotions, and turning back upon herself should know
herself accurately what her actual nature is, and should behold the Original
Beauty reflected in the mirror and in the figure of her own beauty. For truly
herein consists the real assimilation to the Divine; viz. in making our own life
in some degree a copy of the Supreme Being. For a Nature like that, which
transcends all thought and is far removed from all that we observe within ourselves,
proceeds in its existence in a very different manner to what we do in this
present life. Man, possessing a constitution whose law it is to be moving, is
carried in that particular direction whither the impulse of his will directs: and
so his soul is not affected in the same way towards what lies before it (8), as
one may say, as to what it has left behind; for hope leads the forward
movement, but it is memory that succeeds that movement when it has advanced to the
attainment of the hope; and if it is to something intrinsically good that hope thus
leads on the soul, the print that this exercise of the will leaves upon the
memory is a bright one; but if hope has seduced the soul with some phantom only
of the Good, and the excellent Way has been missed, then the memory that
succeeds what has happened becomes shame, and an intestine war is thus waged in the
soul between memory and hope, because the last has been such a bad leader of the
will. Such in fact is the state of mind that shame gives expression to; the
soul is stung as it were at the result; its remorse for its ill-considered attempt
is a whip that makes it feel to the quick, and it would bring in oblivion to
its aid against its tormentor. Now in our case nature, owing to its being
indigent of the Good, is aiming always at this which is still wanting to it, and this
aiming at a still missing thing is this very habit of Desire, which our
constitution displays equally, whether it is baulked of the real Good, or wins that
which it is good to win. But a nature that surpasses every idea that we can form
of the Good and transcends all other power, being in no want of anything that
can be regarded as good, is itself the plenitude of every good; it does not
move in the sphere of the good by way of participation in it only, but if is
itself the substance of the Good (whatever we imagine the Good to be); it neither
gives scope for any rising hope (for hope manifests activity in the direction of
something absent; but "what a man has, why doth he yet hope for?" as the
Apostle asks), nor is it in want of the activity of the memory for the knowledge of
things; that which is actually seen has no need of being remembered. Since,
then, this Divine nature is beyond any particular good (9), and to the good the
good is an object of love, it follows that when It looks within Itself (1), It
wishes for what It contains and contains that which It wishes, and admits nothing
external. Indeed there is nothing external to It, with the sole exception of
evil, which, strange as it may seem to say, possesses an existence in not
existing at all. For there is no other origin of evil except the negation of the
existent, and the truly-existent forms the substance of the Good. That therefore
which is not to be found in the existent must be in the non-existent. Whenever the
soul, then, having divested itself of the multifarious emotions incident to
its nature, gets its Divine form and, mounting above Desire, enters within that
towards which it was once incited by that Desire, it offers no harbour within
itself either for hope or for memory. It holds the object of the one; the other
is extruded from the consciousness by the occupation in enjoying all that is
good: and thus the soul copies the life that is above, and is conformed to the
peculiar features of the Divine nature; none of its habits are left to it except
that of love, which clings by natural affinity to the Beautiful. For this is
what love is; the inherent affection towards a chosen object. When, then, the
soul, having become simple and single in form and so perfectly godlike, finds that
perfectly simple and immaterial good which is really worth enthusiasm and love
(2), it attaches itself to it and blends with it by means of the movement and
activity of love, fashioning itself according to that which it is continually
finding and grasping. Becoming by this assimilation to the Good all that the
nature of that which it participates is, the soul will consequently, owing to there
being no lack of any good in that thing itself which it participates, be
itself also in no lack of anything, and so will expel from within the activity and
the habit of Desire; for this arises only when the thing missed is not found.
For this teaching we have the authority of God's own Apostle, who announces a
subduing (3) and a ceasing of all other activities, even for the good, which are
within us, and finds no limit for love alone. Prophecies, he says, shall fail;
forms of knowledge shall cease; but "charity never faileth;" which is
equivalent to its being always as it is: and though (4) he says that faith and hope
have endured so far by the side of love, yet again he prolongs its date beyond
theirs, and with good reason too; for hope is in operation only so long as the
enjoyment of the things hoped for is not to be had; and faith in the same way is a
support (5) in the uncertainty about the things hoped for; for so he defines
it -- " the substance (6) of things hoped for"; but when the thing hoped for
actually comes, then all other faculties are reduced to quiescence (7), and love
alone remains active, finding nothing to succeed itself. Love, therefore, is the
foremost of all excellent achievements and the first of the commandments of
the law. If ever, then, the soul reach this goal, it will be in i no need of
anything else; it will embrace that plenitude of things which are, whereby alone
(8) it seems in any way to preserve within itself the stamp of God's actual
blessedness. For the life of the Supreme Being is love, seeing that the Beautiful is
necessarily lovable to those who recognize it, and the Deity does recognize
it, and so this recognition becomes love, that which He recognizes being
essentially beautiful. This True Beauty the insolence of satiety cannot touch (9); and
no satiety interrupting this continuous capacity to love the Beautiful, God's
life will have its activity in love; which life is thus in itself beautiful, and
is essentially of a loving disposition towards the Beautiful, and receives no
check to this activity of love. In fact, in the Beautiful no limit is to be
found so that love should have to cease with any limit of 'the Beautiful. This
last can be ended only by its opposite; but when you have a good, as here, which
is in its essence incapable of a change for the worse, then that good will go on
unchecked into infinity. Moreover, as every being is capable of attracting its
like, and humanity is, in a way, like God, as bearing within itself some
resemblances to its Prototype, the soul is by a strict necessity attracted to the
kindred Deity. In fact what belongs to God must by all means and at any cost be
preserved for Him. If, then, on the one hand, the soul is unencumbered with
superfluities and no trouble connected with the body presses it down, its advance
towards Him Who draws it to Himself is sweet and congenial. But suppose (1), on
the other hand, that it has been transfixed with the nails of propension (2) so
as to be held down to a habit connected with material things, -- a case like
that of those in the ruins caused by earthquakes, whose bodies are crushed by
the mounds of rubbish; and let us imagine by way of illustration that these are
not only pressed down by the weight of the ruins, but have been pierced as
well with some spikes and splinters discovered with them in the rubbish. What
then, would naturally be the plight of those bodies, when they were being dragged
by relatives from the ruins to receive the holy rites of burial, mangled and
torn entirely, disfigured in the most direful manner conceivable, with the nails
beneath the heap harrowing them by the very violence necessary to pull them out?
Such I think is the plight of the soul as well when the Divine force, for
God's very love of man, drags that which belongs to Him from the ruins of the
irrational and material. Not in hatred or revenge for a wicked life, to my thinking,
does God bring upon sinners those painful dispensations; He is only claiming
and drawing to Himself whatever, to please Him, came into existence. But while
He for a noble end is attracting the soul to Himself, the Fountain of all
Blessedness, it is the occasion necessarily to the being so attracted of a state of
torture. Just as those who refine gold from the dross which it contains not only
get this base alloy to melt in the fire, but are obliged to melt the pure gold
along with the alloy, and then while this last is being consumed the gold
remains, so, while evil is being consumed in the purgatorial (3) fire, the soul
that is welded to this evil must inevitably be in the fire too, until the
spurious material alloy is consumed and annihilated by this fire. If a clay of the
more tenacious kind is deeply plastered round a rope, and then the end of the rope
is put through a narrow hole, and then some one on the further side violently
pulls it by that end, the result must be that, while the rope itself obeys the
force exerted, the clay that has been plastered upon it is scraped off it with
this violent pulling and is left outside the hole, and, moreover, is the cause
why the rope does not run easily through the passage, but has to undergo a
violent tension at the hands of the puller. In such a manner, I think, we may
figure to ourselves the agonized struggle of that soul which has wrapped itself up
in earthy material passions, when God is drawing it, His own one, to Himself,
and the foreign matter, which has somehow grown into its substance, has to be
scraped from it by main force, and so occasions it that keen intolerable anguish.
Then it seems, I said, that it is not punishment chiefly and principally
that the Deity, as Judge, afflicts sinners with; but He operates, as your
argument has shown, only to get the good separated from the evil and to attract it
into the communion of blessedness.
That, said the Teacher, is my meaning; and also that the agony will be
measured by the amount of evil there is in each individual. For it would not be
reasonable to think that the man who has remained so long as we have supposed in
evil known to be forbidden, and the man who has fallen only into moderate sins,
should be tortured to the same amount in the judgment upon their vicious
habit; but according to the quantity of material will be the longer or shorter time
that that agonizing flame will be burning; that is, as long as there is fuel to
feed it. In the case of the man who has acquired a heavy weight of material,
the consuming fire must necessarily be very searching; but where that which the
fire has to feed upon (4) has spread less far, there the penetrating fierceness
of the punishment is mitigated, so far as the subject itself, in the amount of
its evil, is diminished. In any and every case evil must be removed out of
existence, so that, as we said above, the absolutely non-existent should cease to
be at all. Since it is not in its nature that evil should exist outside the
will, does it not follow that when it shall be that every will rests in God, evil
will be reduced to complete annihilation, owing to no receptacle being left for
it?
But, said I, what help can one find in this devout hope, when one
considers the greatness of the evil in undergoing torture even for a single year; and
if that intolerable anguish be prolonged for the interval of an age, what grain
of comfort is left from any subsequent expectation to him whose purgation is
thus commensurate with an entire age? (5)
Why (6), either we must plan to keep the soul absolutely untouched and
free from any stain of evil; or, if our passionate nature makes that quite
impossible, then we must plan that our failures in excellence consist only in mild and
easily-curable derelictions. For the Gospel in its teaching distinguishes
between (7) a debtor of ten thousand talents and a debtor of five hundred pence,
and of fifty pence and of a farthing (8), which is "the uttermost" of coins; it
proclaims that God's just judgment reaches to all, and enhances the payment
necessary as the weight of the debt increases, and on the other hand does not
overlook the very smallest debts. But the Gospel tells us that this payment of debts
was not effected by the refunding of money, but that the indebted man was
delivered to the tormentors until he should pay the whole debt; and that means
nothing else than paying in the coin of torment (9) the inevitable recompense, the
recompense, I mean, that consists in taking the share of pain incurred during
his lifetime, when he inconsiderately chose mere pleasure, undiluted with its
opposite; so that having put off from him all that foreign growth which sin is,
and discarded the shame of any debts, he might stand in liberty and
fearlessness. Now liberty is the coming up to a state which owns no master and is
self-regulating (1); it is that with which we were gifted by God at the beginning, but
which has been obscured by the feeling of shame arising from indebtedness.
Liberty too is in all cases one and the same essentially; it has a natural
attraction to itself. It follows, then, that as everything that is free will be united
with its like, and as virtue is a thing that has no master, that is, is free,
everything that is free will be united with virtue. But, further, the Divine
Being is the fountain of all virtue. Therefore, those who have parted with evil
will be united with Him; and so, as the Apostle says, God will be "all in all
(2)"; for this utterance seems to me plainly to confirm the opinion we have already
arrived at, for it means that God will be instead of all other things, and in
all. For while our present life is active amongst a variety of multiform
conditions, and the things we have relations with are numerous, for instance, time,
air, locality, food and drink, clothing, sunlight, lamplight, and other
necessities of life, none of which, many though they be, are God, -- that blessed state
which we hope for is in need of none of these things, but the Divine Being
will become all, and instead of all, to us, distributing Himself proportionately
to every need of that existence. It is plain, too, from the Holy Scripture that
God becomes, to those who deserve it, locality, and home, and clothing, and
food, and drink, and light, and riches, and dominion, and everything thinkable and
nameable that goes to make our life happy. But He that becomes "all" things
will be "in all" things too; and herein it appears to me that Scripture teaches
the complete annihilation of evil (3). If, that is, God will be "in all"
existing things, evil; plainly, will not then be amongst them; for if any one was to
assume that it did exist then, how will the belief that God will be "in all" be
kept intact? The excepting of that one thing, evil, mars the comprehensiveness
of the term "all." But He that will be "in all" will never be in that which
does not exist.
What then, I asked, are we to say to those whose hearts fail at these
calamities (4)?
We will say to them, replied the Teacher, this. "It is foolish, good
people, for you to fret and complain of the chain of this fixed sequence of life's
realities; you do not know the goal towards which each single dispensation of
the universe is moving. You do not know that all things have to be assimilated to
the Divine Nature in accordance with the artistic plan of their author, in a
certain regularity and order. Indeed, it was for this that intelligent beings
came into existence; namely, that the riches of the Divine blessings should not
lie idle. The All-creating Wisdom fashioned these souls, these receptacles with
free wills, as vessels as it were, for this very purpose, that there should be
some capacities able to receive His blessings and become continually larger
with the inpouring of the stream. Such are the wonders (5) that the participation
in the Divine blessings works: it makes him into whom they come. larger and
more capacious ; from his capacity to receive it gets for the receiver an actual
increase in bulk as well, and he never stops enlarging. The fountain of
blessings wells up unceasingly, and the partaker's nature, finding nothing superfluous
and without a use in that which it receives, makes the whole influx an
enlargement of its own proportions, and becomes at once more wishful to imbibe the
nobler nourishment and more capable of containing it; each grows along with each,
both the capacity which is nursed in such abundance of blessings and so grows
greater, and the nurturing supply which comes on in a flood answering to the
growth of those increasing powers. It is likely, therefore, that this bulk will
mount to such a magnitude as (6) there is no limit to check, so that we should not
grow into it. With such a prospect before us, are you angry that our nature is
advancing to its goal along the path appointed for us? Why, our career cannot
be run thither-ward, except that which weighs us down, I mean this encumbering
load of earthiness, be shaken off the soul; nor can we be domiciled in Purity
with the corresponding part of our nature, unless we have cleansed ourselves by
a better training from the habit of affection which we have contracted in life
towards this earthiness. But if there be in you any clinging to this body (7),
and the being unlocked from this darling thing give you pain, let not this,
either, make you despair. You will behold this bodily envelopment, which is now
dissolved in death, woven again out of the same atoms, not indeed into this
organization with its gross and heavy texture, but with its threads worked up into
something more subtle and ethereal, so that you will not only h.ave near you
that which you love, but it will be restored to you with a brighter and more
entrancing beauty (8)."
But it somehow seems to me now, I said, that the doctrine of the
Resurrection necessarily comes on for our discussion; a doctrine which I think is even
at first sight true as well as credible (9), as it is told us in Scripture; so
that that will not come in question between us: but since the weakness of the
human understanding is strengthened still farther by any arguments that are
intelligible to us, it would be well not to leave this part of the subject, either,
without philosophical examination. Let us consider, then, what ought to be said
about it.
As for the thinkers, the Teacher went on, outside our own system of
thought, they have, with all their diverse ways of looking at things, one in one
point, another in another, approached and touched the doctrine of the Resurrection:
while they none of them exactly coincide with us, they have in no case wholly
abandoned such an expectation. Some indeed make human nature vile in their
comprehensiveness, maintaining that a soul becomes alternately that of a man and
of something irrational; that it trans-migrates into various bodies, changing at
pleasure from the man into fowl, fish, or beast, and then returning to human
kind. While some extend this absurdity even to trees (1) and shrubs, so that
they consider their wooden life as corresponding and akin to humanity, others of
them hold only thus much--that the soul exchanges one man for another man, so
that the life of humanity is continued always by means of the same souls, which,
being exactly the same in number, are being born perpetually first in one
generation, then in another. As for ourselves, we take our stand upon the tenets of
the Church, and assert that it will be well to accept only so much of these
speculations as is sufficient to show that those who indulge in them are to a
certain extent in accord with the doctrine of the Resurrection. Their statement,
for instance, that the soul after its release from this body insinuates itself
into certain other bodies is not absolutely out of harmony with the revival which
we hope for. For our view, which maintains that the body, both now, and again
in the future, is composed of the atoms of the universe, is held equally by
these heathens. In fact, you cannot imagine any constitution of the body
independent of a concourse (2) of these atoms. But the divergence lies in this: we
assert that the same bodyagainas before, composed of the same atoms, is compacted
around the soul;. they suppose that the soul alights on other bodies, not only
rational, but irrational and even insensate; and while all are agreed that these
bodies which the soul resumes derive their substance from the atoms of the
universe, they part company from us in thinking that they are not made out of
identically the same atoms as those which in this mortal life grew around the soul.
Let then, this external testimony stand for the fact that it is not contrary to
probability that the soul should again inhabit a body; after that however, it
is incumbent upon us to make a survey of the inconsistencies of their position,
and it will be easy thus, by means of the consequences that arise as we follow
out the consistent view, to bring the truth to light. What, then, is to be
said about these theories? This that those who would have it that the soul
migrates into natures divergent from each other seem to me to obliterate all natural
distinctions; to blend and confuse together, in every possible respect, the
rational, the irrational, the sentient, and the insensate; if, that is, all these
are to pass into each other, with no distinct natural order (3) secluding them
from mutual transition. To say that one and the same soul, on account of a
particular environment of body, is at one time a rational and intellectual soul, and
that then it is caverned along with the reptiles, or herds with the birds, or
is a beast of burden, or a carnivorous one, or swims in the deep; or even drops
down to an insensate thing, so as to strike out roots or become a complete
tree, producing buds on branches, and from those buds a flower, or a thorn, or a
fruit edible or noxious--to say this, is nothing short of making all things the
same and believing that one single nature runs through all beings; that there
is a connexion between them which blends and confuses hopelessly all the marks
by which one could be distinguished from another. The philosopher who asserts
that the same thing may be born in anything intends no less than that all things
are to be one; when the observed differences in things are for him no obstacle
to mixing together things which are utterly incongruous. He makes it necessary
that, even when one sees one of the creatures that are venom-darting or
carnivorous, one should regard it, in spite of appearances, as of the same tribe, nay
even of the same family, as oneself. With such beliefs a man will look even
upon hemlock as not alien to his own nature, detecting, as he does, humanity in
the plant. The grape-bunch itself (4), produced though it be by cultivation for
the purpose of sustaining life, he will not regard without suspicion; for it too
comes from a plant (5): and we find even the fruit of the ears of corn upon
which we live are plants; how, then, can one put in the sickle to cut them down;
and how can one squeeze the bunch, or pull up the thistle from the field, or
gather flowers, or hunt birds, or set fire to the logs of the funeral pyre: it
being all the while uncertain whether we are not laying violent hands on kinsmen,
or ancestors, or fellow-country-men, and whether it is not through the medium
of some body of theirs that the fire is being kindled, and the cup mixed, and
the food prepared? To think that in the case of any single one of these
things a soul of a man has become a plant or animal (6), while no marks are stamped
upon them to indicate what sort of plant or animal it is that has been a man,
and what sort has sprung from other beginnings,-such a conception as this will
dispose him who has entertained it to feel an equal amount of interest in
everything: he must perforce either harden himself against actual human beings who
are in the land of the living, or, if his nature inclines him to love his
kindred, he will feel alike towards every kind of life, whether he meet it in reptiles
or in wild beasts. Why, if the holder of such an opinion go into a thicket of
trees, even then he will regard the trees as a crowd of men. What sort of life
will his be, when he has to be tender towards everything on the ground of
kinship, or else hardened towards mankind on account of his seeing no difference
between them and the other creatures? From what has been already said, then, we
must reject this theory: and there are many other considerations as well which
on the grounds of mere consistency lead us away from it. For I have heard
persons who hold these opinions (7) saying that whole nations of souls are hidden
away somewhere in a realm of their own, living a life analogous to that of the
embodied soul; but such is the fineness and buoyancy of their substance that they
themselves' roll round along with the revolution of the universe; and that
these souls, having individually lost their wings through some gravitation towards
evil, become embodied; first this takes place in men; and after that, passing
from a human life, owing to brutish affinities of their passions, they are
reduced (8) to the level of brutes; and, leaving that, drop down to this insensate
life of pure nature (9) which you have been hearing so much of; so that that
inherently fine and buoyant thing that the soul is first becomes weighted and
downward tending in consequence of some vice, and so migrates to a human body; then
its reasoning powers are extinguished, and it goes on living in some brute;
and then even this gift of sensation is withdrawn, and it changes into the
insensate plant life; but after that mounts up again by the same gradations until it
is restored to its place in heaven. Now this doctrine will at once be found,
even after a very cursory survey, to have no coherency with itself. For, first,
seeing that the soul is to be dragged down from its life in heaven, on account
of evil there, to the condition of a tree, and is then from this point, on
account of virtue exhibited there, to return to heaven, their theory will be unable
to decide which is to have the preference, the life in heaven, or the life in
the tree. A circle, in fact, of the same sequences will be perpetually
traversed, where the soul, at whatever point it may be, has no resting-place. If it thus
lapses from the disembodied state to the embodied, and thence to the
insensate, and then springs back to the disembodied, an inextricable confusion of good
and evil must result in the minds of those who thus teach. For the life in
heaven will no more preserve its blessedness (since evil can touch heaven's
denizens), than the life in trees will be devoid of virtue (since it is from this, they
say, that the rebound of the soul towards the good begins, while from there it
begins the evil life again). Secondly (1), seeing that the soul as it moves
round in heaven is there entangled with evil and is in consequencedragged down
to live in mere matter, from whence, however, it is lifted again into its
residence on high, it follows that those philosophers establish the very contrary (2)
of their own views; they establish, namely, that the life in matter is the
purgation of evil, while that undeviating revolution along with the stars (3) is
the foundation and cause of evil in every soul: if it is here that the soul by
means of virtue grows its wing and then soars upwards, and there that those
wings by reason of evil fall off, so that it descends and clings to this lower
world and is commingled with the grossness of material nature. But the
untenableness of this view does not stop even in this, namely, that it contains assertions
diametrically opposed to each other. Beyond this, their fundamental conception
(4) itself cannot stand secure on every side. They say, for instance, that a
heavenly nature is unchangeable. How then, can there be room for any weakness in
the unchangeable? If, again, a lower nature is subject to infirmity, how in the
midst of this infirmity can freedom from it be achieved? They attempt to
amalgamate two things that can never be joined together: they descry strength in
weakness, passionlessness in passion. But even to this last view they are not
faithful throughout; for they bring home the soul from its material life to that
very place whence they had exiled it because of evil there, as though the life in
that place was quite safe and uncontaminated; apparently quite forgetting the
fact that the soul was weighted with evil there, before it plunged down into
this lower world. The blame thrown on the life here below, and the praise of the
things in heaven, are thus interchanged and reversed; for that which was once
blamed conducts in their opinion to the brighter life, while that which was
taken for the better state gives an impulse to the soul's propensity to evil.
Expel, therefore, from amongst the doctrines of the Faith all erroneous and shifting
suppositions about such matters! We must not follow, either, as though they
had bit the truth those who suppose that souls pass from women's bodies to live
in men (5), or, reversely (6), that souls that have parted with men's bodies
exist in women: or even if they only say that they pass from men into men, or from
women into women. As for the former theory (7), not only has it been rejected
for being shifting and illusory, and for landing us in opinions diametrically
opposed to each other; but it must be rejected also because it is a godless
theory, maintaining as it does that nothing amongst the things in nature is brought
into existence without deriving its peculiar constitution from evil as its
source. If, that is, neither men nor plants nor cattle can be born unless some
soul from above has fallen into them, and if this fall is owing to some tendency
to evil, then they evidently think that evil controls the creation of all
beings. In some mysterious way, too, both events are to occur at once; the birth of
the man in consequence of a marriage, and the fall of the soul (synchronizing as
it must with the proceedings at that marriage). A greater absurdity even than
this is involved: if, as is the fact, the large majority of the brute creation
copulate in the spring, are we, then, to say that the spring brings it about
that evil is engendered in the revolving world above, so that, at one and the
same moment, there certain souls are impregnated with evil and so fall, and here
certain brutes conceive? And what are we to say about the husbandman who sets
the vine-shoots in the soil? How does his hand manage to have covered in a human
soul along with the plant, and how does the moulting of wings last
simultaneously with his employment in planting? The same absurdity, it is to be observed,
exists in the other of the two theories as well; in the direction, I mean, of
thinking that the soul must be anxious about the intercourses of those living in
wedlock, and must be on the look-out for the times of bringing forth, in order
that it may insinuate itself into the bodies then produced. Supposing the man
refuses the union, or the woman keeps herself clear of the necessity of becoming
a mother, will evil then fail to weigh down that particular soul? Will it be
marriage, in consequence, that sounds up above the first note of evil in the
soul, or will this reversed state invade the soul quite independently of any
marriage? But then, in this last case, the soul will have to wander about in the
interval like a houseless vagabond, lapsed as it has from its heavenly
surroundings, and yet, as it may happen in some cases, still without a body to receive it.
But how, after that, can they imagine that the Deity exercises any
superintendence over the world, referring as they do the beginnings of human lives to this
casual and meaningless descent of a soul. For all that follows must
necessarily accord with the beginning; and so, if a life begins in consequence of a
chance accident, the whole course of it (8) becomes at once a chapter of accidents,
and the attempt to make the whole world depend on a Divine power is absurd,
when it is made by these men, who deny to the individualities in it a birth from
the fiat of the Divine Will and refer the several origins of beings to
encounters that come of evil, as though there could never have existed such a thing as a
human life, unless a vice had struck, as it were, its leading note. If the
beginning is like that, a sequel will most certainly be set in motion in
accordance with that beginning. None would dare to maintain that what is fair can come
out of what is foul, any more than from good can come its opposite. We expect
fruit in accordance with the nature of the seed. Therefore this blind movement of
chance is to rule the whole of life, and no Providence is any more to pervade
the world.
Nay, even the forecasting by our calculations will be quite useless;
virtue will lose its value; and to turn from evil will not be worth the while.
Everything will be entirely under the control of the driver, Chance; and our lives
will differ not at all from vessels devoid of ballast, and will drift on waves
of unaccountable circumstances, now to this, now to that incident of good or of
evil. The treasures of virtue will never be found in those who owe their
constitution to causes quite contrary to virtue. If God really superintends our life,
then, confessedly, evil cannot begin it. But if we do owe our birth to evil,
then we must go on living in complete uniformity with it. Thereby it will be
shOWn that it is folly to talk about the "houses of correction" which await us
after this life is ended, and the "just recompenses," and all the other things
there asserted, and believed in too, that tend to the suppression of vice: for how
can a man, owing, as he does, his birth to evil, be outside its pale? How can
he, whose very nature has its rise in a vice, as they assert, possess any
deliberate impulse towards a life of virtue? Take any single one of the brute
creation; it does not attempt to speak like a human being, but in using the natural l
kind of utterance sucked in, as it were, with its mother's milk (9), it deems
it no loss to be deprived of articulate speech. Just in the same way those who
believe that a vice was the origin and the cause of their being alive will
never bring themselves to have a longing after virtue, because it will be a thing
quite foreign to their nature. But, as a fact (1), they who by reflecting have
cleansed the vision of their soul do all of them desire and strive after a life
of virtue. Therefore it is by that fact clearly proved that vice is not prior
in time to the act of beginning to live, and that our nature did not thence
derive its source, but that the all-disposing wisdom of God was the Cause of it:
in short, that the soul issues on the stage of life in the manner which is
pleasing to its Creator, and then (but not before), by virtue of its power of
willing, is free to choose that which is to its mind, and so, whatever it may wish to
be, becomes that very thing. We may understand this truth by the example of
the eyes. To see is their natural state; but to fail to see results to them
either from choice or from disease. This unnatural state may supervene instead of
the natural, either by wilful shutting of the eyes or by deprivation of their
sight through disease. With the like truth we may assert that the soul derives its
constitution from God, and that, as we cannot conceive of any vice in Him, it
is removed from arty necessity of being vicious; that nevertheless, though this
is the condition in which it came into being, it can be attracted of its own
free will in a chosen direction, either wilfully shutting its eyes to the Good,
or letting them he damaged (2) by that insidious foe whom we have taken home to
live with us, and so passing through life in the darkness of error; or,
reversely, preserving un-dimmed its sight of the Truth and keeping far away from all
weaknesses that could darken it. --But then some one will ask, "When and how
did it come into being?'" Now as for the question, how any single thing came into
existence, we must banish it altogether from our discussion. Even in the case
of things which are quite within the grasp of our understanding and of which we
have sensible perception, it would be impossible for the speculative reason
(3) to grasp the "how" of the production of the phenomenon; so much so, that even
inspired and saintly men have deemed such questions insoluble. For instance,
the Apostle says, "Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by
the word of God, so that things which are seen are not made of things which do
appear (4)." He would not, I take it, have spoken like that, if he had thought
that the question could be settled by any efforts of the reasoning powers. While
the Apostle affirms that it is an object of his faith s that it was by the will
of God that the world itself and all which is therein was framed (whatever
this "world" be that involves the idea of the whole visible and invisible
creation), he has on the other hand left out of the investigation the "how" of this
framing. Nor do I think that this point can ever be reached by any inquirers. The
question presents, on the face of it, many insuperable difficulties. How, for
instance, can a world of movement come from one that is at rest? how from the
simple and undimensional that which shows dimension and compositeness? Did it
come actually out of the Supreme Being? But the fact that this world presents a
difference in kind to that Being militates against (6) such a supposition. Did it
then come from some other quarter? Yet Faith (7) can contemplate nothing as
quite outside the Divine Nature; for we should have to believe in two distinct
and separate Principles, if outside the Creative Cause we are to suppose
something else, which the Artificer, with all His skill, has to put under contribution
for the formative processes of the Universe. Since, then, the Cause of all
things is one, and one only, and yet the existences produced by that Cause are not
of the same nature as its transcendent quality, an inconceivability of equal
magnitude (5) arises in both our suppositions, i.e. both that the creation comes
straight out of the Divine Being, and that the universe owes its existence to
some cause other than Him; for if created things are to be of the same nature as
God, we must consider Him to be invested with the properties belonging to His
creation; or else a world of matter, outside the circle of God's substance, and
equal, on the score of the absence in it of all beginning, to the eternity of
the Self-existent One, will have to be ranged against Him: and this is in fact
what the followers of Manes, and some of the Greek philosophers who held
opinions of equal boldness with his, did imagine; and they raised this imagination
into a system. In order, then, to avoid falling into either of these absurdities,
which the inquiry into the origin of things involves, let us, following the
example of the Apostle, leave the question of the "how" in each created thing,
without meddling with it at all, but merely observing incidentally that the
movement t of God's Will becomes at any moment that He pleases a fact, and the
intention becomes at once realized in Nature (9); for Omnipotence does not leave the
plans of its fa-seeing skill in the state of unsubstantial wishes: and the
actualizing of a wish is Substance. In short, the whole world of existing things
falls into two divisions: i.e. that of the intelligible, and that of the
corporeal: and the intelligible creation does not, to begin with, seem to be in any
way at variance with a spiritual Being, but on the contrary to verge closely upon
Him, exhibiting as it does that absence of tangible form and of dimension
which we rightly attribute to His transcendent nature. The corporeal creation (1),
on the other hand, must certainly be classed amongst specialities that have
nothing in common with the Deity; and it does offer this supreme difficulty to the
Reason; namely, that the Reason cannot see how the visible comes out of the
invisible, how the hard solid comes out of the intangible, how the finite comes
out of the infinite, how that which is circumscribed by certain proportions,
where the idea of quantity comes in, can come from that which has no size, no
proportions, and so on through each single circumstance of body. But even about
this we can say so much: i.e. that not one of those things which we attribute to
body is itself body; neither figure, nor colour, nor weight, nor extension, nor
quantity, nor any other qualifying notion whatever; but every one of them is a
category; it is the combination of them all into a single whole that
constitutes body. Seeing, then, that these several qualifications which complete the
particular body are grasped by thought alone, and not by sense, and that the Deity
is a thinking being, what trouble can it be to such a thinking agent to produce
the thinkables whose mutual combination generateS for us the substance of that
body? All this discussion, however, lies outside our present business. The
previous question was,-If some souls exist anterior to their bodies, when and how
do they come into existence? and of this question (2), again, the part about
the how, has been left out of our examination and has not been meddled with, as
presenting impenetrable difficulties. There remains the question of the when of
the soul's commencement of existence: it follows immediately on that which we
have already discussed. For if we were to grant that the soul has lived
previous to its body (3) in some place of resort peculiar to itself, then we cannot
avoid seeing some force in all that fantastic teaching lately discussed, which
would explain the soul's habitation of the body as a consequence of some vice.
Again, on the other hand, no one who can reflect will imagine an after-birth of
the soul, i.e. that it is younger than the moulding of the body; for every one
can see for himself that not one amongst all the things that are inanimate or
soulless possesses any power of motion or of growth; whereas there is no
question about that which is bred in the uterus both growing and moving from place to
place. It remains therefore that we must think that the point of commencement
of existence is one and the same for body and soul. Also we affirm that, just as
the earth receives the sapling from the hands of the husbandman and makes a
tree of it, without itself imparting the power of growth to its nursling, but
only lending it, when placed within itself, the impulse to grow, in this very same
way that which is secreted from a man for the planting of a man is itself to a
certain extent a living being as much gifted with a soul and as capable of
nourishing itself as that from which it comes (4). If this offshoot, in its
diminutiveness, cannot contain at first all the activities and the movements of the
soul, we need not be surprised; for neither in the seed of corn is there
visible all at once the ear. How indeed could anything so large be crowded into so
small a space? But the earth keeps on feeding it with its congenial aliment, and
so the grain becomes the ear, without changing its nature while in the clod,
but only developing it and bringing it to perfection under the stimulus of that
nourishment. As, then, in the case of those growing seeds the advance to
perfection is a graduated one (5), so in man's formation the forces of his soul show
themselves in proportion to the size to which his body has attained. They dawn
first in the foetus, in the shape of the power of nutrition and of development:
after that, they introduce into the organism that has come into the light the
gift of perception: then, when this is reached, they manifest a certain measure
of the reasoning faculty, like the fruit of some matured plant, not growing
all of it at once, but in a continuous progress along with the shooting up of
that plant. Seeing, then, that that which is secreted from one living being to
lay the foundations of another living being cannot itself be dead (for a state of
deadness arises from the privation of life, and it cannot be that privation
should precede the having), we grasp from these considerations the fact that in
the compound which results from the joining of both (soul and body) there is a
simultaneous passage of both into existence; the one does not come first, any
more than the other comes after. But as to the number of souls, our reason must
necessarily contemplate a stopping some day of its increase; so that Nature's
stream may not flow on for ever, pouring forward in her successive births and
never staying that onward movement. The reason for our race having some day to
come to a standstill is as follows, in our opinion: since every intellectual
reality is fixed in a plenitude of its own, it is reasonable to expect that humanity
(6) also will arrive at a goal (for in this respect also humanity is not to be
parted from the intellectual world (7)); so that we are to believe that it
will not be visible for ever only in defect, as it is now: for this continual
addition of after generations indicates that there is something deficient in our
race.
Whenever, then, humanity shall have reached the plenitude that belongs to
it, this on-streaming movement of production will altogether cease; it will
have touched its destined bourn, and a new order of things quite distinct from the
present precession of births and deaths will carry on the life of humanity. If
there is no birth, it follows necessarily that there will be nothing to die.
Composition must precede dissolution (and by composition I mean the coming l
into this world by being born); necessarily, therefore, if this synthesis does not
precede, no dissolution will follow. Therefore, if we are to go upon
probabilities, the life after this is shown to us beforehand as something that is fixed
and imperishable, with no birth and no decay to change it.
The Teacher finished her exposition; and to the many persons sitting by
her bedside the whole discussion seemed now to have arrived at a fitting
conclusion. Nevertheless, fearing that if the Teacher's illness took a fatal turn (such
as did actually happen), we should have no one amongst us to answer the
objections of the unbelievers to the Resurrection (8), I still insisted.
The argument has not yet touched the most vital of all the questions
relating to our Faith. I mean, that the inspired Writings, both in the New and in
the Old Testament, declare most emphatically not only that, when our race has
completed the ordered chain of its existence as the ages lapse through their
complete circle (9), this current streaming onward as generation succeeds generation
will cease altogether, but also that then, when the completed Universe no
longer admits of further increase, all the souls in their entire number will come
back out of their invisible and scattered condition into tangibility and light,
the identical atoms (belonging to each soul) reassembling together in the same
order as before; and this reconstitution of human life is called, in these
Writings which contain God's teaching, the Resurrection, the entire movement of the
atoms receiving the same term as the raising up of that which is actually
prostrate on the ground (1).
But, said she, which of these points has been left unnoticed in what has
been said?
Why, the actual doctrine of the Resurrection, I replied.
And yet, she answered, much in our long and detailed discussion pointed to
that.
Then are you not aware, I insisted, of all the objections, a very swarm of
them, which our antagonists bring against us in connection with that hope of
yours?
And I at once tried to repeat all the devices hit upon by their captious
champions to upset the doctrine of the Resurrection.
She, however, replied, First, I think, we must briefly run over the
scattered proclamations of this doctrine in Holy Scripture; they shall give the
finishing touch to our discourse. Observe, then, that I can hear David, in the midst
of his praises in the Divine Songs, saying at the end of the hymnody of the
hundred and third (104th) Psalm, where he has taken for his theme God's
administration of the world, "Thou shalt take away their breath, and they shall die, and
return to their dust: Thou shalt send forth Thy Spirit, and they shall be
created: and Thou shalt renew the face of the earth." He says that a power of the
Spirit which works in all vivifies the beings into whom it enters, and deprives
those whom He abandons of their life. Seeing, then, that the dying is declared
to occur at the Spirit's departure, and the renewal of these dead ones at His
appearance, and seeing moreover that in the order of the statement the death of
those who are to be thus renewed comes first, we hold that in these words that
mystery of the Resurrection is proclaimed to the Church, and that David in the
spirit of prophecy expressed this very gift which you are asking about. You
will find this same prophet in another place (2) also saying that "the God of the
world, the Lord of everything that is, hath showed Himself to us, that we may
keep the Feast amongst the decorators;" by that mention of "decoration" with
boughs, he means the Feast of Tabernacle-fixing, which, in accordance with Moses'
injunction, has been observed from of old. That lawgiver, I take it, adopting a
prophet's spirit, predicted therein things still to come; for though the
decoration was always going on it was never finished. The truth indeed was
foreshadowed under the type and riddle of those Feasts that were always occurring, but
the true Tabernacle-fixing was not yet come; and on this account "the God and
Lord of the whole world," according to the Prophet's declaration, "hath showed
Himself to us, that the Tabernacle-fixing of this our tenement that has been
dissolved may be kept for human kind"; a material decoration, that is, may be begun
again by means of the concourse of our scattered atoms. For that word
<greek>pukaomos</greek> in its peculiar meaning signifies the Temple-circuit and the
decoration which completes it. Now this passage from the Psalms runs as follows:
"God and Lord hath showed Himself to us; keep the Feast amongst the decorators
even unto the horns of the altar;" and this seems to me to proclaim in
metaphors the fact that one single feast is to be kept by the whole rational creation,
and that in that assembly of the saints tire inferiors are to join the dance
with their superiors. For in the case of the fabric of that Temple which was the
Type it was not allowed to all who were on the outside of its circuit (3) to
come within, but everything that was Gentile and alien was prohibited from
entering; and of those, further, who had entered, all were not equally privileged to
advance towards the centre; but only those who had consecrated themselves by a
holier manner of life, and by certain sprinklings; and, again, not every one
amongst these last might set foot within the interior of the Temple; the priests
alone had the right of entering within the Curtain, and that only for the
service of the sanctuary; while even to the priests the darkened shrine of the
Temple, where stood the beautiful Altar with its jutting horns, was forbidden,
except to one of them, who held the highest office of the priesthood, and who once a
year, on a stated day, and unattended, passed within it, carrying an offering
more than usually sacred and mystical. Such being the differences in connection
with this Temple which you know of, it was clearly (4) a representation and an
imitation of the condition of the spirit-world, the lesson taught by these
material observances being this, that it is not the whole of the rational creation
that can approach the temple of God, or, in other words, the adoration of the
Almighty; but that those who are led astray by false persuasions are outside
the precinct of the Deity; and that from the number of those who by virtue of
this adoration have been preferred to the rest and admitted within it, some by
reason of sprinklings and purifications have still further privileges; and again
amongst these last those who have been consecrated priests have privileges
further still, even to being admitted to the mysteries of the interior. And, that
one may bring into still clearer light the meaning of the allegory, we may
understand the Word here as teaching this, that amongst all the Powers endued with
reason some have been fixed like a Holy Altar in the inmost shrine of the Deity;
and that again of these last some jut forward like horns, for their eminence,
and that around them others are arranged first or second, according to a
prescribed sequence of rank; that the race of man, on the contrary, on account of
indwelling evil was excluded from the Divine precinct, but that purified with
lustral water it re-enters it; and, since all the further barriers by which our sin
has fenced us off from the things within the veil are in the end to be taken
down, whenever the time comes that the tabernacle of our nature is as it were to
be fixed up again in the Resurrection, and all the inveterate corruption of sin
has vanished from the world, then a universal feast will be kept around the
Deity by those who have decorated themselves in the Resurrection; and one and the
same banquet will be spread for all, with no differences cutting off any
rational creature from an equal participation in it; for those who are now
excluded by reason of their sin will at last be admitted within the Holiest places of
God's blessedness, and will bind themselves to the horns of the Altar there,
that is, to the most excellent of the transcendental Powers. The Apostle says the
same thing more plainly when he indicates the final accord of the whole
Universe with the Good: "That" to Him "every knee should bow, of things in heaven,
and things in earth, and things under the earth: And that every tongue should
confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father": instead of the
"horns," speaking of that which is angelic and "in heaven," and by the other
terms signifying ourselves, the creatures whom we think of next to that; one
festival of united voices shall occupy us all; that festival shall be the
confession and the recognition of the Being Who truly Is. One might (she proceeded)
select many other passages of Holy Scripture to establish the doctrine of the
Resurrection. For instance, Ezekiel leaps in the spirit of prophecy over all the
intervening time, with its vast duration; he stands, by his powers of foresight,
in the actual moment of the Resurrection, and, as if he had really gazed on
what is still to come, brings it in his description before our eyes. He saw a
mighty plain (5), unfolded to an endless distance before him, and vast heaps of
bones upon it flung at random, some this way, some that; and then under an impulse
from God these bones began to move and group themselves with their fellows
that they once owned, and adhere to the familiar sockets, and then clothe
themselves with muscle, flesh, and skin (which was the process called "decorating" in
the poetry of the Psalms); a Spirit in fact was giving life and movement to
everything that lay there. But as regards our Apostle's description of the wonders
of the Resurrection, why should one repeat it, seeing that it can easily be
found and read? how, for instance, "with a shout" and the "sound of trumpets" (in
the language of the Word) all dead and prostrate things shall be "changed (6)
in the twinkling of an eye" into immortal beings. The expressions in the Gospels
also I will pass over; for their meaning is quite clear to every one; and our
Lord does not declare in word alone that the bodies of the dead shall be raised
up again; but He shows in action the Resurrection itself, making a beginning
of this work of wonder from things more within our reach and less capable of
being doubted. First, that is, He displays His life-giving power in the case of
the deadly forms of disease, and chases those maladies by one word of command;
then He raises a little girl just dead; then He makes a young man, who is
already being carried out, sit up on his bier, and delivers him to his mother; after
that He calls forth from his tomb the four-days-dead and already decomposed
Lazarus, vivifying the prostrate body with His commanding voice; then after three
days He raises from the dead His own human body, pierced though it was with the
nails and spear, and brings the print of those nails and the spear-wound to
witness to the Resurrection. But I think that a detailed mention of these things
is not necessary; for no doubt about them lingers in the minds of those who
have accepted the written accounts of them.
But that, said I, was not the point in question. Most of your hearers will
assent to the fact that there will some day be a Resurrection, and that man
will be brought before the incorruptible tribunal (7); on account both of the
Scripture proofs, and also of our previous examination of the question. But still
the question remains (8): Is the state which we are to expect to be like the
present state of the body? Because if so, then, as I was saying (9), men had
better avoid hoping for any Resurrection at all. For if our bodies are to be
restored to life again in the same sort of condition as they are in when they cease
to breathe, then all that man can look forward to in the Resurrection is an
unending calamity. For what spectacle is more piteous than when in extreme old age
our bodies shrivel up (1) and change into something repulsive and hideous,
with the flesh all wasted in the length of years, the skin dried up about the
bones till it is all in wrinkles, the muscles in a spasmodic state from being no
longer enriched with their natural moisture, and the whole body consequently
shrunk, the hands on either side powerless to perform their natural work, shaken
with an involuntary trembling? What a sight again are the bodies of persons in a
long consumption! They differ from bare bones only in giving the appearance of
being covered with a worn-out veil of skin. What a sight too are those of
persons swollen with the disease of dropsy! What words could describe the unsightly
disfigurement of sufferers from leprosy (2)? Gradually over all their limbs
and organs of sensation rottenness spreads and devours them. What words could
describe that of persons who have been mutilated in earthquake, battle, or by any
other visitation, and live on in such a plight for a long time before their
natural deaths? Or of those who from an injury have grown up from infancy with
their limbs awry! What can one say of them? What is one to think about the bodies
of newborn infants who have been either exposed, or strangled, or died a
natural death, if they are to be brought to life again just such as they were? Are
they to continue in that infantine state? What condition could be more miserable
than that? Or are they to come to the flower of their age? Well, but what sort
of milk has Nature got to suckle them again with? It comes then to this: that,
if our bodies are to live again in every respect the same as before, this thing
that we are expecting is simply a calamity; whereas if they are not the same,
the person raised up will be another than he who died. If, for instance, a
little boy was buried, but a grown man rises again, or reversely, how can we say
that the dead in his very self is raised up, when he has had some one substituted
for him by virtue of this difference in age? Instead of the child, one sees a
grown-up man. Instead of the old man, one sees a person in his prime. In fact,
instead of the one person another entirely. The cripple is changed into the
able-bodied man; the consumptive sufferer into a man whose flesh is firm; and so
on of all possible cases, not to enumerate them for fear of being prolix. If,
then, the body will not come to life again just such in its attributes as it was
when it mingled with the earth, that dead body will not rise again; but on the
contrary the earth will be formed into another man. How, then, will the
Resurrection affect myself, when instead of me some one else will come to life? Some
one else, I say; for how could I recognize myself when, instead of what was once
myself, I see some one not myself? It cannot really be I, unless it is in
every respect the same as myself. Suppose, for instance, in this life I had in my
memory the traits of some one; say he was bald, had prominent lips, a somewhat
flat nose, a fair complexion, grey eyes, white hair, wrinkled skin; and then
went to look for such an one, and met a young man with a fine head of hair, an
aquiline nose, a dark complexion, and in all other respects quite different in his
type of countenance; am I likely in seeing the latter to think of the former?
But why dwell longer on these the less forcible objections to the Resurrection,
and neglect the strongest one of all? For who has not heard that human life is
like a stream, moving from birth to death at a certain rate of progress, and
then only ceasing from that progressive movement when it ceases also to exist?
This movement indeed is not one of spacial change; our bulk never exceeds
itself; but it makes this advance by means of internal alteration; and as long as
this alteration is that which its name implies, it never remains at the same stage
(from moment to moment); for how can that which is being altered be kept in
any sameness? The fire on the wick, as far as appearance goes, certainly seems
always the same, the continuity of its movement giving it the look of being an
uninterrupted and self-centred whole; but in reality it is always passing itself
along and never remains the same; the moisture which is extracted by the heat
is burnt up and changed into smoke the moment it has burst into flame and this
alterative force effects the movement of the flame, working by itself the change
of the subject-matter into smoke; just, then, as it is impossible for one who
has touched that flame twice on the same place, to touch twice the very same
flame (3) (for the speed of the alteration is too quick; it does not wait for
that second touch, however rapidly it may be effected; the flame is always fresh
and new; it is always being produced, always transmitting itself, never
remaining at one and the same place), a thing of the same kind is found to be the case
with the constitution of our body. There is influx and afflux going on in it in
an alterative progress until the moment that it ceases to live; as long as it
is living it has no stay; for it is either being replenished, or it is
discharging in vapour, or it is being kept in motion by both of these processes
combined. If, then, a particular man is not the same even as he was yesterday (4),
but is made different by this transmutation, when so be that the Resurrection
shall restore our body to life again, that single man will become a crowd of human
beings, so that with his rising again there will be found the babe, the child,
the boy, the youth, the man, the father, the old man, and all the intermediate
persons that he once was. But further (5); chastity and profligacy are both
carried on in the flesh; those also who endure the most painful tortures for
their religion, and those on the other hand who shrink from such, both one class
and the other reveal their character in relation to fleshly sensations; how,
then, can justice be done at the Judgment (6)? Or take the case of one and the same
man first sinning and then cleansing himself by repentance, and then, it might
so happen, relapsing into his sin; in such a case both the defiled and the
undefiled body alike undergoes a change, as his nature changes, and neither of
them continue to the end the same; which body, then, is the profligate to be
tortured in? In that which is stiffened with old age and is near to death? But this
is not the same as that which did the sin. In that, then, which defiled itself
by giving way to passion? But where is the old man, in that case? This last, in
fact, will not rise again, and the Resurrection will not do a complete work;
or else he will rise, while the criminal will escape. Let me say something else
also from amongst the objections made by unbelievers to this doctrine. No
part, they urge, of the body is made by nature without a function. Some parts, for
instance, are the efficient causes within us of our being alive; without them
our life in the flesh could not possibly be carried on; such are the heart,
liver, brain, lungs, stomach, and the other vitals; others are assigned to the
activities of sensation; others to those of handing and walking (7); others are
adapted for the transmission of a posterity. Now if the life to come is to be in
exactly the same circumstances as this, the supposed change in us is reduced to
nothing; but if the report is true, as indeed it is, which represents
marriage as forming no part of the economy of that after-life, and eating and drinking
as not then preserving its continuance, what use will there be for the members
of our body, when we are no longer to expect in that existence any of the
activities for which our members now exist? If, for the sake of marriage, there are
now certain organs adapted for marriage, then, whenever the latter ceases to
be, we shall not need those organs: the same may be said of the hands for
working with, the feet for running with, the mouth for taking food with, the teeth
for grinding it with, the organs of the stomach for digesting, the evacuating
ducts for getting rid of that which has become superfluous. When therefore, all
those operations will be no more how or wherefore will their instruments exist?
So that necessarily, if the things that are not going to contribute in any way
to that other life are not to surround the body, none of the parts which at
present constitute the body would (8) exist either. That life (9), then, will be
carried on by other instruments; and no one could call such a state of things a
Resurrection, where the particular members are no longer present in the body,
owing to their being useless to that life. But if on the other hand our
Resurrection will be represented in every one of these; then the Author of the
Resurrection will fashion things in us of no use and advantage to that life. And yet we
must believe, not only that there is a Resurrection, but also that it will not
be an absurdity. We must, therefore, listen attentively to the explanation of
this, so that, for every part of this truth we may have its probability saved
to the last (10).
When I had finished, the Teacher thus replied, You have attacked the
doctrines connected with the Resurrection with some spirit, in the way of rhetoric
as it is called; you have coursed round and round the truth with plausibly
subversive arguments; so much so, that those who have not very carefully considered
this mysterious truth might possibly be affected in their view of it by the
likelihood of those arguments, and might think that the difficulty started against
what has been advanced was not altogether beside the point. But, she
proceeded, the truth does not lie in these arguments, even though we may find it
impossible to give a rhetorical answer to them, couched in equally strong language.
The true explanation of all these questions is still stored up in the hidden
treasure-rooms of Wisdom, and will not come to the light until that moment when we
shall be taught the mystery of the Resurrection by the reality of it; and then
there will be no more need of phrases to explain the things which we now hope
for. Just as many questions might be started for debate amongst people sitting
up at night as to the kind of thing that sunshine is, and then the simple
appearing of it in all its beauty would render any verbal description superfluous, so
every calculation that tries to arrive conjecturally at the future state will
be reduced to nothingness by the object of our hopes, when it comes upon us.
But since it is our duty not to leave the arguments brought against us in any
way unexamined, we will expound the truth as to these points as follows. First
let us get a clear notion as to the scope of this doctrine; in other words, what
is the end that Holy Scripture has in view in promulgating it and creating the
belief in it. Well, to sketch the outline of so vast a truth and to embrace it
in a definition, we will say that the Resurrection is "the reconstitution of
our nature in its original form (1)." But in that form of life, of which God
Himself was the Creator, it is reasonable to believe that there was neither age nor
infancy nor any of the sufferings arising from our present various
infirmities, nor any kind of bodily affliction whatever. It is reasonable, I say, to
believe that God was the Creator of none of these things, but that man was a thing
divine before his humanity got within reach of the assault of evil; that then,
however, with the inroad of evil, all these afflictions also broke in upon him.
Accordingly a life that is free from evil is under no necessity whatever of
being passed amidst the things that result from evil. It follows that when a man
travels through ice he must get his body chilled; or when he walks in a very hot
sun that he must get his skin darkened; but if he has kept clear of the one or
the other, he escapes these results entirely, both the darkening and the
chilling; no one, in fact, when a particular cause was removed, would be justified
in looking for the effect of that particular cause. Just so our nature, becoming
passional, had to encounter all the necessary results of a life of passion:
but when it shall have started back to that state of passionless blessedness, it
will no longer encounter the inevitable results of evil tendencies. Seeing,
then, that all the infusions of the life of the brute into our nature were not in
us before our humanity descended through the touch of evil into passions, most
certainly, when we abandon those passions, we shall abandon all their visible
results. No one, therefore, will be justified in seeking in that other life for
the consequences in us of any passion. Just as if a man, who, clad in a ragged
tunic, has divested himself of the garb, feels no more its disgrace upon him,
so we too, when we have cast off that dead unsightly tunic made from the skins
of brutes and put upon us (for I take the "coats of skins" to mean that
conformation belonging to a brute nature with which we were clothed when we became
familiar with passionate indulgence), shall, along with the casting off of that
tunic, fling from us all the belongings that were round us of that skin of a
brute; and such accretions are sexual intercourse, conception, parturition,
impurities, suckling, feeding, evacuation, gradual growth to full size, prime of life,
old age, disease, and death. If that skin is no longer round us, how can its
resulting consequences be left behind within us? It is folly, then, when we are
to expect a different state of things in the life to come, to object to the
doctrine of the Resurrection on the ground of something that has nothing to do with
it. I mean, what has thinness or corpulence, a state of consumption or of
plethora, or any other condition supervening in a nature that is ever in a flux, to
do with the other life, stranger as it is to any fleeting and transitory
passing such as that? One thing, and one thing only, is required for the operation
of the Resurrection; viz. that a man should have lived, by being born; or, to
use rather the Gospel words, that "a man should be born (2) into the world"; the
length or briefness of the life, the manner, this or that, of the death, is an
irrelevant subject of inquiry in connection with that operation. Whatever
instance we take, howsoever we suppose this to have been, it is all the same; from
these differences in life there arises no difficulty, any more than any
facility, with regard to the Resurrection. He who has once begun to live must
necessarily go on having once lived (3), after his intervening dissolution in death has
been repaired in the Resurrection. As to the how and the when of his
dissolution, what do they matter to the Resurrection? Consideration of such points
belongs to another line of inquiry altogether. For instance, a man may have lived in
bodily comfort, or in affliction, virtuously or viciously, renowned or
disgraced; he may have passed his days miserably, or happily. These and such-like
results must be obtained from the length of his life and the manner of his living;
and to be able to pass a judgment on the things done in his life, it will be
necessary for the judge to scrutinize his indulgences, as the case may be, or his
losses, or his disease, or his old age, or his prime, or his youth, or his
wealth, or his poverty: how well or ill a man, placed in either of these, concluded
his destined career; whether he was the recipient of many blessings, or of
many ills in a length of life; or tasted neither of them at all, but ceased to
live before his mental powers were formed. But whenever the time come that God
shall have brought our nature back to the primal state of man, it will be useless
to talk of such things then, and to imagine that objections based upon such
things can prove God's power to be impeded in arriving at His end. His end is one,
and one only; it is this: when the complete whole of our race shall have been
perfected from the first man to the last, -- some having at once in this life
been cleansed from evil, others having afterwards in the necessary periods
been healed by the Fire, others having in their life here been unconscious equally
of good and of evil, -- to offer to every one of us participation in the
blessings which are in Him, which, the Scripture tells us, "eye hath not seen, nor
ear heard," nor thought ever reached. But this is nothing else, as I at least
understand it, but to be in God Himself; for the Good which is above hearing
and eye and heart must be that Good which transcends the universe. But the
difference between the virtuous and the vicious life led at the present time (4) will
be illustrated in this way; viz. in the quicker or more tardy participation of
each in that promised blessedness. According to the amount of the ingrained
wickedness of each will be computed the duration of his cure. This cure consists
in the cleansing of his soul, and that cannot be achieved without an
excruciating condition, as has been expounded in our previous discussion. But any one
would more fully comprehend the futility and irrelevancy of all these objections
by trying to fathom the depths of our Apostle's wisdom. When explaining this
mystery to the Corinthians, who, perhaps, themselves were bringing forward the
same objections to it as its impugners to-day bring forward to overthrow our
faith, he proceeds on his own authority to chide the audacity of their ignorance,
and speaks thus: "Thou wilt say, then, to me, How are the dead raised up, and
with what body do they come? Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened,
except it die; And that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall
be, but bare grain, it may chance of wheat or of some other grain; But God
giveth it a body as it hath pleased Him." In that passage, as it seems to me, he
gags the mouths of men who display their ignorance of the fitting proportions in
Nature, and who measure the Divine power by their own strength, and think that
only so much is possible to God as the human understanding can take in, but
that what is beyond it surpasses also the Divine ability. For the man who had
asked the Apostle, "how are the dead raised up?" evidently implies that it is
impossible when once the body's atoms have been scattered that they should again
come in concourse together; and this being impossible, and no other possible form
of body, besides that arising from such a concourse, being left, he, after the
fashion of clever controversialists, concludes the truth of what he wants to
prove, by a species of syllogism, thus: If a body is a concourse of atoms, and a
second assemblage of these is impossible, what sort of body will those get who
rise again? This conclusion, involved seemingly in this artful contrivance of
premisses, the Apostle calls "folly," as coming from men who riled to perceive
in other parts of the creation the masterliness of the Divine power. For,
omitting the sublimer miracles of God's hand, by which it would have been easy to
place his hearer in a dilemma (for instance he might have asked "how or whence
comes a heavenly body, that of the sun for example, or that of the moon, or that
which is seen in the constellations; whence the firmament, the air, water, the
earth?"), he, on the contrary, convicts the objectors of inconsiderateness by
means of objects which grow alongside of us and are very familiar to all. "Does
not even husbandry teach thee," he asks, "that the man who in calculating the
transcendent powers of the Deity limits them by his own is a fool?" Whence do
seeds get the bodies that spring up from them? What precedes this springing up? Is
it not a death that precedes (5)? At least, if the dissolution of a compacted
whole is a death; for indeed it cannot be supposed that the seed would spring
up into a shoot unless it had been dissolved in the soil, and so become spongy
and porous to such an extent as to mingle its own qualities with the adjacent
moisture of the soil, and thus become transformed into a root and shoot; not
stopping even there, but changing again into the stalk with its intervening
knee-joints that gird it up like so many clasps, to enable it to carry with figure
erect the ear with its load of corn. Where, then, were all these things belonging
to the grain before its dissolution in the soil? And yet this result sprang
from that grain; if that grain had not existed first, the ear would not have
arisen. Just, then, as the "body" of the ear comes to light out of the seed, God's
artistic touch of power producing it all out of that single thing, and just as
it is neither entirely the same thing as that seed nor something altogether
different, so (she insisted) by these miracles performed on seeds you may now
interpret the mystery of the Resurrection. The Divine power, in the superabundance
of Omnipotence, does not only restore you that body once dissolved, but makes
great and splendid additions to it, whereby the human being is furnished in a
manner still more magnificent. "It is sown," he says, "in corruption; it is raised
in incorruption: it is sown in weakness; it is raised in power: it is sown in
dishonour; it is raised in glory: it is sown a natural body; it is raised a
spiritual body." The grain of wheat, after its dissolution in the soil, leaves
behind the slightness of its bulk and the peculiar quality of its shape, and yet
it has not left and lost itself, but, still self-centred, grows into the ear,
though in many points it has made an advance upon itself, viz. in size, in
splendour, in complexity, in form. In the same fashion the human being deposits in
death all those peculiar surroundings which it has acquired from passionate
propensities; dishonour, I mean, and corruption and weakness and characteristics of
age; and yet the human being does not lose itself. It changes into an ear of
corn as it were; into incorruption, that is, and glory and honour and power and
absolute perfection; into a condition in which its life is no longer carried on
in the ways peculiar to mere nature, but has passed into a spiritual and
passionless existence. For it is the peculiarity of the natural body to be always
moving on a stream, to be always altering from its state for the moment and
changing into something else; but none of these processes, which we observe not in
man only but also in plants and brutes will be found remaining in the life that
shall be then. Further, it seems to me that the words of the Apostle in every
respect harmonize with our own conception of what the Resurrection is. They
indicate the very same thing that we have embodied in our own definition of it,
wherein we said that the Resurrection is no other thing than "the re-constitution
of our nature in its original form." For, whereas we learn from Scripture in the
account of the first Creation (6), that first the earth brought forth "the
green herb" (as the narrative says), and that then from this plant seed was
yielded, from which, when it was shed on the ground, the same form of the original
plant again sprang up, the Apostle, it is to be observed, declares that this very
same thing happens in the Resurrection also; and so we learn from him the
fact, not only (7) that our humanity will be then changed into something nobler,
but also that what we have therein to expect is nothing else than that which was
at the beginning. In the beginning, we see, it was not an ear rising from a
grain, but a grain coming from an ear, and, after that, the ear grows round the
grain: and so the order indicated in this similitude (8) clearly shows that all
that blessed state, which arises for us by means of the Resurrection is only a
return to our pristine state of grace. We too, in fact, were once in a fashion a
full ear (9); but the burning heat of sin withered us up, and then on our
dissolution by death the earth received us: but in the spring of the Resurrection
she will reproduce this naked grain (1) of our body in the form of an ear, tall,
well-proportioned, and erect, reaching to the heights of heaven, and, for
blade and beard, resplendent in incorruption, and with all the other godlike marks.
For "this corruptible must put on incorruption"; and this incorruption and
glory and honour and power are those distinct and acknowledged marks of Deity
which once belonged to him who was created in God's image, and which we hope for
hereafter. The first man Adam, that is, was the first ear; but with the arrival
of evil human nature was diminished into a mere multitude (2); and, as happens
to the grain (3) on the ear, each individual man was denuded of the beauty of
that primal ear, and mouldered in the soil: but in the Resurrection we are born
again in our original splendour; only instead of that single primitive ear we
become the countless myriads of ears in the cornfields. The virtuous life as
contrasted with that of vice is distinguished thus: those who while living have by
virtuous conduct exercised husbandry on themselves are at once revealed in all
the qualities of a perfect ear, while those whose bare grain (that is the
forces of their natural soul) has become through evil habits degenerate, as it were,
and hardened by the weather (as the so-called "hornstruck" seeds (4),
according to the experts in such things, grow up), will, though they live again in the
Resurrection, experience very great severity from their Judge, because they do
not possess the strength to shoot up into the full proportions of an ear, and
thereby become that which we were before our earthly falls. The remedy offered
by the Overseer of the produce is to collect together the tares and the thorns,
which have grown up with the good seed, and into whose bastard life all the
secret forces that once nourished its root have passed, so that it not only has
had to remain without its nutriment, but has been choked and so rendered
unproductive by this unnatural growth. When from the nutritive part within them
everything that is the reverse or the counterfeit of it has been picked out, and has
been committed to the fire that consumes everything unnatural, and so has
disappeared, then in this class also their humanity will thrive and will ripen into
fruit-bearing, owing to such husbandry, and some day after long courses of ages
will get back again that universal form which God stamped upon us at the
beginning. Blessed are they, indeed, in whom the full beauty of those ears shall be
developed directly they are born in the Resurrection. Yet we say this without
implying that any merely bodily distinctions will be manifest between those who
have lived virtuously and those who have lived viciously in this life, as if we
ought to think that one will be imperfect as regards his material frame, while
another will win perfection as regards it. The prisoner and the free, here in
this present world, are just alike as regards the constitutions of their two
bodies; though as regards enjoyment and suffering the gulf is wide between them.
In this way, I take it, should we reckon the difference between the good and the
bad in that intervening time (6). For the perfection of bodies that rise from
that sowing of death is, as the Apostle tells us, to consist in incorruption
and glory and honour and power; but any diminution in such excellences does not
denote a corresponding bodily mutilation of him who has risen again, but a
withdrawal and estrangement from each one of those things which are conceived of as
belonging to the good. Seeing, then, that one or the other of these two
diametrically opposed ideas, I mean good and evil, must any way attach to us, it is
clear that to say a man is not included in the good is a necessary demonstration
that he is included in the evil. But then, in connection with evil, we find no
honour, no glory, no incorruption, no power; and so we are forced to dismiss
all doubt that a man who has nothing to do with these last-mentioned things must
be connected with their opposites, viz. with weakness, with dishonour, with
corruption, with everything of that nature, such as we spoke of in the previous
parts of the discussion, when we said how many were the passions, sprung from
evil, which are so hard for the soul to get rid of, when they have infused
themselves into the very substance of its entire nature and become one with it. When
such, then, have been purged from it and utterly removed by the healing
processes worked out by the Fire, then every one of the things which make up our
conception of the good will come to take their place; incorruption, that is, and
life, and honour, and grace, and glory, and everything else that we conjecture is
to be seen in God, and in His Image, man as he was made.